LORD ROBERTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN DES PATCHES.
IF any further proof were needed of Lord Roberts's greatness as a commander, it could be found in the new South African despatches. They show how amply justified the British nation has been in reposing its con- fidence in him, and in regarding him as a soldier worthy to stand in the first rank. Public opinion may, and doubtless often does, err, but it has not erred here. In a, general a great deal more is -wanted than strategical and tactical ability. It is not enough to have the general's eye and the general's nerve. In supreme command there are also wanted the capacity and the willingness to take moral responsibilities of the most momentous kind, and to exercise judgment on the semi-political phenomena with which a general in the field is certain to be confronted. Moral courage is as necessary as physical bravery. The great soldier must, above all things, possess the mens cequa in arduis,—the power to keep his head and to exercise a cool judgment in the midst of confusion and perplexity, of distractions and doubts. He must know, on the one band, when to give an imperative order over the heads of the men on the spot, and when, on the other, to leave the men on the spot a free hand. This mixture of personal supremacy joined with trust and confidence in subordinates sounds easy enough on paper. In practice it is the most difficult thing in the world. But Lord Roberts, as the despatches show, contrives to combine the two qualities with as much success as has ever been achieved by any commander living or dead.
Take as an example of Lord Roberts's willingness to accept responsibility, however onerous, his correspondence with Sir Redvers Buller in regard to the relief of Lady- smith. Lord Roberts states that on February 6th last year he received a telegram from Sir Redvers Buller " reporting that he had pierced the enemy's line, and could hold the hill which divided their position, but that to drive back the enemy on either flank, and thus give his own artillery access to the Ladysmith plain ten miles from Sir George White's position, would cost him from two thousand to three thousand men, and success was doubtful. General Buller inquired if I thought that the chance of relieving Ladysmith was worth such a risk. On the same day I replied that Ladysmith must be relieved even at the cost anticipated. I urged Sir Redvers Buller to persevere, and desired him to point out to his troops that the honour of the Empire was in their hands, and to assure them that I had no doubt whatever of their being successful." Here is an example of Lord Roberts's perfect readiness to accept responsibility, and also of his judgment,—of his capacity to see things in their true proportions. It may seem to the public, judging in quiet and security, incredible that any general should have thought it possible to do anything else but relieve Lady- smith at all costs. But the fact remains that the man on the spot was so terribly impressed by the difficulties of the task that he not only put the question whether the risk was one which ought to be run, but emphasised his question in such a way that it entered the category of what grammarians call "questions that expect the answer 'No." Sir Redvers Buller could not possibly know that he would lose two thousand or three thousand men, and the only explanation of the figures in the context is of course that of rhetorical emphasis. To use them was merely a forcible way of declaring that to order the attempts at relief to continue was, in the circumstances, to order a butchery. Yet •even when the question was put to him in this form, and when the responsibility for an unsuccessful butchery would thus have fallen entirely on his shoulders, Lord Roberts did not shrink from the responsibility, but willingly took it. Even when Sir Redvers Buller supplemented his original question that expected the answer "No" by a formal declaration that he was engaged in an impracticable task, and when Sir Charles Warren confirmed this opinion, Lord Roberts remained unshaken. Here is Lord Roberts's account of this transaction :—" On the 9th February General Buller reported that he found himself not strong enough to re- lieve Ladysmith without reinforcements, and that, with the force at his disposal, he regarded the operation upon which he was engaged as impracticable. As Sir Charles Warren confirms the views of Sir Redvers Buller, I have informed the latter that, though I have no wish to interfere with his dispositions, or to stop his harassing the Boers as much as possible, my original instructions must hold good." The language of the last sentence is a little vague, but we presume it means that though Lord Roberts insisted on the attempts to relieve Ladysmith being continued, he did not wish to dictate (as of course he could not) the actual method of relief, and also that he was willing that the operations should not be hurried, or the plan of harassing the Boers be abandoned pending a new attack. He simply maintained the spirit shown in the old Indian story of the attack on the hill fort. An artillery subaltern was ordered to get a gun into a certain most difficult position. After trying again and again he went to his superior and reported that the feat was impossible. "Impossible !" was the reply. "Impossible I why I've got the order for it in my pocket." The subal- tern returned and got his gun into position. We shall be told perhaps that this is rhetoric. If it is, it is rhetoric of the kind on which the Empire is built. It must not, however, be supposed that Lord Roberts insisted on Ladysmith being relieved in spite of everything merely because he had ordered it. He did so in obedience to his sound judgment and wise discrimination. He realised, what apparently the commander on the spot did not see, that the very existence of the Empire was at stake. If we had failed to relieve Ladysmith, and some ten thousand men had laid down their arms or had been cut to pieces almost within sight of an army as gallant and as large as that which Sir Redvers Buller commanded on the Tugela, the military forces of Great Britain must henceforth have been regarded as something very like a negligible quantity. The notion of giving up the attempt to relieve Ladysmith was one which could not be entertained under any possible circumstances. It was not a question of losing 5 or 10 per cent. of men, or even 20 per cent., in the attempt, as one might imagine from Sir Redvers Buller's words, but of risking the loss of the entire force rather than allowing Ladysmith to fall without the attempt. When it is necessary for a lifeboat to go out, no thought of what percentage of the crew may be swept away is allowed to interfere with the effort to rescue the ship in peril. The one object is to save those on the wreck. Lord Roberts, with the clear vision of a man who sees events in their true nature and proportion, realised that the Natal army was engaged in the work of saving men from a ship- wreck—nay, perhaps in saving the British Empire itself from ruin—and that in the attempts to accomplish thia rescue all risks must be run. Sir Redvers Buller, though a man of peerless personal courage, never seems to have realised that his force was the lifeboat sent to rescue the crew and passengers of her Majesty's ship Ladyamith. The nation's gratitude cannot be too great to one who saw so clearly and acted so promptly and with such sincerity and simplicity of purpose as Lord Roberts. Throughout the despatches there are plenty of other examples of Lord Roberts's clearness of judgment—witness his decision at Paardeberg, on the one hand not to attack prematurely, and on the other not to allow too large a hostile force to gather for Cronje's relief—but we have chosen to dwell on the episode just dealt with because it is, in our opinion, a crucial one. It illustrates exactly the highest qualities of head and heart required in a great soldier.
The perusal of the despatches raises many points of great interest to the student of the military problems of the war, and especially in regard to the operations in Natal. There are two questions in particular which one would like to see answered far more fully than they are answered by anything that appears in the papers to be laid before Parliament. The first question is Why did not Sir Redvers Buller inform Sir George White, with whom he could communicate in cipher by means of the heliograph, that he was going to attack on December 15th, in order that Sir George White might co-operate with him by acting in the rear of the Boers?' Sir George White tells us he prepared " a flying column " to co operate with General Sir Redvers Buller, , and that all the arrangements were perfected by December 15th. Surely it would have been worth while to have made use of this proffered co-operation. It would not, perhaps, have prevented the failure at Colenso, but surely it was not a chance to be neglected. In the nice balance of a battle a very little may turn the scale. Possibly there are good reasons for holding that any help Sir George White could render was a negligible quantity, but if so it would be interesting and useful to see those reasons set forth. The other question which the despatches raise, but in no way clear up, is the failure of Sir Redvers Bullet to follow up and harass the Boers as they retreated from Ladysmith. Lord Roberts, as we understand him, states that Sir Redvers Buller thought that the country round Ladysmith was clear of the Boers before it really was clear, and so failed to act. But this explanation of the facts seems difficult to understand. Surely it was Sir Redvers Buller's first duty to find out whether the Boers were within his reach, not to assume, and, as it turned out, to assume quite wrongly, that they had got off out of reach.
We cannot leave the despatches without saying one word as to General Hunter's most striking, if uncon- ventional, despatch of August 4th. It is full of good sense admirably expressed, and is worthy of the able commander who penned it. We should like to quote the whole of this admirable piece of military criti- cism, but can only spare space for the passage dealing with Lord Lovat's Scouts. Remember that Lovat's Scouts were only civilian soldiers, though doubtless drawn from an exceptionally useful class :— " To get news Lovat's Scouts were used. The idea was General MacDonald's instigated by Lord Lovat. In ones, twos, and threes, these men crept, climbed, and spied ; were absent for days at a time, but always came safely back with the truth discovered. Major Hon. A. D. Murray who commands them, Captain Lord Lovat who raised them, each officer and man in the Corps is a specialist and picked man. As scouts, spies, guides, on foot or pony, as individual marksmen or as a collective body in the fighting line, they are a splendid band of Scotchmen, which is the highest compliment I can pay them."
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