THE GOVERNMENT'S EGYPTIAN BONDAGE.
SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE took credit last week at the Mansion House, for a policy "the result of which would be greatly to increase the honour and elevate the posi- tion of the country." We wonder whether he was romanticist enough to sustain himself in that optimist vein of feeling during the delivery of that confused and feeble apology for the Egyptian policy of the Government, with which he made answer to Sir Julian Goldstnid's very forcible indictment on Monday night. Could he have really thought that that curious mixture of extenuation and mystification would "increase the honour and elevate the position of the country ?" Nay, could he have thought that a policy for which that was the best excuse he could offer, had tended to anything but collapse of both ? A contemporary which is usually supposed to be more jocular than serious, lately depicted graphically the extraordinary " limpness " of Sir Stafford Northcote's moral condition, and thereby, perhaps, stimulated him into the unusual display of resolution with which, a day or two after, he met Mr. Chamberlain's advice to with- draw the Public Works Loans Bill,—"I won't 1" But that "hue of resolution" was by no means "native." Before Monday night, it had faded away again, and nothing could give a more painful impression of the helplessness of the Government than Sir Stafford Northeote's floundering reply to Sir Julian Goldsmid. What is charged against the Government in relation to Egypt is this :—(1), That we have embarrassed ourselves with responsibilities for the foreign Bondholder, whose interest in Egypt is not only not ours, but is in most respects opposed to ours, because it is opposed to the interests of the inhabitants of Egypt ; (2), that we have embarrassed ourselves, by undertaking joint and complex responsibilities with France, in a country in whose affairs France meddles for two reasons only,—the stock-jobbing interest just referred to, which is quite different from ours,— and a keen national jealousy of British influence, which is opposed to ours ; (3), that in the embroilments caused by these embarrassing ties, the Government, virtually distrusting the action of Parliament, have kept it even longer and more completely in the dark on Egyptian affairs than on any others, and have even positively misled it at very critical moments ; and (4), that as a result of all these fiounderings, Great Britain is now in a much worse position in relation to Egypt than it was before we bought the Suez-Canal shares, and has joined in deliberately placing Egypt in a permanently worse position for the future, by restoring the influence of the Porte, from which, at least, the late Khedive had cut himself free.
Now, on none of these heads did Sir Stafford Northcote make even a plausible defence. On all of them, his speech reads like the mere throwing of dust into the air, to make matters which are clear seem confused. In fact, on all these heads the leader of the House of Commons did not BO much speak as maunder,—that is, put forth a cloud of words, which came to nothing but complaints that the House of Commons would not trust the Government to flounder on as it had floundered, without asking questions which it was inconvenient to answer. Let us take each head in order, and see what the Chancellor of the Exchequer said to it. In relation to the first, the plea that we had identified ourselves with the cause of the foreign creditors of Egypt who should have looked out for themselves, and whose interest is so far from being identified with the interest of Egypt, that it is positively inconsistent with it, the ease can hardly be clearer than it is, or than Sir Julian Goldsmid showed it to be. On April 16th, 1878,—that is, sixteen months ago,—Lord Salisbury wrote to Mr. Vivian that, in the opinion of the French Government, the institution of the Finance Commission,—itself a concession to the foreign creditors of Egypt,—ought not to stand in the way of the payment of the coupon, then accruing, and that he was to urge this view upon the Khedive. What could be a more flagrant and open advocacy by the Government of the case of the Bondholders,—nay, not merely of the general case of the Bondholders, but of the immediate, pecuniary cravings of the Bondholders? And what we were doing sixteen months ago, we have been doing ever since. The crisis of the moment is identical in principle with the crisis of the spring of last year. We are now about to send out Major Baring as the English member of a body of control. The scheme of a tempo- rary Commission, which may very likely again include Mr. Rivers Wilson, though it is not decided upon, is, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer admits, again under discussion. We are doing a second time, under Tewfik Pasha, what we did before under Ismail Pasha. And except that everything in Egypt is a good deal worse than it was then, there is nothing to show that the foreign Bondholders are not exerting just as much influence, relatively to their more hopeless position, now, as they exerted a year and a quarter ago, when Lord Salisbury wrote his despatch in favour of paying the coupon that was then due. Sir Stafford Northcote "denied that the Government were acting for the Bondholders," but said nothing, apparently, about Lord Salisbury's de- spatch of April, 1878, which was as much dictated by the Bondholders as if he had been their agent. It may be very true that our interest in the Bondholders is not so much direct as indirect,—is due to the necessity of co-operating with France, rather than to the necessity of co-operating with the money-lenders who hold Egyptian Securities. But it is, never- theless, a stock-jobbing interest, for all that. Lord Salisbury used. the influence of England to get a coupon paid, and is still acting with the same colleagues, and taking precisely the same class of means for the same class of ends, as he took then. How idle, then, is it for Sir Stafford Northcote to deny in terms what all the facts of the case loudly attest!
That we have embarrassed ourselves, by identifying our action in Egypt with that of France, Sir Stafford Northcote did not attempt to deny ; and that France is concerned directly for the Bondholders, he implicitly affirmed. On the second head, therefore, we may say that the Chancellor of the Exchequer pleaded guilty, though he denied any guilt.
On the third head, the head of having not merely kept Parliament in the dark, but positively misled it, as to the policy pursued in Egypt, Sir Stafford icorthcote's disclaimers were so qualified, and so much diluted with lamentations that it was impossible to be candid to Parliament without hampering our policy in Egypt, that they were almost equivalent to admitting that the Government had played towards Parlia- ment at least a far from ingenuous part. "Questions," he said," were raised in that House on imperfect information, and the Government were pressed to make explanations. If they declined to do so, they were forthwith accused of endeavouring to keep the House in the dark ; and if they made a frenk and explicit statement, it was at once telegraphed out to Egypt, and made use of for personal or party purposes." That we take to be equivalent to a plea of "Guilty, with extenuating circumstances." But we can imagine no extenuating circum- stances for giving up our independent policy in Egypt for a policy of subserviency to French stock-jobbers, without even affording Parliament an opportunity of discussing so moment- ous a question. Lord Salisbury's despatch recommending the payment of the coupon, and all the important steps taken just before that despatch was written, were all entered upon at a time when Parliament was in Session ; but Parliament was kept sedulously in ignorance of the course of events. Again, this year, the despatch of March 8th, threatening the Egyptian Government with the consequences of ignoring our advice, has never been communicated to Parliament, though its terms are known. And yet in April, Sir Stafford Northcote gave two answers, both intimating that the Government admitted the right of the Khedive to dismiss his European Ministers, and that they would not punish him for so doing. Sir Stafford Northcote now takes refuge under the wretched and disingenuous plea that the Khedive was removed by the Sultan, not by France and Eng- land,—as if the Sultan would have dared to interfere at all with the Khedive, if he had not had plenty of hints that such an interference would be pleasing to, and supported by, the Powers of France and England. The simple truth is that for the last two years the British Parliament has not only been kept in the dark as to the Egyptian policy of the Government, but has been treated with much more reserve than the Chambers of France. Sir Stafford Northcote, when he replied that Mr. Rivers Wilson and his French colleague were Ministers of the Khedive, and liable to be dismissed by him, must have been aware that he was leading Parliament into the grossest possible misapprehension of the real drift of our policy in Egypt. The House of Commons thought we had made up our minds, re- luctantly perhaps, to let Egyptian policy alone,—at least, for a time,—when in truth we were setting to work underground, through our influence at Constantinople, to take our revenge on the Khedive, who had set our policy at defiance.
As to the fourth charge against the Government,—that Great Britain is in a worse position in regard to Egypt than she was before the famous purchase of the Suez-Canal Shares, —especially in this, that she is hampered with a French alliance, in which the interests of France and England are not the same, and that she has sanctioned the rostora- tion of the Turkish influence over Egypt, which may be used as easily by an enemy to countermine us, as by ourselves,—the Chancellor of the Exchequer had nothing to say. We do not know what could be pleaded against it, so self-evident is it. France is perfectly frank in admitting that she has a double interest in Egypt,—one to get the French creditors paid, the other to keep us in check. We have a much greater interest in seeing Egypt prosperous, as well as a far higher duty to perform in trying to make her prosperous, than we have in helping to keep French money-lenders in cash. And as for the French interest in checking us, of course that is not to our advantage. But we have now made sure that another of the Great Powers, who is not particularly well disposed to us, may do a. good deal to hamper us in Egypt, if she please. Russia is likely to have at least as much influence over Turkey as we are likely to have. And we have ourselves helped to turn that influence over Turkey into an influence over Egypt, by getting the Sultan to reassert the dependence of Egypt on Con- stantinople, and the new Khedive to admit that dependence. Such is the great result of this Government's strategy and expenditure in Egypt. The Government have prostituted our policy to the. interests of stock-jobbers, and stock- jobbers not even or our own nation,—instead of fight- ing for the millions who are the miserable victims of Egyptian misrule. They have consented to play a part second to France in a country where our objects are far higher than those of France, and far less bound up with alien interests. They have allowed Parliament to be not only kept in the dark, but misled, in order that these things might be the more easily done. And they have succeeded in putting Egypt once more under the foot of a Power which either France or Russia or both combined, may at any time turn into a Power hostile to us, and yet powerful to do in Egypt whatever our enemies might suggest. The holders of Egyptian Bonds' in spite of all their manoeuvres, are to be pitied. But Great Britain, which is held in bondage by these Bondholders, and is made ignoble by that bondage, is more to be pitied still.
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