GERMANY IN SHANGHAI.
[TO TILE EDITOR OF TIM "SPECTATOR."] SIR,—Reviewing politics is like squeezing a wet sponge,— write or squeeze how one may, the matter, as the sponge, is seldom squeezed dry. Particularly does this apply to Germany and her political attitude towards us, about which much that is most instructive has of late been written, and nowhere more so than in the columns of the Spectator,—it has been said, un- fairly. But as the blind lead the blind, so, forsooth, those who do not see through the " rills and runnels " of German diplomacy may think. Those who do see have reason to think otherwise. The point to be understood in all Germany's dealings with us is that she is double-handed,—in her own defence, be it said, she can hardly be otherwise. Driven forward by the same economic forces that impel us and the United States, she seeks to expand. In every step that she takes forward she has to consider two Powers,—Russia and Great Britain. Russia she can never flout, England she thinks she can. Of Germany's attitude during the Fashoda crisis it is unnecessary to say more ; it is known how, with the semblance of outward neutrality, she endeavoured to entangle France in war with us, and bow M. Delcasse, who saw through the scheme, declined to play Germany's game. But if proof of Germany's duplicity be wanting, let us dwell for a moment upon Germany's recent attitude towards us in China. With what is now known as the Yangtsze agreement in his pocket, Count von Billow achieved a notable diplomatic success. With doubtful wisdom we threw. the Yangtsze Valley open to Germany, gave her the aegis of our Fleet, and believed—though in drafting the agreement Count von Billow expressly stipulated the contrary—that the clauses of the treaty relating to land- grabbing extended to Manchuria. Now the agreement, as its name denoted, was limited to the Yangtsze. So having discovered the futility of the arrangement, and the impossibility of obtain- ing a fair bargain with Germany, we found what we wanted in the naval power of Japan. Not long ago, order being at last restored in China, it became incumbent upon the Powers to withdraw the foreign troops. To agree upon any- thing at all is for the Powers interested in China a task fraught with difficulty. But China bad long pleaded for the withdrawal of the garrisons at Shanghai, where Germany, out of all proportion to her interests, maintained a strong garrison, and so the Powers began to negotiate. Finally, they agreed. The garrisons at Shanghai were to he withdrawn simul- taneously, with the proviso, put forward by France, that in the event of any Power having to send troops to Shanghai, the other Powers interested could, for the sake of appearances, send a similar contingent. So far the Powers seemed to be at one. Observe. Distrustful as ever, Germany wanted more ; she thought to outdo us. Openly she demanded from China a declaration neutralising the Yangtsze Valley, whereby China should promise to grant no political or terri- torial privileges in the Yangtsze district. Secretly Germany obtained it. Now this was doubly artful. Here was Germany, secure from all.intrusion in the Yangtsze district by her agree- ment with us, seeking to create for herself a special sphere in the region whither we had invited her, and where we were, moreover, bound, if necessary, to defend her. It was—it only could be—directed against us. Naturally, we protested. This, then, was Germany's friendliness, her fair-and-square diplo- macy! And we told her so plainly with unwonted emphasis. A deadlock arose. Of course Germany was ready with an excuse ; but this time we were in earnest. There could be no question of withdrawing our garrison from Shanghai in such circumstances, and when Germany came to under- stand that, she reconsidered the situation. Pressed by our representations, and aware that she had been " dis- covered," Germany gave in. The declaration was modified, or rather, was extended. Originally referring to the Yangtsze region, the declaration (probably in deference to Germany's susceptibilities) was made to extend to all China—whether Manchuria is implied is a nice problem for a debating society —and we, as probably most other Powers, decline to recognise it. There the matter and the agreement stand. It is true that the German Government is in possession of the declara- tion; but apart from the value of the document as such, it can have now little, if any, significance. It is significant in another sense. It is documentary evidence of what we have to expect from Germany ; it should teach us how to treat her. Now the Shanghai affair is but one of a long series of political equivocations which might be told off against Germany one by one, like the beads of a rosary, and for every one of which a prayer of atonement is owing. There is something petty, like the Philistinism still characteristic of the German character, in all this policy. It is all so obvious and simple. Now it is a case of Germany as the agent-provocateur (as in the Paunce- fote controversy and the Fashoda incident) ; now it is a pin- prick, and this particularly when Germany is in need of something ; or a policy of bluff is tried—witness Count von Billow's speech in the Reichstag in answer to Mr. Chamber- lain—or, as if to keep up his reputation as the statesman who pleases all men, Count von Billow attempts a counterbalance, as on the occasion of the abortive reception by the Emperor of the Boer generals; sometimes it is a feint, a subterfuge, but never an open thrust. We can bear it, and especially if we know about it. Added to this there is the active hostility of Germany towards Englishmen. We say the German Emperor is our friend; so he is. We say that what the Emperor wills he does, that the rest does not matter, which is in part true. But the feelings of peoples can no longer be dis- regarded. From the dead palsy of German public opinion sprang during the war a power which has come to stay, and has already surprised the unwary. Take it for all in all, it is no hyperbole to say, if the Boer generals were " slim," the German Government is " slimmer."—I am, Sir, &c., X. Y. Z.
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