BOOKS.
M. JULES SIMON ON M. TRIERS.* M. JULES SIMON, whose book we have noticed before, offers us a spirited account of a most exciting period, of history, verifies numberless reported episodes, and is profuse in _pieces justiftcatives ; but nevertheless, he disappoints us. His book is in parts lengthy and in parts dull, the reason being that with all his ability—and he is evidently an able, sincere man, with a talent for overcoming opposition in emergencies— he lacks the faculty of the biographer. We hear in his book constantly of M. Thiers, of what he did and what he said, and quite enough of M. Jules Simon; but we gain no further notion of what M. Thiers really was than we had before, and of M. Jules Simon, as a human being, we learn nothing what- ever. The avoidance of self-assertion is not quite com- plete, but of self-betrayal or self-portraiture the book is abso- lutely free, and we close it without any definite addition to our knowledge of its author's personality. It possesses, there- fore, only the interest of a spirited and accurate narrative of the events which followed the fall of Paris in 1871, events fairly well understood, and does not add decidedly to our comprehension of them, or of the personages who, because they acted in them, fill so large a space in English imagination. We do not now want to know what the Commune did, or M. Thiers, or M. Gambetta, or the ruling parties, but why they did it; and of this M. Jules Simon, though he verifies, confirms, or denies many his- torical statements, tells us next to nothing at all. For example, he relates rather lengthily the history of the Commune, describes its personages, who according to him were, with the exception of Cluseret, and perhaps Roussel, rather feeble, and explains the method of its defeat, the defeat, in his account, of a mob by regular troops'; but he throws no light whatever on the only point now of interest, the ideas which gave this feeble group such a sway over Paris, which inspired such passionate heroism, which alarmed so deeply all governing men, and which had such an attraction for all Frenchmen, that it was doubtful for a few hours which way the Army would go. What was the secret of attraction in the Commune? What induced its leaders to spare the Bank of France, quite the most wonderful single fact in the in- surrection? Why did its chiefs, like Raoul Rigault, when cap- tured, court death, utterly disdaining subterfuge, flight, and even defence ? Raoul Rigault is to M. Jules Simon merely a dangerous scoundrel,—why, when caught, did he say voluntarily, "I am Raoul Rigault?" with a pride that invited the death which was instantly, and for all we know justly, dealt out to him. Upon none of these points does M. Jules Simon give us any light, and as these are the points of interest, his quotations of decrees, and accounts of the Communistic hierarchy, and sketches of the squabbles among the leaders grow not a little tiresome. No question is more curious in all these events than this,—Had M. Thiers any limit in his mind beyond which he would not have gone in his negotiations with Prince Bismarck ? But M. Simon does not enable us to produce any answer. Or if there is anything more curious still, it is why M. Gambetta, in full control of Bordeaux, of the re- maining Army, of the Prefects throughout unoccupied France, with power, indeed—as is clear from this narrative—to declare himself Dictator, and continue the war, suddenly flung up his hand. Was it weakness, or patriotism, or some influence of which the world is still wholly unaware ? For the public, M. Simon only deepens the mystery. Englishmen, at all events, were hardly aware that when M. Gambetta yielded at Bordeaux, in February, 1871,—the struggle being round the question of the
• The Govern mend of M. Thiers, from February 815, 1871, to illy 24th, 1873. From the French of M. Jules Simon. In 2 vols. London : Sampson Low and Co. 1879.
right of all citizens to vote, M. Gambetta having proscribed the Bonapartists,—the unoccupied part of France was ready to follow him,—and, indeed, he had been offered the Dictator- ship. The Prefects were devoted to him, the Mayors, the people, and part at least of the Army; but on February 6th, in a circular to the Prefects, full of manly self. restraint, he resigned, without praise, blame, or explanation from M. Simon, who, nevertheless, knew beforehand that he would resign. Nor does he throw much light on the composi- tion of the first Assembly. He accounts for the sudden reappearance of the Legitimists as a power in politics by a brief allusion to the influence of the clergy, which is, we imagine, inaccurate; and for their quiescence, by a reference to their natural indisposition to strong measures. He explains, however, very well the position of the Centre, and alleges that M. Thiers intended from the first a Conservative Republic :—
" Between the obstinate Orleanists and the Orleanists 'turned Bonapartists, there existed in the Right Centre a group consisting of one hundred clear-headed men, who were equally incapable of abandon- ing the principles upon which all society rests, and of renouncing liberty. They would have preferred Constitutional Monarchy to any other form of government ; if they had found it established, or if they could have restored it by a vote without violent measures. But they perceived at once that neither the Legitimists nor the Bonaptutists would accede to the constitutional form ; it would not have a majority either in Parliament nor among the people, while it was in itself, and from the temperament of its advocates, happily unable to resort to 'force. They were well aware that the reappearance of the Legitimist party upon the political stage was a brief incident, which would have no result; and the only possible monarchy was that which they would not accept at any price, that which openly and unscrupulously appealed to material interests and to force. The Republic inspired them with distrust, which in some cases, at that time, certainly reached the height of aversion. But, being persuaded that they would have to choose between the Republic and the Empire, and that the Empire would never reconcile itself with the principles of right, with justice, or with liberty, they did not despair of being able to construct a liberal and conservative Republic. In a word, they re- jected Legitimacy as chimerical, and dictatorship, whether Republican or Ctesarian, as odious ; they preferred a liberal Monarchy to a moderate Republic, but they did not hold that it would be right to bring about a revolution simply that they might make the presidency of the Republic hereditary."
M. Jules Simon brings out only one portion of M. Thiere character with great clearness, and that is his immovable per- sistency. He paints him as a determined man, whose mind shifted only on the surface, and whose all-devouring activity was made possible to him and beneficial to France by his power of concentrating his whole strength, if it were only for a few minutes, on the immediate business before him, and by his perennial cheerfulness :—
"He managed to do everything, thanks to his strength of will and the extreme lucidity of his mind. He seemed to give himself up entirely to the matter in hand and the person present. Many people who do not do the twentieth part of his work have a busy and pre- occupied air which he never had. He was not only master of his in- tellect, but of his temper. Not that he restrained himself when he was irritated, or that he gave himself much trouble about it. If he was hurt, or even annoyed, he let it be seen without hesitation. But he was not of a melancholic temperament. He was cheer- ful in the midst of the greatest crisis. He caught a happy or jesting phrase on the wing. He was not even afraid of rather a doubtful joke. His was a serious and persistent base, with a surface which was always in motion. He would not have been able to get through his crushing work without this natural cheerfulness, which came to him without effort, and restored him to peace and strength."
He had also a remarkable power of weighing men, though on one occasion his prevision failed. He was aware that the "three Monarchies," irritated by the declaration in his Message of 1872 that henceforth only the Republic was possible, had resolved to upset him, but he believed they would be unable to find a candidate. For reasons which M. Simon gives, only Marshal MacMahon could by possibility unite the suffrages of the majority of the Monarchical parties :—
"The three monarchies had an equal interest in overthrowing M. Thiers, because the fact of his being in power indefinitely adjourned their return, and every day increased the chances of the stability and definite establishment of the Republic ; but the difficulty was to find a successor to him who, while he would be little in favour of the Re- public, would not give the advantage to the Legitimists, the Bona-
partists, or the Orleanists Merit was not enough,—there was a more difficult condition to be satisfied ; we must have a General who was not too obscure, and yet who did not take too decided a line in politics. Such a man, in such times as ours, it was almost
impossible to find. Among our Generals of 1873, some had takenpart in the Imperial coup d'etat, which of course excluded them ; others had been ministers, or aides-de-camp, or favourites of the Emperor, and owed their advancement to their personal devotion to him ; others, while accepting commands under the Republic, loudly proclaimed their attachment to the Orleans family or to the Legiti. mate royalty. The same General might, according to the occasion, be a passionate Legitimist or Orleanist ; he might fight against the Republic under any flag, even that with the stain of Sedan upon it ; but no emergency of his position, no effort of his will, could make a neutral of him, and it was, above all, a neutral of whom we stood in need. This valuable quality of neutrality was specially wanting in General Changarnier, even more than in all the others ; and besides, be had all the defects of youth, although he had completed his eightieth year just one month previously. Of the Republican Generals, many of whom—Chanzy, Jaureguiberry, Pothnau, Frebault, Faidherbe—had a great military reputation, there could be no ques- tion. The objections against all the Generals, one alone excepted, were so decided and so evident, that the choice was not far to seek. The three coalesced monarchies then agreed in nominating Marshal MacMahon, who was indicated by his rank, and by the position of Commander-in-Chief which M. Thiers had given him. It might be said that he was not enrolled in any party. His family traditions were Legitimist, but his career had been under the Emperor, who also had specially distinguished him. An occasion was called to mind on which he had proved that he was no courtier, and that he knew how to vote and speak independently. It is a very certain and a very curious fact, that if any scruple had prevented him from yielding to the wishes of the Right, it would have had nobody to take the place."
M. Thiers believed, from some expressions of Marshal MacMahon, that he was devoted to himself, and would never take his place, and the 24th May was therefore a surprise to him. That celebrated day was, in M. Simon's opinion, a renewal of the Pact of Bor- deaux, with this difference,—that there was a secret understand- ing on all hands that it should end in the destruction of the Republic, an understanding baffled by the jealousies of the parties, the reluctance of the Comte de Chambord to take the throne, and the feeling of the country. Perhaps M. Thiers had, in his secret heart, a faint contempt for Generals who, being French, had yet been defeated. At least, his savage mot to a General who worried him with complaints of neglect suggests that inner thought :—" M. Thiers had made answer one day to an ambitious and restless General, who com- plained of & certain choice made by Government for a very im-
portant pot, 'No one of you was pointed out to me by victory." M. Simon's book is a valuable addition to the materials for future history, but it is not history, still less biography.
We have only to add that the translation, though a little unequal, is admirably clear and precise; and that the two large volumes are absolutely devoid of index, contents, and marginal dates, indeed of any help whatever to the reader who is reading for instruction.
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