THE FUTURE OF WESARISM.
/ITEM marriage of the Duke of Aosta, once King Amadeo of Spain, to his niece, the Princess Letitia Bonaparte, reported in the journals of Wednesday at such preposterous length and expense, has absolutely no political importance whatever, and only one point about it of the slightest political interest. The Duke of Aosta's career ended with his abdication. He is not likely to succeed to the throne of Italy, even if his renunciation of all claims to it should prove as meaningless as such renunciations usually are, and, indeed, under the Legitimist theory of right, must necessarily be ; and the Bonapartists, so far as they are devotees of a family, uphold the Salic Law as strictly as the Bourbons. They never name the descendants of Napoleon's sisters. If they throw over Prince Victor, they will not turn for a candidate to a son of Princess Letitia, though, according to English ideas, he would be the nearest heir. The destiny of no country is affected by the wedding, and the only point of interest in it, beyond the evidence it affords that the Roman Catholic Church still claims the right to allow the marriage of such close relations, is, as the Standard has observed, the proof it affords that the Royal families of Europe admit the Bonapartes to be in some sense Royal. The House of Savoy could not directly deny that while the Princess Clotilde lived ; but we fancy, if the marriage had been regarded as a m4alliance, means of preventing it would have readily been found. The Princess Clotilde's consent could easily have been refused on the ground of too close kinship ; and the grant of a dispensation from the Pontiff would have involved delays equivalent to refusal. One wonders whether, in thus judging, the Royalties are right,—whether, that is, the chance of a Bonaparte restoration is a really serious one. They should know their special business best; but we have seen of late some reason to doubt whether they do know it, whether they comprehend subtle changes in popular feeling, whether Csesarism in France may not wholly outlive any regard for the NapoleonidEe. That regard, it may be admitted, materially smoothed the path of Napoleon M. The body of the peasantry, and perhaps a majority of Frenchmen of all other classes, no doubt approved the Coup d'ttat out of dislike of Parliamentary government and dread of the Red Spectre which they thought the only and the imme- diate alternative. They were, however, greatly influenced also by the President's name, by the idea that it implied victory over the foreigner, by the fancy that the chief of that House must, by all laws of heredity, be among visible candidates the ablest man. We are not sure that this sentiment lingers in France now. Loyalty to a person is a feeling difficult to arouse in Frenchmen, the name of Napoleon is now associated with defeat, and there are few signs of the disaffected in France still clinging to the tradi- tion. On the contrary, the marked fact of the situation is that now that the wheel has gone nearly round, that the Republic has lost its prestige, and that France begins to sigh for a, dictator, Bonapartists and Legitimists find it possible to coalesce, and that the mass of Re- actionaries have selected a new standard-bearer. The common people are not voting, we may be sure, in order that General Boulanger should restore either the Bonapartes or the House of France. Had the feeling been for the Napoleons, and not merely for a dictator of some kind, it would have declared itself long since, and unmistakably. There are plenty of influential Bonapartists, old Prefects of the Empire, ready to be elected, and it is no more dangerous to vote for them than to vote for the can- didate whom the ruling party so openly detest. Loyalty to the Bonapartist heir could be shown as easily as loyalty to the Legitimist. Of danger from the mob there is none outside Paris, and even in Paris an organ of the Extremists, the Cri du Peuple, recently declared Parliamentarism to be a disease caused by a bacillus, which induced people to bellow like maniacs, and that a paroquet inoculated with it immediately began to ridicule General Boulanger in the language of M. Floquet ! Nevertheless, with a third of the people voting for a monarchy of any sort, and perhaps half of them hungering for a dictatorship, there is no manifestation in favour of Prince Victor, who is just as well ]mown and as little known as Louis Napoleon was in '48. Is it not at least possible that the French Omsarists have lost, as the Roman Cresarists lost, their original faint feeling of preference for their Julian House, and that when they crown a Cesar next, they will choose the man who seems to them the strongest, who has gladdened them with most political success, or who promises them most prosperity ? In that case, the whole clan of the Napoleonidse will be out of the race, for their name will bring them no support, except from a few administrators, while it is loaded down with the remembrance, always fresh while Alsace-Lorraine can cry aloud, of a great military calamity. There is no evidence whatever that the Julian House, had it lasted, would have retained a prior claim on the supreme office, and a Roman felt the claim of birth as a modern Frenchman never can.
This subtle change of sentiment, which may yet affect history most materially, although it extends the liberty of choice, may not secure to France rulers of ability. The Republic has failed to do that, and so may the dictator- ship. If the electors were competent, it would secure at least strong men ; but they are not competent, or they would obtain greater Parliamentary leaders. It is true that in Rome the sceptre rarely fell into incompetent hands, though there were instances of that occurrence while the Empire seemed irresistible ; but then, the Emperors were selected,—first by the soldiery, who at least knew who could and could not command ; and afterwards by the sternest of all processes, the test of a, series of battles, which at least revealed the soldier. Even fools could not mistake Vespasian. The French populace has no such test to apply, and is at least as likely to be charmed by a Lafayette, all feathers and magniloquence, or by a Boulanger, all promises and physique, as by a, soldier capable of organising, or a statesman competent to solve the most pressing social problems. There must be soldiers, and statesmen too, in France ; but they do not come decidedly to the top, or obtain from public favour any foothold, the strongest among them, M. Ferry, falling at the first breath of popular displeasure. The acumen of the people as to character seems to have been blunted, and it is the most singular fact in the recent history of a great nation, that with all barriers levelled and all careers open, with the claim of birth temporarily dead, and with every prominent man made as visible as an ubiquitous Press can render him, no Frenchman except General Boulanger has obtained even the slightest hold upon the people, and no Frenchman can be said to have achieved great practical success. The Caesar, when he comes, and most of the signs seem to show that he has nearly arrived, may as easily be incompetent as successive Premiers have been, though doubtless he will have easier work to do, the control of the Chamber being at present the impossible condition of success, and a Caesar who is incapable will fall. That is a poor outlook for France ; but it is at least as possible as any return of the Napoleons, whose dwindling followers now regard the stately ceremonial of Tuesday, with its procession of Kings and Princes and Ambassadors, as proof of the rank the family they support has attained in Europe. It is no proof of anything, except that in the eyes of the dynasties the chance of the Napoleons is not quite extinct, and that they therefore accord them a favour which they would never dream of withdrawing from the Bourbons. It is on the progress of ideas in France that Bonapartist chances depend, and, so far as outsiders can perceive, those ideas have taken a path fatal to the family, the path which leads to the conviction that Csesarism is better than representative government, and that a new man may prove an acceptable Caesar. There are plenty of Bonapartists still in some Departments ; but whether 10 per cent. of them would be discontented if the Dictator were not of the first Emperor's Lin, remains, to say the least, unproved.
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