ADMIRAL BYNG.• As Horace Walpole foresaw while the great court-martial
was still in progress, posterity has never been able accurately to strike a balance of blame between the various parties who were responsible for the lamentable loss of the Island of Minorca in 1756. To Byng's friends (so says the eulogy of his epitaph) his execution seemed " a perpetual disgrace of public justice " — an act of " political persecution " at a time "when bravery and loyalty were insufficient securities for the life and honour of a naval officer " ; and Walpole himself, after being distinctly hostile in the first shame of the disaster, came near to sharing the same view, and left a noble account of Byng's death, which must have gone near to converting many of his opponents. Yet there must have been some ground for the tremendous wave of feeling which was reflected in such watchwords as " Shoot Byng, or take care of your King," and in the savage prints and pamphlets which showered from the press both before and after the final scene on the quarter-deck of the `Monarque.' Bravery and loyalty of a kind we may grant the unfortunate Commander, yet we cannot think that the hostility to him was entirely factitious, entirely stirred up by Anson and the Admiralty to hide their own lack of judgment, or by Newcastle to cloak the effects of his own timidity. It was not only political persecution which brought Byng to his death, nor was the sentence passed on him a disgrace of public justice. In point of fact, Byng fell a victim to a harsh law, an obstinate King, and a series of blunders, for some at least of which he himself
• Tild Lou of Minorca. Edited by H. W. Richmond. 1'UL:cations of the Navy Record.3 Society. VoL
was not responsible. The court-martial expressly acquitted him of cowardice or disaffection, yet the law, which had been deliberately amended a short time before owing to the scan- dalous favouritism shown to influential deliuquents, was such that the only sentence that could be passed on him was the capital one. His judges, conscious of the excessive severity of the penalty, recommended him strongly to mercy. Johnson, always on the side of the unfortunate, threw himself into his cause, and the most strenuous efforts were made in his favour both in and out of the House of Commons. But public agita- tion was too strong ; the twelve judges, to whom the sentence was referred, refused to quash it, and the King stoutly declined to exercise his prerogative.
Captain Richmond's book, however, deals with none of these matters. The principal object is to make public the draft defence prepared by the Government of the time to meet the charges levelled against them in connexion with the disaster. Two copies of this document have been discovered, one in the British Museum and one in the Admiralty Library, and, as the two are not quite identical, the text has been compiled from both of them. The publication, together with its editor's introduction and notes, undoubtedly throws a great deal of light on a very obscure problem.
The position between England and France at the end of 1755 and 1756 was one of great difficulty. The French were known to be engaged on a comprehensive scheme of armament, the immediate objective of which could not be definitely ascertained. A considerable fleet was fitting out at Toulon, while even more extensive preparations were in progress in the Channel ports. These activities might have bad various objects. The Toulon fleet might be destined for a Mediterranean expedition, and Gibraltar, Minorca, and Corsica were all named as possible points of attack. Some, however, thought that both this and the northern armaments were intended for North America, where France and England were already in conflict. But by far the stronger opinion held that the object of the northern fleet was an invasion of either England, Scotland, or Ireland. Further, it was plain that either of these armaments might be used as a blind to divert attention from the other. To defend the country against these dangers the Admiralty had formulated the following policy. Before everything they put the actual defence of our own shores, and this necessitated the retention of a large fleet in home waters. The other cardinal point was the maintenance of a strong western squadron to watch the waterways to America end protect English commerce. This policy had been proved extremely efficacious in the recent war with Spain, when Anson, now First Lord of the Admiralty, had been one of its most successful exponents. The result of their insistence on these two cardinal principles was that the Government were extremely reluctant to detach a large force to watch Toulon or patrol the Mediterranean. Nor, perhaps, would such a course have been possible if there had been any immediate fear of invasion, for in the conditions of service prevailing at the time, the wear and tear both of ships and men was very rapid if a fleet was kept long from shore, and the necessity of keeping a consider- able number of ships continually at sea in the home waters meant the maintenance of a disproportionately large fleet on the active list.
With expert opinion taking this line and Newcastle in office, the timidity which, in fact, lost us Minorca was almost inevitable. In reading the detailed account of the intelligence which reached the Government from abroad during the twelve months preceding Byng's commission, one sees only too plainly how the calamity was brought about. As early as February 1755 the reports spoke of French activity at both Toulon and Brest, but although for a considerable time nothing was said for certain as to the destination of either armament, the general conclusion as to the northern force was, naturally enough, that it was designed for North America. Early in August rumour spoke of an attack upon Gibraltar from Provence, and in September a design upon Minorca is first mentioned. By the end of the year it became evident that the southern preparations were being eagerly pressed
forward, but the Government's informers were sure nothing could be ready till February or March, and the objective was still a matter of doubt. Meanwhile the Channel
armaments were causing grave anxiety. Extensive military preparations were reported in August, and very soon after- wards there came the first rumours of the projected invasion. These, however, are not at first taken very seriously, the informers rather assuming them to be circulated to divert attention from a proposed expedition to the West Indies. Throughout October the rumours gather weight, but in spite of the undoubted magnitude of the preparations it should have been plain to the Government at the end of the year, had they considered the actual details of their informa- tion coolly and without panic, that, whatever the design of the northern armament might be, there was no immediate likeli- hood of its being put into execution. Early in February of 1756 the Minorca rumours begin to gather weight, and in spite of conflicting reports, which persisted till the end of the month, orders were given on March 8th for the fitting out of Byng's squadron. It seems, however, that even now the Government were by no means convinced as to the real pur- pose of the Toulon preparations. All through January and February the reports from across the Channel had been growing more and more disquieting. Soldiers, artillery, ammunition, and stores were being moved up to the coast, and though some of the informants persisted in regarding these manoeuvres as a blind, the scale of the preparations was such that a panic seems to have been created in London. No doubt, the Government ought, as Captain Richmond. shows, to have analysed with more exactitude the actual conditions of the respective armaments. Advice received between February 24th and March 8th showed clearly that the southern expedition was nearly ready and that its object was almost certainly Minorca, but a careful consideration of the intelligence from the northern ports must have shown that the Channel force, whatever might be its destina- tion, was still far from completion and could not be ready for any project so serious as an invasion for a con- siderable time. Captain Richmond, indeed, seems to bold that the Government themselves did not really anticipate an immediate invasion, and he finds some support for this view in the fact that the Admiralty ventured to detach ships from the home forces for convoy and other services on several occasions during the early part of the year. But whether this is so or not, there is little doubt that the Government were by no means convinced as to the real objective of the Toulon armament. The latter part of March brought some conflict of information, and Byng's instructions of the 30th show that the authorities thought it at least equally likely that the enemy's fleet would have slipped out towards North America. At any rate, when Byng at last reached Gibraltar at the beginning of May, he found that the French under Richelieu had already succeeded in effecting a landing on Minorca.
And now the responsibility shifts from the Government to its commander on Byng's arrival, and Fowke, who was in command at Gibraltar, immediately summoned a council of war to consider the desirability of sending a detachment of the garrison to reinforce stout old General Blakeney at Port Philip. After much deliberation it was decided that• this was not advisable, as it would mean weakening Gibraltar for a cause which was already considered hopeless. Byng himself had expressed practically the same view in a despatch written home on May 4th, and be did not press Fowke to carry out his instructions. This was the first mistake. Byng had been ordered to do all in his power to relieve Minorca should he find it already attacked, yet be and Fowke had practically given up the task without even having visited the scene of action. No doubt the delay of the Admiralty had made the position very difficult, but Captain Richmond clearly shows that it was far from hopeless. Blakeney was firmly convinced that a landing might have been effected at small risk, and even a delay of a few days would have enabled further reinforcements to reach the fortress, which ultimately fell through a surprise attack on one of the outworks, rendered successful by the sheer exhaustion of the small garrison. Before this, however, Byng bad made his effort at sea, and this too failed. An interesting map of the engagement is given in the present volume, and there seems little doubt that the failure was due to mistaken tactics on the part of the British commander. He himself always maintained that his force was inadequate from the start, the French being superior both in the size of ships, weight of metal, and number of men. It is, however, by no means certain that this was the case. The Admiralty stoutly maintained that the English fleet was
definitely superior. Captain Richmond shows this view also to be untenable, and the truth seems to be that in effective force there was in fact 'very little to choose between the two squadrons. The real fault of the Government lay in not taking their measures earlier. Having regard to the import- ance of the island and the persistent information of the attack with which it was threatened, it seems plain that they should either have sent a force to close the harbour of Toulon in the first instance, or, failing that, have dispatched Byng's squadron earlier.
It seems that Byng realized this, and embarked upon his task with a premonition of failure. But the faults of the Government cannot excuse his own lack of spirit and initiative. His instructions were express, and it was his duty to obey them, and if the penalty appears excessive, the condemnation was not necessarily unjust. After all, the whole structure of warfare is founded on obedience, and if the failure to obey takes the form of a shrinking from danger and ends in ignominious defeat, the culprit has little right to expect mercy. Newcastle could oppose the impenetrable buckler of a party majority to the malice of his foes, but poor Byng's offence was flagrant, and with those who were scarcely less responsible than himself leagued against him for their own protection, he had nothing left him but to redeem the indignity of his failure by the nobility of his end.
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