THE CHANCES OF REVOLT IN GERMANY By ROBERT POWELL I S
the German Reich, despite its show of military strength, heading for internal revolution at an early date? That was the question with which almost all the Berlin corre- spondents were greeted immediately they crossed the Ger- man frontier. Whether they went to Denmark, to Holland or to Belgium, they were always asked this question. And here in Great Britain they found that their editors and friends were equally eager to hear something on the same subject. That, of course, is natural enough.
Let us look at the facts as they appeared to the foreign observer in Germany just a few days before War was declared and try to assess conditions in the light of them and of the reports since received from that country. That great unrest exists throughout the whole territory ruled by the Nazis today is very true. It exists and has existed for a long time past. One had only to talk privately with repre- sentatives of all classes and opinions to hear complaints and condemnation of the present regime. The manufacturer who was weary of being dictated to by ignorant party bosses, the worker who hated the Bonzos who were growing rich and living in luxury, the older generation disgusted with the moral and cultural degradation to which Hitler and his advisers have brought German civilisation today, the thou- sands of Jews and other "outcasts "—all these are loud in their condemnation. It is unnecessary to add that what can be said of conditions in Germany itself applies far more emphatically to Austria, especially Vienna, and to the " Pro- tectorate " of Bohemia-Moravia.
To the old complaints the Germans had against the Nazis must be added, during the past fortnight, that Hitler has taken his country into a war, not simply with Poland, but also with Great Britain and France. One might talk much about the fact that the Fiihrer has broken yet another of his promises to his own people, and this time so openly that even the simplest must n_alise that he has been let down. The first results of the march of the triumphal armies have been new burdens, ration-cards, new taxes, less beer and thinner quality, dearer milk and an increasing danger of inflation. For no German is so naïve as to believe the excuses given by his Government for the printing of notes of such small denominations as two marks at a time when the monetary circulation is increasing by millions of marks every month. His only hope is that, as in the case of earlier successes in Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, so now Poland will either foot the bill or at least help to stem the headlong rush to financial catastrophe until it can be again "adjusted "—how they do not know or care.
The facts of the discontent, shortage of foodstuffs and of raw materials, &c., are all true. Not all the boasting of Goering can disguise that. But what is more important than the facts is the question how the German people inter- pret them, and whether if this interpretation were along " democratic " lines, they could or would take any decisive and collective action. Right interpretation implies an adequate knowledge of the facts, if not by the people them- selves then at least by the Press, cultural leaders, &c., who will present the case to their readers. But this has been impossible in Germany for six years. Not only have the facts been withheld but deliberate misstatements have re- placed them. The result is that the Glekhschaltung (co-ordi- nation) which Goebbels initiated by terror and brutality in 1933 has produced a nation which has become apathetic and even more fatalistic than before the Nazis came to power. The average Briton's ignorance, which brought us to last September's Munich Agreement, is as nothing com- pared with the abysmal ignorance of the average German about what his rulers want him not to know. But the German has been in the "September information stage" for nearly seven years! He had been told so often that Britain and France would not fight "over Danzig" that he has hardly grasped the reality even today.
In view of their ignorance of the facts and of the false interpretations so long supplied them, the Germans are not likely to accept suddenly the British-French explanation of events. When shells burst over their positions or bombs blow up their battleships, is it conceivable that they are going to believe that " encirclement " is simply a peaceful or defensive action of the democracies? The dropping of pamphlets, rather than bombs, may have its value as an indication that we could do other things if we so desired. But it is very doubtful whether pamphlet-dropping will in fact achieve much. This kind of kid-glove attack smacks too much of " appeasement " to the younger generation of Germans, who understand only the language of brute force and have yet to be convinced that the British and French mean business. (This is our price for " Munich " and it is not yet fully paid.) But even if the average German becomes convinced of the Allies' arguments, what are the chances that effective action will follow? Today, there are over 3,000,000 Germans under arms. At the time of writing the majority of them are not in Germany. They are either in Poland, Bohemia- Moravia or Slovakia. In other words, they are far from their homes and usual surroundings. They are soldiers liable to military discipline, and hardly likely to be thinking much about revolution when they are devastating other people's territory and adding new provinces to the Reich. Would it be unnatural under such conditions, and remem- bering all the " conquests " which Hitler has brought them in so short a time, that if they gave a thought to the democracies, they would maintain that Britain and France could never give them what their Fiihrer has given the new Germany? • Many of the workers, upon whom the hopes of an anti- Nazi revolution have been set, are among these soldiers. Thousands of others are still at work in factories and work- shops. Undoubtedly, much sabotage will reveal itself during the next few weeks (especially in Bohemia-Moravia and in Vienna). But at the same time the ruthless Gestapo (Secret Police) is more active than ever, and if its methods were severe and inhuman in peace-time, words fail to express its treatment of its victims in war. Moreover, Germany has been living in such a " war-peace " system for so many years, and all contacts of anti-Nazis have been so spasmodic and ineffective, that they are not likely to function immediately in war-time. It is consistent with a whole-hearted admiration for the brave acts of resistance of many individual Germans to add that, judged from the viewpoint of effective revolution, they are unimpressive.
It is very tempting to see much in the disillusionment which the signing of the German-Soviet Pact must have brought to the "Old Veterans" in the Nazi Party, to talk of the final revelation of the failure of the Fiihrer's omni- science since the period of bloodless triumphs is over, but the speed of events has given the German little time or opportunity to think ; and even if he had it, his mind has been so warped that he could not quickly react. You cannot surrender all personal responsibility under the Leadership Principle for years, and then expect suddenly to be able to act as a free man. Let us read the lesson of the last war aright as far as the question of Germany's surrender is concerned. It was not because of any implicit faith in Wilson's Fourteen Potnts that the Germans surrendered, nor simply because of the troubles at home. Another fundamental fact was that had the war continued fighting would have taken place on German soil. Such an idea is repugnant to the German. He still holds to the doctrine of Frederick the Great, "Spread the cloth as far away from Germany as possible." And as a result, not all the pamphlets in the world will influence his action so much as the fact that the French are already across the German frontiers.
In conclusion, there is one fact which must also be mentioned. It is that Germany is a country in which any- thing is possible. The erratic " dynamism " which pro- duced the Nazis may with equal swiftness turn and rend them. But, in view of all that has been said above, that eventuality is hardly likely to come about until Germany has experienced military defeat and much greater economic hardship, or the Nazi leaders quarrel among themselves— a hope so long deferred that "it maketh the heart sick" indeed.
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