TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE MEXICAN IMBROGLIO.
PHILOSOPHERS and historians have often pointed out the ironic tendeucy in the decrees of fate. Especially does this irony seem dominant in the case of statesmen and rulers who adopt in the abstract pacifist principles, who declare war to be useless and need- less, and imply that they will never resort to it. Such general declarations appear to be a challenge to destiny which is always taken up. No sooner are the words spoken than one begins to bear the thunder of the guns. Cynical critics, indeed, might point out how much safer it is to talk about war than to talk about peace. The German Emperor, for example, has been talking about war for the last quarter of a century, but yet he has never made war. Mr. Roosevelt, in the same way, was by no means disinclined to talk about war and to prepare for war, but in spite of having earned the fear, nay detestation, of pacifists all the world over, and of being regarded as a man of " blood and iron," he never while President of the United States gave the order for the guns to open fire, or even went within measurable distance of doing so in the case of any civilized or Christian Power. But now come Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan, than whom there never were sincerer or more vocal advocates of peace, or greater haters of Imperialism in all its forms. Yet before they have been seven months in office they have reached the very verge of war, and are treating a neighbouring Republic with threats and menaces which one associates with the most ruthless of autocrats and tyrants in his dealings with his neighbours. That in the special case President Wilson is wrong we are far from saying. We hold no brief for Mexico. We must, however, point the lesson to our pacifists here, and note how futile it is to indulge in wild talk about the age of peace having dawned and there being no longer any necessity for war- like preparations. As long as nations feel deeply and strongly on moral and political questions and have wills of their own, there must be the chance of a conflict of wills. But wherever there is a conflict of wills there is a danger of war unless there is some outside power of such tremendous authority (as, for example, the British Raj in India) as to be capable of knocking up the swords of the combatants and compelling them to keep the peace, just as the courts of law and the police compel indi- viduals in civilized communities.
Though our sympathies are, and always will be, with America, we felt bound last week, as friends of the Americans, to show how circumstances were leading them into the most perilous, arbitrary, and indefensible form of Imperialism, a form of Imperialism which must be specially hateful to the subject nations on whom it is forced, and which must therefore be dangerous to the Power which attempts to uphold it. The attempt to set up control without the acceptance of responsibility for control, without that virtual bestowal of partnership which necessarily conies with conquest in the case of a modern State, is bound to end either in the worst and most indefensible form of tyranny or else in disaster. Yet it is upon this path that the United States is unconsciously entering. We have not the actual text of President Wilson's message before us as we write, but the analysis of his six points of policy as regards Mexico published in Thursday's Times makes his intentions abundantly clear. He is going to try to do what Napoleon tried and failed in, that is, to dictate from outside how a nominally independent country is to be governed. Napoleon put matters more picturesquely and more crudely when he used to write dispatches or letters declaring that he was not pleased with this or that king or government, or when he proclaimed that this or that Royal House " had ceased to reign " because it was "bloodstained" or antagonistic to France or oppressive or what nut. President Wilson does not use grandiloquent language of this kind, but he is in effect doing much the same thing when he tells the Mexicans that the present government is " bloodstained," and that he will not tolerate it, and when he places particular individuals under his ban, as be does when he declares that the United States will insist upon " the elimination " of General Huerta and all those closely
associated with him from the control of public affairs. He goes on to say that he will use all the force at his command in order to secure obedience to his wishes, and will invade Mexico if necessary. Napoleon placed Madame de Stael by name under a ban of this kind, but after all she was only an individual and not a ruler. As far as we can remember, Napoleon never went so far as to outlaw the de facto rulers of a country except by such declarations as that " the House of — has ceased to reign in —."
It is, of course, quite possible that President Wilson may be immediately successful in his ultimatum, and that General Huerta and his government will yield to force majeure, and will allow the Americans to choose some neutral person to be their ruler. But even if he does succeed, the position, from the American point of view, will be most dangerous. The whole Mexican people will be some with the soreness that is always felt by a humiliated nation. On that soreness it is impossible to believe that a solid reformed administration can be built up, such as the Americans honestly desire. It is far more likely, especially as the Americans do not, we presume, demand the imprisonment, exile, or death of General Huerta, and his friends, that some sort of national party will be formed in Mexico, the object of which will be to shake off American domination in every shape and form, and make the country once again really independent. In other words, even if General Huerta and his friends are got rid of for the time, it will only be for the time, and war will only be postponed till Mexico is better prepared to fight. Friends of America may therefore be pardoned for hoping that General Huerta will not succumb now in order to fight better later, but that the active crisis will come at once. In that case it is more likely to be got over quickly. Presuming that pressure will have to be applied, the Americans, we are told, hope to effect their end by financial pressure. Possibly this will succeed, but we cannot help remembering what a disappointment were Pitt's schemes to bring about the bankruptcy of the Convention during the French war. All the economists and financiers prophesied that the Jacobins could never carry on the war with an empty treasury. When even the making of paper money failed owing to its absolute depreciation, the business world here agreed that the struggle must soon end. Yet Carnet managed to organize victory for the Republican arms and to keep them well supplied with guns, uniforms, ammuni- tion, and even food, while the Government was admittedly bankrupt. All history shows that it is not the richest States or the best-fed armies that fight the hardest. If ordinary financial pressure proves inadequate, then the American navy will blockade the Mexican ports, destroy the Customs revenues, and prevent the importation of munitions of war. This, of course, is part of the induce- ment of the bankruptcy policy. But it does not take account of the extreme difficulty of keeping up a blockade on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic coasts, or of the ingenuity of the blockade runner. No doubt the Mexicans will pay more for munitions of war, but they will find means of making explosives, just as the French Republicans did when we thought we had deprived them of saltpetre. Again, if, as is further suggested, the United States collects the Mexican Customs itself, we can only suppose that something will happen like what happened when the Government used to collect the rents on the estates of the Highland Jacobites. Just as the tenants paid two rents, one to King George's factor and one to the chief over the water, so the Mexican merchant will have to pay two sets of Customs duties. The considerations just stated tend to make us entirely sceptical as to the power of the Americans to carry out their will without invasion. The truth is, you may coerce a well-organized Power much more successfully tha.n a disorganized one. The well-organized Power has much more to lose and is therefore afraid of a greater evil occurring. A Power which is already faced with internal rebellion is not much frightened by the introduction of yet another hostile element. It always sees the possibility of foreign interference knocking the weapons out of the rebels' hands and consolidating the whole country in one supreme effort to get rid of the foreign foe. Mexico, indeed, already provides a capital example of this result. The Mexicans were fighting among themselves tooth and nail in the 'sixties till the French troops landed. After that Mexico soon became solid in her determination to
abandon the luxury of rebellion till she had driven out the common enemy.
In cue way or another, sooner or later, the present American policy must lead, in our opinion, to armed inter- vention followed by annexation. There is uo other way by which one State can permanently control another. If invasion comes, all President Wilson's well-meant resolves to make it clear to foreign nations that nothing will in- duce the United States to acquire territory as the result of intervention will come to naught. We made just the same kind of declarations, and in just as good faith, when we went to Egypt, but we have never been able to carry them out, and never shall. If the American troops once enter Mexico and put down opposition to their will by force, they will never permanently leave Mexico. They may, and no doubt will, go out temporarily in obedience to some vagary of public sentiment, but they will soon be back again in order to prevent the fruits of good American government being thrown away. The thing will be done in a different way from that in which we should do it, owing to the temper of the American people being different in many respects from that of their kinsfolk here, but the net result will be very much the same. As to the ultimate annexation, we have no doubt that President Wilson's pledge, or rather prophecy, will be kept in the letter—but only in the letter. What we should expect to happen, if we may lift the veil of the future for a moment, will be something like this. If the. Americans resolve to invade Mexico they will no doubt be able to do so. The struggle may prove hard, but it is certainly not above their powers, on the assumption that they are not in too great a hurry. On a successful war the temporary occupation of the country is bound to follow. This, of course, will soon raise a strong demand in America for evacuation. The Jingo lit is sure to be followed by a new pacifist fit. In that case we should not be surprised if the Americans discovered that the northern provinces of Mexico—Mexico is a Federal Republic—in which the present rebellion has been so successful, were well fitted for geographical and moral reasons to form a community by themselves, and if accordingly a new Republic— Northern Mexico—were formed, while Southern Mexico were for the time left to itself. Into the new Northern Republic placed by treaty under special American pro- tection—vide the treaties with Panama and Nicaragua— American emigrants, agricultural and industrial, will crowd in very large numbers, till they become either an actual majority of the population or, at any rate, completely control its electoral machinery. Then the Republic in question will follow the precedent of Texas, which first separated itself from Mexico and then petitioned to be admitted to the Union as a State. Congress would find it very difficult, nay, impossible, to refuse a demand of this kind, and thus the process of absorption will begin. No doubt in one sense this would not be annexation, but it would be difficult for the plain man not versed in the niceties of the Constitution to distinguish it at a distance. " Convey, the wise it call."
We have only one more word to say, and that is to express the ardent hope that if it comes to invasion the Americans will be prudent in the matter of any advance from the line of the Rio Grande. We can quite well understand an American army marching without much Molestation through the insurgent provinces, and e-an reaching the city of Mexico. The danger would be of such a force getting its retreat cut off, and of bodies along the lines of communication being surrounded and starved into surrender. A disaster of this kind, though it would not prevent America's ultimate victory, would greatly increase her difficulties. Once prove the Americans not invincible, and all Mexico will be like an angry wasps' nest. To put our meaning in other words, America will be most unwise to commit herself to military action until she has organized a really competent force, a force which she is far from possessing at the present moment. No doubt her regular army is, man for man, one of the best, perhaps the very best, in the world, but it is exceedingly small. Probably not more than twenty thousand men could be put into Mexico, and such a force, if the Mexicans play the Fabian game, as they no doubt will, would soon be lost in a country so huge as Mexico. They would not even find it easy to get from Vera Cruz to Mexico City— though we admit that invasion with a.sea-base and a short march to the capital is to be preferred to an advance from the Rio Grande.
Happily the Americans have in their Chief of Staff, or virtual Commander-in-Chief, General Leonard Wood, an officer of the very highest military ability, an officer as wise and prudent as he is brave. And General Wood is more than a very able soldier in the field and administrator in the office. He has also proved himself a statesman of rare capacity. He is a man of the type of the Indian Lawrences, and if his advice is taken and his military skill and strength of character are relied on, President Wilson will be in safe hands. The only difficulty we foresee here is that General Wood will not be willing to promise to do miracles at the bidding of Washington politicians. He will prove a thoroughly loyal servant to the Administration, for he is no political soldier, but he will also be a truthful one, and politicians in a hurry are unfortunately very apt to regard truth-speaking in a soldier as a kind of treason. We feel sure that President Wilson will know how to estimate these high qualities at their true value. Can we feel sure that the Senators and Congressmen, on whose co-operation in the case of war the President must to a great extent depend, will be equally prepared to be wise and patient, generous and sted fast—the qualities which must be found in the civilian rulers if the soldiers are to be given a fair chance ?
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