THE APOTHEOSIS OF THE SULTAN.
MANY signs are beginning to show that the most im- portant as well as the worst result of the present war will be its effect in reviving the spirits and the energy of the Ottoman caste. They thought their day was over, and that the Frank—may his name be accursed—was destined in the mysterious providence of Allah to reduce Islam to temporary subjection. They think so no longer. The Sultan having done his duty in massacring dis- affected infidels within his dominion, and treating with external infidels only after victory, the favour of God has been again deserved, and " Roum " is again a power- ful military Empire. Clearly the Sultan must continue in a course so obviously acceptable to the higher powers, must restore his Mussulmans to their full rights over their Christian slaves, and must oppose to all remon- strances from Christian diplomatists the invincible stub- bornness becoming the leader of the armed Faithful. This will be the view of every Ottoman soldier and provincial Ottoman as he hears of the Sultan's victories, and of the way in which the infidels fled before him, a way clearly showing that God had made their hearts as water ; and its influence, we may rely on it, will be felt in Yildiz Kiosk. The Sultan is probably a believer in his own creed, he is permanently afraid of irritating Ottoman opinion, and, like all Kings, he ascribes to himself the merit of all his servants. He thinks that his policy has succeeded, which is perfectly true so far ; he believes that his Empire is armed, which is also true if he can in- crease taxation ; and he will unquestionably be harder to deal with than Western journalists are as yet at all inclined to believe. Why should he not be ? He has called three effective armies, fifty thousand strong, from the very ground. If Russia invaded Armenia or entered Bulgaria to-morrow he could at once find, arm, and defend a new Plevna, which, while his drilled peasants from Asia Minor continued willing to give their lives on his behalf, it is by no means certain that the Russian Generals could take. All the European precedents are in favour of exacting hard terms from the vanquished, and of territorial cessions as guarantees for those terms ; and as he has been admitted into the comity of Europe, why should he be treated worse than William I. was after Paris fell ? Has he not heartily on his side the strongest of the Kings, the German Emperor, who lends him the science of his Staff, who professes friendship in every letter, and who wants nothing from him but commercial preferences and a general hostility to " Carthage," both of which the Sultan is only too delighted to promise ? As a victor, as a Khalif favoured of God with a triumph, as a diplomatist proud of his own skill in evasion, above all as a Sovereign who has to clear away by conspicuous success the memory of long years of depression, and to justify his gradual monopoly of all living powers within his own dominion, the Sultan will be tempted stubbornly to defy pressure, and to insist that until his terms are granted he shall remain both in Thessaly and Crete. What does he risk by that attitude, and what may he not risk if he disappoints by concessions what we may perhaps most intelligibly describe as the Dopper section of his subjects ?
No doubt he may be exposed to a pressure which may overcome even his stubbornness. There is some reason to believe that the new situation in Constantinople is attracting displeased attention in St. Petersburg. The statesmen who hold the Czar in leash, or at all events on serious questions sway his final decisions, are not likely to approve a revivification of Turkey, and may be pleased to stand forward as protectors of their co-religionists in Athens. The Greeks are not heretics as the Armenians were, nor had the Armenians a Russian Princess sitting upon the throne of Erzeroum. It is possible that Russia may press for leniency to Greece, and if the well-informed correspondent of the Daily Telegraph at Athens may be trusted, M. Nelidoff, who knows how to overawe as well as how to conciliate the Sultan, has already received in- structions in that sense. But the pressure must be exercised under a new dread of a rebuff, for if the Sultan should so far screw up his courage as to assert his independence, what could Russia actually do ? She will not let England into the Bosphorus, though England is the only Power who could strike straight at the heart, and she does not want another Plevna, to be carried by a lavish expenditure of life in a war which is not strictly in her own interest. Still less does she want a quarrel with the German Emperor, whose policy is incalculable, and who in the East, whatever determination he takes, carries Austria with him, Count Banffy having on Wednesday explained to the Hungarian Parliament that no under- standing with Russia is intended in any degree to weaken the Triple Alliance, which is the "immutable policy" of the Empire. The Sultan has only to be obstinate, and Russia must retire, or make an effort of the supreme kind, such as the present Czar and his trusted Counsellor, M. de "Witte, are most anxious to avoid. Russia desires to reign at Constantinople without war, not with it ; and the Sultan, the most adroit of mankind, who has baffled and tricked and defeated all the picked diplomatists of Europe, will take full advantage of that situation. He dreads the Concert ; but for coercing him there is no Concert, only a Committee with his dearest friend sitting complacently as chairman thereof with three votes in six.
The only weak place, in fact, in the Sultan's position is to be sought in his own capital. There must be intrigues going on there, some of which may be directed against his personal authority. For years past his Majesty has suppressed the great soldiers of his Empire, and has entrusted all power to a group of favourites—lawyers, priests, and servitors of the Palace—of whom only one is known to be a man of even passable ability. Osman Ghazee has been virtually a prisoner, Fuad Pasha was only saved from exile by the Embassies, Edhem Pasha has been once superseded and once summoned to Yildiz Kiosk to give certain explanations, while the Army generally out- side the capital has been left without pay except at lengthen- ing intervals. Now it is the soldiers' turn. The Army is to be maintained in its full strength, at all events for a term, and armies do not like to hear that their favourite Generals are exiled or imprisoned or disgraced. The Sultan must leave his Generals alone, and it is not probable, it is almost impossible, that his Generals either like him or trust him, or believe in him as a Sultan who can carry out an imperious or awe-inspiring policy. They detest the Palace clique, and they know how little real foothold that clique has in Turkish affairs except through their master's favour. They will make demands, too, on the Treasury in the interest of the soldiery, -which it will be very difficult to satisfy, yet which must be satisfied unless victorious troops are to be left, as heretofore, nine months or fifteen months in arrear. The garrison of Yildiz Kiosk did not win the victory in front of Pharsala, and all armies, especially armies in the field, are jealous of the Pretorian Guard. When we reflect on the wild struggle that must be going on in the Palace among men who have the spoil of an Empire to lose or to retain, on the discontent among the great officers, on the deadly hostility every Greek and Armenian must bear to Abd-ul-Hamid, on the rage of the " Young Turks," who see their last hope torn away, and on the stupefaction of the Ambassadors, who were dealing with a fox, and find a panther in the cage, we begin to doubt whether after all the Sultan is beyond any political danger, and whether revolution has been rendered as impossible by the war as assault from without, except by sea, undoubtedly has. States have been known to be sick unto death at the centre while full of strength abroad; and the insect may pierce the brain while the man in his gilded armour appears unassailable by human force. The Sultan may not be safe from his own people ; but all others will find, we believe, that the total effect of the "high policy" of the Concert has been to release him from his fetters, and enable him to treat appeals to his fears with the smiling scorn with which he has always received appeals to his clemency or his justice.
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