THE WAR SURVEYED : THE FINNISH CAMPAIGN
By STRATEGICUS
NOW that the fighting in Finland has ended, to all appear- ances finally, it is of some importance to recognise the tactics which have secured Russia her success. It is, of course, untrue that the Finnish resistance has been overcome. While we know neither the extent nor the arma- ment of the Mannerheim Line in detail, it is at least clear that its nature is nearer to that of the West Wall than the Maginot Line. It is, that is to say, an elastic, mobile defence in depth, and, as such, given the labour, the material and the troops, it could be extended indefinitely. The doubt is about each of these three factors, since new positions would make heavy calls on all. The tendency to write down Finnish heroism and skill by the suggestion that the Russians did not attack seriously at first does not survive serious criticism, :hough it is certainly true that Stalin had no idea how hard and costly the Finnish campaign would be. It is the penalty of being a dictator that the brutal truth tends to be con- cealed and only the welcome falsehood proffered. But it is none the less true that it was a highly mechanised modern army that attacked Finland. It creaked in all its joints ; it treated its human material crudely and its staff work was bad, just as in the Tsarist armies. In the last respect and in its leading, it seems to have been definitely worse. But its supply of tanks was lavish ; and what it lacked of other material seems to have been due to over-reliance on this arm.
What then caused the Finns on several occasions to announce their readiness for peace and, in the present instance, to discuss terms once more in Moscow? It was their success and not their failure. They have achieved the almost incredible. For three and a half months they have held up, and inflicted numerous losses on, an army whose mobilised strength is over thirty times as large as their own. Everyone knows that such success could not continue indefinitely. If they were to be left to fight alone, if they were not to receive substantial and continuous help, they were • bound to fall ultimately. It is wise to lead from strength in peace discussions. If the Finns had been inclined to ignore the logic of the situation, unpleasant facts, a month ago, opened up vistas that no one with vision could ignore. What were the facts and what is their interest for the Allies?
There have been two phases in the Russo-Finnish cam- paign. The first two months saw the phase of trial and error. The original attack was delivered by an army which superficially resembled the Expeditionary Force which we sent to France. It has already been pointed out that this force was designed for the offensive ; but the novelty of the Russian operations was that the tank divisions and the motorised units were launched against a modern defensive position without artillery preparation. Such touching faith in tanks courted the fate it met. Tanks are invaluable in the conditions for which they were devised. They are effective in open warfare. But they cannot challenge pill- boxes. Ordinary anti-tank obstacles check their advance ; and, checked, they fall an easy prey to anti-tank guns, to artillery and even to grenades and the petrol bottle. They are not heavily armed or armoured. They are a specialised device and only of real value in appropriate conditions. It was, therefore, not altogether unexpected that the number of tanks destroyed reached a staggering figure.
For an entire month the Russian commanders banged their heads against the wall. They had an almost unlimited supply of tanks, and men were cheaper still. When, at the end of December, they began to prepare the advance with artillery, they used it as they had used the tank, as if it were effective of itself. There was no sign that the gunners knew anything of the military use of artillery. It was seven weeks from the beginning of the campaign before the attack showed any sign of scientific control. By this time Stalin had discovered that Finland was merely bringing him casualties ; and there were changes in the command. On January Mt Taipale, where the line leaves Lake Ladoga, was assaulted by tanks, assisted by bombing-planes and fighters. The ground had been well prepared by artillery bombardment and skilful support was given during the battle. The attack was repulsed ; but it is significant that the Finnish communiqué did not make the usual claim to have inflicted casualties or taken prisoners. Apparently the Russians had found how to launch and control an action to their satisfaction ; and the second phase began.
On February 1st the Russian commander launched another attack on the same plan. There was a prolonged and skilful artillery bombardment, and then a division, covered by a smoke-screen, was flung against Summa. Tanks, armoured sledges and 13o aeroplanes, double the number used ten days before, assisted. The centre of the line had been carefully chosen, and the attack was repeated several times during the next few days. The attacks were beaten off, with a loss of several tanks. But though they could hardly have been expected to produce any consider- able result, as they were of a purely local nature, they gave the Russian staff confidence to plan more ambitiously. On February t t th the whole of the Mannerheim Line between Taipale and the Gulf of Finland was the scene of the most violent and skilful assault yet delivered on that sector. The artillery preparation was accurate, the liaison between tanks, infantry and bombing planes was effectively maintained, and the attack was pushed home. At Summa, several divisions were used ; and the Russians secured a lodgement in the line.
For the first time the Finnish communiqués made a point of their counter-attacks. They were delivered without delay and many positions were recaptured. But, now that the Russians had discovered the correct tactics and secured a success, they pressed the attack without cessation. On February i3th it was stated that, on one day, the Russians had used 300,000 shells, and that on the Summa sector alone they had lost between 30,000 and 40,000 killed. It is clear that those engagements were the fiercest, as well as the most skilfully directed, that Finland had yet seen ; and on February i5th the Finns fell back to their second position. Since then their right flank has been withdrawn still further, but apparently in complete order, since the Russians claimed no significant capture of prisoners.
The progress of the campaign was followed with the greatest attention in the Allied countries as well as in Ger- many for the light it throws on the strength of the West Wall and the Maginot Line. As to the latter, the immense superiority in artillery over the Finnish line makes com- parison difficult. The Finns have suffered from an in- sufficient supply from the beginning ; and, in the actions of February r rth and the next few days, the Russian bombard- ments were probably as heavy as any that might be ex- pected on the Western front. The Finnish anti-aircraft defence and air force were very much inferior to that of the Russians. But these facts do not affect the vulnerability of the tank, which has been thoroughly demonstrated, though it is not certain if the newest and heaviest tanks would suffer so badly. Making all the appropriate reservations, it does not seem that the Russian success has done much more than show that even the strongest positions, defended by the most resolute troops, are not impregnable in face of a skilfully correlated attack of all arms, if losses are of no account. If we knew this in the broad before, it is much to have a large-scale demonstration ; and detailed study may suggest that the Russian infiltration was made at an un- necessarily heavy cost.
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