Geneva and World Power By JULES MENKEN A resolution adopted
at Berlin on February 18th provides the diplomatic basis for the Geneva conference. Although attendance of both Peking and the North Korean puppet government is envisaged, the Berlin resolution expressly stipu- lates that neither their invitation nor the conference itself "shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded." Barring miracles, it is already abundantly clear that the Korean problem will not be solved at Geneva. Without Soviet and Chinese support the North Korean regime is manifestly not viable. Before the Com- munist aggression in June, 1950, about 9 million people lived in North Korea and about 21 million in South Korea. The 21 million North Korean refugees who (in Lenin's apt phrase) "voted with their feet" by fleeing to the south at one time or another during hostilities testify to popular detestation of Com- munist rule. But North Korea is far too important to Com- munist strategy for Moscow or Peking to give it up. The great Japanese-built hydro-electric station at Suiho on the Yalu supplies a large portion of the power essential to the Chinese . heavy industry and armaments base in Manchuria. North Korean mines supply tungsten much wanted by, if perhaps not essential to, the Soviet armaments industry. Even more important, North Korea is indispensable as a base for the Com- munist conquest of all Korea. Before June, 1950, Moscow pursued this aim tenaciously by all means short of war; reports by Swiss and Swedish members of the United Nations Super- visory Commission that the Communists are now pouring air- craft, munitions, and other warlike supplies into North Korea in defiance of their armistice undertakings show that Moscow has not abandoned its goal today. Once again, the reason is only too clear. Korea as a whole is all but indispensable for a Communist conquest of Japan—another aim which Moscow and Peking have assuredly not abandoned. Quite apart from the contrary but no less resolute will of the South Koreans to achieve their own unification of the peninsula, it is unthinkable that either Washington or London, after all the blood and sacri- fice poured out to defend them, could allow such strategically vital prizes to fall to world Communism.
The problem of Indo-China is much more complex. The immediate situation turns on the battle which has been raging at Dien Bien Phu since the major Viet Minh attack there began on March 13th. Under the leadership of Colonel de Castries, one of the great soldiers of this generation, heavily out- numbered French, French Union, and Vietnamese forces have been fighting with a valour, skill, and tenacity which will make the name of this remote valley glorious not only in the resplen- dent French military tradition but also in the wider history of war. In the larger framework of the struggle in Indo-China as a whole, Dien Bien Phu shows that the Viet Minh cannot defeat the French and French Union forces in frontal attack without losses which the Communists cannot sustain over a long period. Unfortunately, it also shows that Chinese aid to the Viet Minh in the form of arms, transport, road-building, training, and military, political, and technical advice is far larger than had previously been realised. Even Dien Bien Phu, a battle engaging (with immediate reserves) upwards of 60,000 Communist troops, has not compelled the Viet Minh to remain inactive elsewhere; while their concurrent guerrilla attacks in the Red River delta—especially on the vital road and railway by which American supplies arriving at the port of Haiphong travel to Hanoi—testify to the strategic skill and experience now directing Viet Minh operations.
In terms of physical geography, the Viet Minh hold firmly much of North Vietnam, occupy parts of Central Vietnam, and have a weaker grip on a few areas of South Vietnam. They also occupy northern Laos, and retain a few isolated areas in Cambodia. But in Indo-China physical geography is mislead- ing; and in terms of strategic geography the Viet Minh position is far weaker. Of the total population of Indo-China, perhaps two-fifths are under Communist rule or control; but the areas in which they live are food-deficit areas; the vital rice-growing deltas of the Red River in the north and the Mekong in the south are firmly in French Union hands; and so long as the will to resist continues and troops and supplies in sufficient quantities flow in from overseas, the Viet Minh, with forces estimated at something over 300,000, cannot defeat the French Union forces of more than 500,000 (of whom about 300,000 will be Vietnamese troops by the end of this year) or Will a victory in the field. The crucial question is thus whether the will to resist will continue. The Vietnamese will depends first and foremost on independence. Qualified independence within the French Union • is not enough; complete independence, and nothing less, is essential. But complete independence is just what the French at present will not give; and on this very point negotiations with Prince Buu Loc, the Vietnamese premier, reached dead- lock last month. Since complete independence for Vietnam would create a precedent for other parts of the French Union —North Africa in particular—the French attitude is under- standable, even though it cannot be sustained in the long run. The French will to resist is harder to assess. In many circles weariness and disgust with the war in Indo-China are extreme, and there is readiness to make peace with the Viet Minh on any—or almost any—terms. A victory at Dien Bien Phu would tap French pride and rally waverers; but at Geneva the French representatives will certainly hope and work for a settlement, if any tolerable—or even plausible—settlement can be arranged.
The trouble is that no settlement is possible which accords with the vital interests of the West. Neither physical nor strategic geography makes it feasible to divide Indo-China as Korea is divided. Any attempt to do so would destroy Viet- namese morale and hasten a Communist victory. The loss of Indo-China would threaten the rest of South-East Asia and bring Communism to the door of Australia. Loss of the rice of Indo-China, Burma, and Siam would expose the food-deficit countries of free Asia from India to Japan to severe Communist pressure and blackmail. The loss of South-East Asia would rob the West of vital strategic materials, rubber, tin, and tungsten among them. With the rich resources of South-East Asia at its command, Communist China could push indus- trialisation swiftly ahead and speed up the production of arma- ments which industrialisation has the primary purpose of pro- viding. Politically and morally the blow would be even more deadly. All over Asia and Africa the timid, the hesitant, and the careerists would argue that the West can no longer win, and would seek safety or advantage under the Communist banner.
Everything at Geneva will thus turn on American policy — and on British. Mr. Dulles's recent speeches and his trip this week to London and Paris should not be misunderstood : he former are part of the immense effort needed to bring home to American opinion the foquidable and unexpe.ned tasks i.ow confronting the United States; the latter is due to the urge.lcy of seeking tripartite unity before the conference meets )n ton has strengthened enormously in the past two months, and has grown sternly realistic as well. The informed and official British attitude is not less strong as regards fundamentals, though perhaps more supple as regards tactics. The right policy foF the West may be summed up in a paradox : Geneva will fad if it succeeds, and will succeed only if it fails. There are it() valid arguments for concessions to Communist China, or for giving her a breathing-space in which to extend her conquests and increase her strength.
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