THREE YEARS WAR AND WHY NA T HET HER the War
Cabinet's announcement of the decision to prepare for a three-years war was a deliberate or a fortuitous response to the speech delivered by Field Marshal Goering in a Berlin munition factory the same day, the Field Marshal's threats, appeals and protestations could have no fitter commentary. The hopes of the rulers of Germany are not disguised. Poland is to be crushed in a whirlwind campaign—Goering gives it four weeks in all, including " cleaning-up " operations— during which Germany will stand on the defensive in the west. Then will come peace proposals. They will not necessarily emanate from Berlin. Signor Mussolini is reputed to be working hard on a peace-plan which he will launch at the appropriate moment. It will be scrutinised with respect if and when it comes. There will be no predisposition to question its bona fides, for though the close relations which till recently existed between Italy and Germany may suggest the possibility of a manoeuvre concerted between Berlin and Rome there is every sign that Italy intends to make her neutrality genuine, and from her own point of view every reason why she should.
Whatever the authorship of the peace proposals of which Field Marshal Goering's speech gives a preliminary hint, and of which we are likely soon to hear something more specific, they are destined to fail doubly unless they embody terms such as it is inconceivable that a Nazi Germany should accept. They will fail to bring an early peace— not that they will be designed with that end seriously in view. And they will fail equally in what may be regarded as their primary purpose, to transfer the responsibility for the continuation of the war from Ger- many to the Allies. The world is not dependent, for the formulation of its judgements, on the propagandist pro- testations of any combatant. The facts are before its eyes, and the conclusions flow from them irresistibly. Even the Moscow Izvestia, studious hitherto to preserve a frigid objectivity, refers as it were involuntarily to Germany's invasion of Poland. There stands exposed the single naked fact. Germany invaded Poland. Having previously declared that he had no further territorial ambitions in Europe, Herr Hitler last year invaded Austria, and was not resisted. Having repeated that he had no further territorial ambitions, he last March in- vaded Czecho-Slovakia, and was not resisted. Last month he invaded Poland, and Poland, in the simple and moving words of her Ambassador in London, "dared to say No to Hitler," and is fighting today for her inde- pendence and her life. Britain and France, who had pledged themselves to stand by her in such a case, have honoured their bond. There in two sentences is the truth and the whole truth. Not a syllable more is needed to explain why war came. The issue is as simple and clear- cut as that.
Because it is so clear-cur and so simple the verdict of the world is decisive. Germany has had her associates, whether or not she has them now. They may for reasons of self-interest desire her victory, though there is none of them for whom it would not ultimately spell disaster. But not one of them can believe that there was any cause of war except German aggression. Not one of them can doubt that in this war, unlike almost any other war in history, the undivided responsibility lies on the shoulders of a single State. That being so, neither our statesmen nor our less official spokesmen need waste breath in pro-. claiming the purity of the motives with which we took up arms. Other tasks are much more important, one of them in particular. We must make it, and keep it, un- equivocally clear that we can countenance no peace which leaves the aggressor in possession of ill-gotten gains, and that, however long and hard the struggle, we intend no ill to the German people, covet not an acre of their territory, and so far from seeking to curtail their free- dom seek rather to restore it. On the basis of those principles the war must be fought, for the three years which we are preparing for and if necessary for longer. It must be the constant purpose of Allied speakers and writers to proclaim them ceaselessly and convey them to the people of Germany and all other lands by every means which opportunity may offer or ingenuity can devise.
That is the first step towards a definition of war-aims, and for the present it will suffice. Our primary aim is clear—to resist aggression, and to support and ultimately re-establish its victims, which include Czecho-Slovakia, and if she desires it, Austria, no less certainly than Poland. In taking that stand, and insisting continuously that we seek nothing for ourselves, we make it plain that we are fighting the battle of every lesser State in Europe. Holland, Belgium, Hungary, Rumania, Yugo- slavia, Bulgaria, Greece, are all, and all know they are, potential objects of future German domination if Ger- many wins this war. However correctly neutral their governments may be, their peoples have intelligence enough to grasp the situation, and their sympathies are inevitably dictated by it. Our business is to keep the salient facts, and above all the fundamental fact of our own disinterestedness, perpetually before them. Field Marshal Goering alleges that this country "wants to pre- vent a German town from returning to the German Reich." He had been answered more than a fortnight before he spoke by Mr. Chamberlain, who declared in the House of Commons that if war came "we shall not be fighting for the political future of a far-away city in a foreign land; we shall be fighting for the preservation of those principles the destruction of which would involve the destruction of peace and liberty for the peoples of the world." There could be no better war-aim.
But to set before us clear and worthy aims is one thing; to ensure that they are known to and understood by both neutrals and the enemy is another. Part of the responsibility for the latter task falls on the Ministry of Information, and so far as neutrals are concerned it should not be difficult. To reach the German people is, of course, far harder. But truth does ultimately percolate, and it may be more important at this moment to define our attitude towards Germany than to find ways of con- veying knowledge of it to the German people. There should be little doubt about it, but it needs stating plainly by either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary. We seek to impose one restric- tion, and one only, on the German people. What- ever form of government they choose, they must not choose Hitlerism. To do them justice, they never have chosen it. Herr Hitler never secured a majority at any free election. Hindenburg offered him
the Chancellorship and from that moment freedom dis- appeared; the internal politics of Germany were deter- mined thenceforward by the Secret Police. A rOgime witn which no agreement can be made because perjury and repudiation are the chief weapons in its diplomatic annoury must go, with its leader and all his immediate associates. Germany can remain totalitarian, she can return to democracy, she can revert to monarchy; we do not aspire to prescribe her constitution. Nothing will be taken from her. Even the German character of Danzig will still be recognised. No trade channels will be closed to her. Whatever she could justly claim before the war will still be a proper subject for claim after it. There is only one condition. Hiderism, damned irrevocably, must go. With it there can be no truce or compromise, whether its destruction takes three years or thirty. Without Hiderism Germany can have peace and freedom and even friendship. That is the truth which all our resources in propaganda must somehow bring home to the German people.
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