TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT OF VETO.
ikGREAT many clever speeches were made during the debate on the second Resolution—which the liberals describe as abolishing the veto of the Lords— but the realities of the question were scarcely touched. Even the Opposition leaders did not insist upon the House of Commons being made to face exactly what it is about, but seemed to prefer small dialectical points and minor issues. What the House of Commons is really engaged in doing is depriving the people of the United Kingdom of that somewhat restricted and imperfect right of veto over the actions of their repre- sentatives which in certain cases the Constitution has hitherto accorded to -them. The allegation that the Lords either possess or claim a right to veto legislation is the purest moonshine. Those who possess the power of veto, as do a good many Continental Sovereigns, as do some of the Second Chambers abroad, and as does the President of the United States, exercise a very different function. They assert the right to forbid a Bill which is presented to them by the Lower House, or by both Houses, of Parliament from ever becoming law. The Lords have entirely and irrevocably abandoned the right of veto, though no doubt they once possessed it. Under the working of the Constitution the very most that the Lords have claimed to do in the present generation is to secure in doubtful cases the right of veto to the electors through a General Election. When in recent times the Lords have refused to pass a Bill, the spokesmen of the majority have always made it perfectly clear, as they did in the case of the Budget, that their action was intended, not as the exercise of any supposed right of the Lords to stop legis- lation which they dislike, but solely to obtain a clear and direct order from the people. Every such declaration has always wound up with the frankest admission that if an appeal takes place to the country, and the country elects representatives who again send up the referred Bill to the Lords, it will be their duty to accept that decision without further question. The fact that they themselves continue to think the measure injurious will in the contemplated case have no influence on their action.
Thus by the working of the Constitution the people of this country are in matters of great moment secured an opportunity of expressing an opinion as to whether their representatives have or have not rightly interpreted their wishes in regard to the construction of a particular piece of legislation. The appeal thus secured may without exaggeration be said to be the chief safeguard of democracy. In a very real sense it establishes the sovereignty of the people and makes them supreme. If the right of veto which is thus lodged by the practical operation of the Constitution in the hands of the people is taken away from them, as is proposed by the Government's second Resolution, supremacy in a most important particular passes away from the people, and is usurped by the House of Commons. When the people have elected a House of Commons, as long as that House remains undissolved it will, subject only to a little delay, be "in all causes ecclesiastical as well as civil within these its dominions supreme." While that House of Commons lasts the people will have lost all power over it and its doings. To take an analogy from the law that governs individuals, the electors will be in the position of a man who has given to an agent a power of attorney irrevocable during a fixed period by the person who gave it. In such a case the principal may long to veto the acts of his agent, but he has no power to say him nay during the period fixed, though no doubt the agent may himself cancel the old power and ask for another. Let us consider in detail once again how the power of the House of Lords to give the people an opportunity of exercising a veto over legislation works in practice. People sometimes talk as if the power of the Lords to consult the electors were always leading to Dissolutions and throwing the administration of the country into confusion. In reality nothing of the kind happens, for the very good reason that the House of Lords is ex- ceedingly timid about troubling the electors with the question : " Does this Bill really represent your wishes, or would you like to veto it? " The House of Lords either passes a Bill which it dislikes because it believes that such a Bill does represent the will of the people, or else by rejecting it it interprets the will of the people so accurately that the Government responsible for the Bill do not dare to submit it to the ordeal of a General Election. A good example of the admission by the Lords that a Bill which they considered thoroughly bad was, nevertheless, in their view in accord with the will of the people is to be found in the Trade Disputes Bill. The Lords regarded that measure as injurious, as indeed did a considerable section of the Government, but they believed that if it were referred to the people the verdict of the people would be for it. Accordingly they did not think it expedient to insist that it should be submitted to the people. In the case of the Education Bill the Lords believed that the Bill did not express the will of the people of the United Kingdom. Therefore they claimed that before it became law it should be referred to the electors. The justice, or at any rate let us say the correctness, of their diagnosis was tacitly admitted by the Government. They would not risk an ad hoc Dissolution. They had no confidence that it would receive popular approval. In the case of the Old-Age Pensions Bill, the Lords again believed that the people would not veto that measure. Therefore, though undoubtedly the majority of the Peers were against a non-contributory scheme, they did not think it a measure which ought to be referred. Then came the Budget, which, as our readers know, we thought it inexpedient to refer to the people. The Lords, however, thought otherwise; and we are bound to say that their action has to a great extent been justified by the result. As the history of the present Session has shown, if the Budget of 1909-10 had been submitted to the new House of Commons as soon as it assembled, it would have been rejected. That is a statement which is fully borne out by the tactics of the Government. The electors, in fact, rejected the Budget; though it is possible that by a series of Parliamentary bargainings the Govern- ment may be able to induce the representatives of the people to accept it in a modified form, and thus stultify the suffrages of the voters. Let us now consider what would have happened to the Bills which we have mentioned if the Government Resolu- tions had been in force, and the Lords had had no right to call the veto powers of the people into existence, but had been obliged after a certain amount of delay to accept anything and everything that was sent to them by the House of Commons. The Education Bill, which the Government tacitly admitted would have been vetoed at a General Election, would have been passed, and the same thing would have happened with the Budget, which has actually been vetoed at a popular reference. In view of these facts, can it be said that we are exaggerating when we say that the real proposal before the country now is to deprive the people of the somewhat imperfect, but never- theless exceedingly useful, form of veto which they now possess owing to the functions claimed and exercised by the House of Lords ?
It is of course quite possible to argue that the right of veto over the actions of the representatives of the people is a useless, or indeed injurious, institution, and that the sooner it is got rid of the better. Those, however, who believe, as we do, that the right of veto ought to exist in every sound Constitution, and that the proper place in which to lodge that right is the hands of the', people, cannot be expected to support the Government plan. Further, it is begging the question entirely to talk about " the monstrous pretensions of the Lords to withstand popular government." As we have shown, the Lords make no such pretensions, but merely claim that in doubtful matters the people shall be consulted. There remains the question whether the present House of Lords is a suitable body to exercise this undoubtedly very important function of deciding in regard to a particular Bill whether it ought or ought not to be submitted to a popular vote. For ourselves, we hold that an Upper Chamber reformed on the lines indicated in the recent debates in the House of Lords, and set forth in the principles to which Lord Rosebery is now inviting the Peers to give their assent, would be a much better body than the present body. But remember that the obstructives to reform of this kind are not the Peers but the Commons. Sir Carruthers Gould expresses this fact in his cartoon in Wednesday's West- minster Gazette. Lord Rosebery tells the inefficient and undesirable Peer to go away, while Mr. Asquith says he may stop under restrictions.
Though it is notorious that a very large section, probably a majority, of the present Government would, if they dared, like to reform the House of Lords, they have not ventured to do more than talk about it as a possibility of the future. If we are to judge the Government and the Commons by their acts and not by their words, which is the only safe way of judging in politics, what they mean to do is to deprive the people of all right of veto over legislation by depriving the Lords of their power to insist on a reference to the people. It is conceivable, no doubt, that if the House of Commons succeeds in depriving the people of their right of veto, it may alter the composition of the Upper House. It is hardly necessary to say, however, that all interest in such reconstruction will evaporate as soon as the Lords have been deprived of the one important function which they still retain,—the right of calling for a reference. No one seriously troubles about repair- ing a building which has ceased to be inhabited or used. If it were decided that in no circumstances should the Army take the field, or that, if it did, nothing but blank ammunition should ever be served out to the men or to the batteries, who in the future would trouble about Army reform ? Bills for its better organisation would be laughed out of Parliament. We may be perfectly sure, then, that if once the Lords are deprived of their functions, we shall hear no more about reform. The only possible answer to this line of argument is that the Government may regard such deprivation as a purely temporary measure, and that as soon as the House of Lords is reformed they may restore to it its former powers. It is well to note, however, that when Sir Henry Dalziel asked the Government whether they were contemplating action of this kind, he was unable to obtain any answer,—a fact which obviously means that the Government do not imagine that it will be possible to restore their functions to a reformed House of Lords, should they ever adopt the policy of rebuilding a structure that has been abandoned as permanently unfit for use. Let us end by asking the electors to keep their eyes fixed upon the realities of the situation, and not to allow their minds to be clouded by rhetoric and sophistry. No matter what the names used, what the Government are engaged on is a scheme for depriving the people of all right of veto over the legislative acts of the House of Commons.
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