A WOE]) TO PRESIDENT KRUGER. T HE situation in South Africa
has improved within the last ten days. The Government of the Transvaal has done the wise and prudent thing, and has repealed the Aliens Immigration Law,—an Act which created a clear breach of the Convention. It is true the Volksraad asserted that they did not repeal it because it was a breach of the Convention, but because it was considered unfriendly by their neighbours in South Africa; but this little piece of " stiffness," or of attorney-like anxiety to write "Without prejudice" at the top of every communi- cation, is quite immaterial. The fact remains that our Government felt obliged to protest against the law as a breach of the Convention, and to demand its suspension or repeal, and that the law has been repealed. The breach, then, has been remedied, and what is more, the Transvaal Government has shown that it does not intend to maintain an attitude of " Go and be d—d," or of to quoque, whenever it is asked to remember that the British Government cannot acquiesce in or overlook any breaches of the Convention, even though such breaches can b- called immaterial or technical. That is a most important point to the good. It is also an important point to the good that public opinion here, while viewing with satisfaction the determination of the Government to maintain an increase of our military strength in South Africa, has shown no sort of encouragement to the Jingo notion of picking a quarrel with the Boers, and so putting an end to all the fuss and trouble. For example, the St. James's Gazette, which has occasionally taken up a more strenuous attitude in regard to South Africa than we hold reasonable or warranted by the facts, has lately written with great sense and moderation, and has delivered a well-merited snub to the General who thought fit to season an address to the battery which is being despatched to the Cape with bellicose remarks as to the marksmanship of the Boers. In a word, the general attitude of responsible people, in the Press and elsewhere, has been most reasonable. The resolve of the Government to have a force in South Africa which shall make it clear that we are the paramount Power in fact as well as in name has been strongly sup- ported ; but at the same time, anything like an attempt to browbeat the Transvaal Government, or to press unfairly on them, has been most clearly deprecated. These facts, coupled with the improvement in the Par- liamentary situation at Cape Town which has also taken place, make the general prospect very much more hopeful than it was a fortnight ago.
The situation having thus temporarily improved, the great object is to keep it from again becoming dangerous and irritated, for nowhere more than in South Africa do sudden stormclouds darken the political sky. This is our reason and excuse for addressing a word or two of warning to President Kruger and the Transvaal Govern- ment. We desire peace quite as much as they do ; and though we cannot deny that the Boer oligarchy is an anachronism, we do not desire to interfere with the autonomy accorded them by the London Convention. At the same time, we deprecate as strongly as do the Boers the influence of Mr. Rhodes in South Africa, and are as anxious as they can be, though possibly on different grounds, to see that influence destroyed. If, then, we venture to offer advice to President Kruger, it is not as enemies, but as friends. Our first desire is to urge President Kruger most strongly to disabuse his mind of the notion that he can gain anything by accepting the advice of foreign Powers, or by in any way leaning on them for support. The invocation of that support may help him out of temporary difficulties, but it will in the end be his ruin. We shall be told, of course, that President Kruger has no desire to lean upon foreign Powers, and that he and the Boers generally would far rather be under English control than German, and we can well believe that this statement is made in all sincerity. At the same time, the fact remains that the Transvaal, not unnaturally perhaps, has imagined that without running any risk of a German protectorate it can play off the Kaiser against England. As Mr. Schreiner told us, the Dutch hold that when you are weak you must be " clever ;" and President Kruger has undoubtedly thought it would be " clever " to use Germany, and also other foreign Powers, as makeweights against England. Yet that is the one thing which, as we have said, will in the end injure the Transvaal. If the feeling in England is allowed to grow as it is growing, that the Transvaal is trying to play off Germany and other foreign Powers against England, President Kruger will find the people of this country in a temper of mind which he will by no means like. He could in reality take no wiser or more useful step than to publicly, plainly, and openly acknowledge that we are the paramount Power, to repudiate all notion of the Tra nsvaal being, as he once said, a child crawling between the Great Powers, and to assert that even if his country had suffered wrong from England he was not going to make reprisals by understandings with foreign Powers. We do not, of course, suppose that President Kruger will ever be bold enough to make such an announcement., or to act upon it, but the nearer he approaches this attitude the stronger he will make his position. Another piece of advice we would most strongly, and also most respectfully, press upon the President is to disabuse his mind of the notion that he can possibly gain anything by taking advantage of the strife of parties in England. As we pointed ont last week, the democracy will not stand anything of the kind. In the days of Pitt and Fox foreign Powers no doubt reckoned on the fact that during a war the foreign Power would always have the Opposition with them, but those days are passed for ever. President Kruger may get a certain amount of help from the Opposition up to the beginning of hostilities, but the instant war breaks out such help will fail him utterly. Another matter is worth bringing to the notice of the Transvaal Government. If they are wise they will not get into the habit of refusing to give way till an ultimatum is sent them. If they do adopt this habit they will find that whenever a dispute arises there will be enormous pressure put on the Govern- ment here to enforce every demand by an ultimatum. At present there is a real danger of an ultimatum getting looked on as a panacea for difficulties with the Transvaal, and if this goes on the result will be most regrettable. When the next controversy with the Boers is proceeding, and our Government, maybe, is patiently arguing the matter out, we do not want to have our Jingoes declaring that the Colonial Office is mismanaging the affair because they do not send an ultimatum. 'If they would only have the sense to remember that an ultimatum is the only thing with the Boers, they would do much better. An ultimatum cleared the air last time at once, and so it would this.' Now, personally we have no special dislike to ultimatums, and hold that if they were occasionally used towards our European neighbours we should find things easier ; but we cannot put the sort of general faith in them which Mr. Weller, sen., put in alibis. But such is the view which the public will be taught to take of them if the South African Republic never makes a concession till it has received an ultimatum. We implore President Kruger to remember this fact. If he does not, we feel certain that the pressure on the Government to send off ulti- matums on what are not really important points will become a marked feature of the relations between the two countries. But surely that is a result which President Kruger will not contemplate with any particular pleasure. We shall forbear to make any detailed suggestions as to what the Transvaal ought or ought not to do in regard to the franchise, for we feel that in this matter repre- sentations from us will have little or no effect. We must, however, make the bare statement that if the President and Volksraad were to give the full franchise after five years' residence they would do more to strengthen the Transvaal and ensure its continuance as a separate Re- public than they can possibly do by any other means. If the Outlanders had the vote the Transvaal in two years' time would be unanimously calling itself the Empire State in South Africa, and claiming to take the lead in South African affairs. Here, however, President Kruger may say that we are impertinent and interfering in his domestic concerns. He cannot fairly say that when most anxiously, most sincerely, and most earnestly we advise him to give up the notion of leaning on foreign Powers in order to check England, to abandon the idea of playing off the outs against the ins, and to beware of strengthening the notion that the only way to deal with the Boers is to send them ultimatums.
There is yet one other point to which we ought to refer. It is clear that the Transvaal Government and the English should come to a clear and reasonable understanding as to the proper moment when treaties ought to be submitted to the veto of the Colonial Office. All that is wanted is a little discussion conducted with common courtesy on both sides. No doubt it will be said that the Boers cannot be expected to do that, because they have been so much ill-used— which we grant most heartily—and that, in fact, they have a right to sulk over this, after all, rather small matter. Perhaps they have a moral right to do so, but they will be very un wise if they exercise their right to sulk. And for this reason. They must not forget that if they will not come to some amicable arrangement as to the proper procedure in regard to the presentation of treaties, the Colonial Office has the power to dictate its own terms in the matter. Suppose the Boers sulk and will not agree on a reasonable plan, there is nothing to prevent the Colonial Office prescribing the procedure by themselves. Suppose the Secretary of State were to write a despatch saying that in future all treaties must be submitted by the Transvaal Government at such and such a stage, and that if in future any treaty were submitted not in accord- ance with the form suggested, her Majesty's Government would feel obliged to refuse their consent to it, even though the actual provisions were quite unobjectionable. The power to write thus, and no one can say that the Colonial Office has not got that power, allows us to fix the forms at our own discretion. The fact that our veto is absolute carries with it the right to dictate the -way in which the treaty shall be presented. We do not suggest that the Colonial Office should take this course unless and until they have exhausted all other arguments. We would much rather they came to an amicable arrange- ment with the Boer Government. Still, as we have said, the Boers must remember that in this matter, at any rate, the power to have our own way lies with us.
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