BOOKS.

CALVERT'S CORRESPONDENCE ON THE Wilt IN FLANDERS AND HOLLAND.* THE war in Flanders and Holland under the Duke of York was so disastrous in its course and results, is generally considered so discreditable to the British arms, and was so obscured by succeed- ing events, that except in the condensed account of the historian little is now known about it. These letters and journals of the late General Sir Harry Calvert, a judicious officer, who was en- gaged throughout the whole of the war, in the favourable post for observation and knowledge of Aide-de-camp to the Duke of York, may be received as a useful addition to our original military memoirs.

The book does not, indeed, present any striking description of events, or any new pictures of war, though it intimates a good deal respecting the under-current of daily life in a campaign. One great source of the early success of the French, from the dissatis- faction of the invaded countries with their own government, is strongly indicated, and as well with the army as the civilians,—un- less the Dutch are assumed to have been cowards as well as disloyal. The great characteristic of the book is its exposure of official bad management, to give it no worse name. From the highest to the lowest part of civil administration there is the same glaring miscon- duct to be found. In spite of warning and experience, both of the strongest kind, our Ministry clung to their system of coalitions and subsidies, in which British treasure was squandered and Bri- tish blood wasted, to enable Austria to work out her own ob- jects under the guise of hostility backed by the power of Great Britain, and then to leave us in the lurch. Sir Harry Calvert had served under Cornwallis in America, and was familiar with practical warfare. Of the conduct of the army and the officers he speaks better than has generally been the fashion ; but the home management was deplorable. Commissions were given to persons who could raise a certain number of men—and this was the best kind of influence. Such officers could have no experience in war; yet they were the class sent out by the Government. The army was crippled by the want of general officers, and the recruits who joined were despatched without even arms ;—something like which is now the ease in the Company's service in India, as may be learned from Sir Charles Napier and Mrs. Colin Mackenzie. More startling still, the whole enterprise may be said with some proba- bility to have failed for want of naval succours. Naval cooperation was essential to the capture of Dunkirk. During the whole of the siege, French gun-boats continually bellied or restrained the operations of the British army, without any effective hinderance, till the French levies en masse and other energetic operations under Carnot enabled them to raise the siege.

The object of the war was threefold,—to secure Holland, then threatened by the French ; to free Austrian Flanders (now Bel- gium) from the French armies; to establish a government in France (the Jacobins were then in power) with which the Allies could safely treat. The arrival of the British forces in 1793, aided by some of the smaller Germanic powers and the operations of the Austrian's, soon effected the first object, and the French were forced back from the Dutch frontier. After a campaign of varying fortune, but in the main successful, the French were driven out of Flanders ; France was invaded ; several frontier fortresses were captured ; the Allies with an army of 130,000 men were within fifteen marches of Paris ; and the covering army of the capital was defeated. Success seemed within the grasp of the Allies ; for the French nation, disgusted or horrified at the atrocities of the reign of terror, was divided, and a large portion of the people indifferent, or disposed to favour the Allies. This-fair prospect was marred by discordant designs and projects, springing from the most unprin- cipled selfishness and bad faith. Some time before, the General of the Allies, the Prince of Cobourg, had issued a proclamation dis- avowing all ambitious objects; professing that an equitable peace with a stable government was all that the Allies aimed at ; that if they entered France it would be with no plan of conquest, but only in the end of peace, and that any fortresses of which they might gain possession would be considered as a de- posit, to be restored to the national government. As soon as success fairly dawned upon them, this proclamation, after a meet- ing of diplomatists, was withdrawn, and another issued, arro- gant in its assumption and breathing dismemberment. The first effect of which was to unite the French people to induce them to submit to the " energy " of the Terrorists, shown by requisitions, levies en masse, &c. ; and to furnish the genius of Carnet with materials on which to work. The second was to disunite the confederation, by that display of selfishness to which "combina- tions of wickedness" sooner or later give rise. The volume before us abounds with denunciations of Austrian corruption, trea- son, selfishness, and " swindling." It must, however, be said in fairness, that the British Government set the worst example of self- ishness. They looked upon the port of Dunkirk as the best part of the spoil. In defiance of remonstrance from the Prince of Cobourg and the other Generals, they ordered the forces under the com- mand of the Duke of York to move upon Dunkirk. Having thus rendered farther advance impossible, and given time to the Ter- rorist Government to organize their resources, "the Heaven-born • The Journals and Correspondence of General Sir Harry Calvert, Bart., G.C.B. and G.C.H., Adjutant-General of the Forces under II.R.H. the Duke of York; comprising the Campaigns in Flanders and Holland in 1793-'4. With an Appendix, containing his Plane for the Defence of the Country in case of Invasion. Edited hy his Son, Sir Harry Verney, Bart. Published by Hurst and Blacken.

Minister" did not even make sure of Dunkirk. He allowed the British army to be baffled by a parcel of gun-boats, and to fail al- together for want of navalootiperation.

From this period disaster and disgrace attended the Allied arms. Whether provoked by the selfishness of England, by despair of success,' or from natural treachery, the Austrians made a secret treaty with the French, by which they agreed to recross the Rhine under a show of-pursuit, leaving the fortresses with their garrisons to- be captured at leisure. This was base enough, but crime was added to Austrian dishonour. A number of emigrants serving with the army were at the same time abandoned to death, though the.humanity of Pichegru saved them when he could.

"I put a double cover to your letter it:shave the satisfaction of informing yeti that the fate of the emigrants of Bois-le-Due is not quite so deplorable as we had reason to fear. Piehegru sent them word that he did not wish their death, and that if they marched out mixed with the garrison, no no- tice Would be taken of them. This plan was adopted till that rascal Jour- den rode into the ranks, accompanied by some Dutch deserters, and pitched on thirty, whom he instantly massacred. The rest escaped."

The persons to whom the letters of Sir Henry Calvert are ad- dressed are chiefly his own family, and Sir Hew Dalrymple, who, however unsuccessful in command or conventions himself, seems from the tone of his correspondent to have been a man of military knowledge and a critic. The family of the writer, even the female part of it, appear to have had a general knowledge of war ; and the letters altogether leave a favourable impression of the writer and his connexions. To have a full apprehension of the conclusions to be drawn, the book itself must be perused ; but a few extracts will give an idea of the two most important topics, official bad manage- ment and German alliances. The badness of the home management began with the beginning in the condition of the ships ; the Trans- port service being then, if it is not now, a sort of independent service, over which the persons who were dependent on it exer- cised no influence. An early remark of the Duke of Wellington in Portugal was likewise in a similar tone.

a It is much to be lamented that the first observation that must occur to every officer employed on this service, is the very unfit state the transports were in for the reception of troops, and the very small 'provision that was made for their health- and accommodation while on board. The tonnage of the ships was so inadequate to the numbers embarked, that every bad conse- quence was to be apprehended had it been necessary to put on the hatches, which must haie been the case had we not made Helvoet before the gale of wind came on. There was no small species of provisions on board; no vinegar (that most essential preservative) ; and lastly, neither medicines nor sergical instruments. On our arrival at Helvoet, we could not, without much surprise, observe the perfect tranquillity of that towu, and the little preparation for defence, when we were within hearing of the enemy's guns before Willemstadt; and there were no embrasures cut through the parapet walls, and not above twenty men employed on that most essential service ; and yet the contents of the dockyard, eleven liue-of-battle ships and two frigates, and large arseuals and stores, seemed to demand every attention and call 'for every exertion for their defence. The cause of this total want of energy was supposed by many to be the disaffection of the people to the Statliholder; and the shameful surrender of Breda appeared to give ground for this idea."

The Transport service related to the naval department : the Ar- my was not a whit behind its brother in arms, nor the Ordnance either. These extracts are from letters to Sir Hew Dalrymple, who was in eniploy at home. "-Send me some news; the most acceptable will be the probability of Lord Cornwallis's return to the Continent. Explain to me the reason of the recruits joining the army without arms or any appointments necessary for soldiers. I am often asked the question, and can't resolve it. * * * " Five more regiments are on their road to join, without field-pieces, without ammunition, and many without arms!"

"'I am sorry that all my letters are of a character so triste—all that I hear, see; and-feel is so, to the last degree. We want artillerymen, we want a general officer at the head of the artillery, we want drivers and smiths ; we want three major-generals of infantry ; we want a commanding en- gineer of rank and experience ; we want a total reform in our hospital; we want, at least, two out of the four brigades of mounted artillery with- which- his Grace of Richmond is amusing himself in England ; we want a total stop put to that most pernicious mode of bestowing rank, on officers without even the form of recommendation, merely for raising (by means of crimps) a certain number of men, to restore to the army those independent and disinterested feelings. and those high principles who should actuate a soldier and form the basis of the military discipline of a free country, and to relieve deserving officers from the intolerable grievance of seeing men without merit, without family, or the smallest pretension to any military ability, pass over their heads, and arrive at a very high and till now a very respectable rank in the army, solely through the medium of a rascally crimp." The subject touched upon in the preceding extracts, the want of chiefs and experience, is more fully developed at a later date.

"The want of general officers to command brigades has in this army been an evil of the most serious nature, and has been attended with the very worst consequences. From the time Lord Cathcart left us—which, if I recollect right, was about the 23d of July—till Generals Balfour and De Bourg joined, which was the latter end of September, we had five brigades ofiatantry of the lipe, with one major-general, (Stewart,) for General Fox is too much occupied. in his staff employment to be reckoned as a major- general, though his zeal induces him to come forward as such whenever he can.

"In this time the command of brigades devolved on young men newly come into the service, whose years and inexperience totally disqualified them for the situation. I could mention lads of one-and-twenty who had never been on service before. Be assured, the Duke made the most urgent and repeated representations how much the service was injured by this circum- stance but the two most active months of the campaign were allowed to pass without any redress; and then, at that late period, two major-generals came out in lieu of the four that were wanting ; and, at the same time, an augmentation to the army of those regiments which were sent from Lord Mulgrave made a fifth absolutely necessary.

"The want of general officers is always a great detriment to the service ; but in this army particularly so, where the field-officers are many of them boys, and have attained their rank -by means suggested by Government at home, which, I am sure, have never directly or indirectly received the smallest

countenance from the Commander-in-chief in this country : consequently his Royal Highness cannot be responsible for their youth and inexperience.'

The disgust towards Austria is strong, and breaks out on every occasion : sometimes a mere opinion ; sometimes, as in this passage, containing the facts on which the conclusion is grounded.

"TO HIS SISTER.

" Head-Quarters, Nymegen, October 9, UN.

"Of public news I can only tell you, that the Austrians are all across the Rhine, and that they now declare their intention of defending the banks of that over; in which, as it is the boundary of the Emperor's own dominions, I conclude that they will keep their word. Let me give you a trait of that monarch, which, in my opinion, forms a very worthy and consistent finale to his political and military career for the year 1794. He has directed that nona,of those people who, from their attachment to the house of Austria, and from the part they have taken in its support, have been driven to the cruel necessity of abandoning their homes and possessions in the Netherlands, shall be allowed to seek an asylum in any part of his hereditary dominions. If there is one human being on the face of the earth who has done more prejudice to the cause of [sovereigns, and who has furnished more arguments in favour of Democracy, than another, it is his Imperial Majesty."

The following opinion on subsidies and self-reliance is also based somewhat on facts.

" In regard to another campaign, I most sincerely hope, that those who have the administration of our affairs at this awful period will have learnt, from dear-bought experience, the very little reliance we can place on real cooperation from our Allies. The Prussian subsidy was useless, as the event has too clearly demonstrated ; but I believe the evils it has produced, inde- pendently of our being duped out of our money, are not to be told; for I am quite convinced, that from the moment that cursed treaty was published, the first object was not to beat the French but to cheat the English. The situation of his Prussian Majesty's empire and subjects, I believe, now prevents his completing his engagements, even were he so inclined : and, take this from me, the abandonment of Flanders is too favourite a measure with the pre- vailing party in the Imperial Cabinet (which I believe to be the most profli- gate and debauched in Europe,) to be put aside by subsidy, and it is a mea- sure in which the army acquiesce with pleasure. In short, I really believe that whatever share of public spirit and public virtue remains on the earth is exclusively concentrated in Great Britain. Let us trust to nothing but God and ourselves; for, I repeat it again and again, there is nothing else left on which we can rely with safety. " I have never thought it very likely that the General who, with 60,000 men and upwards, crossed the Rhine, leaving Mnestricht to its fate, losing Cologne, Bonn, &c. and all the country between the Rhine and the Meuse early in September, would in November reeross the Rhine with half his army, and under many disadvantages, to fight the battle which he declined six weeks before with everything in his favour. Surely, my dear friend, the calamities of the campaign must open the eyes of our rulers, and impress them with this truth, that not the smallest reliance can be placed on the King of Prussia, or Emperor ; they are absolute swindlers."

Attached to the main correspondence are a few letters of Sir Harry Calvert, when he was sent, in 1795, on an abortive mission to Berlin, the King of Prussia having already signed a treaty. An. appendix contains a series of elaborate professional papers on the best mode of meeting an invasion, apparently drawn up when Sir Harry was Adjutant-General. The few operative suggestions, as it were, are probably obsolete ; the general lines of defence, rest- ing on the natural features of the country, are to a great extent as valuable as ever.