Seconds out!
Patrick Cosgrave
First impressions, they say, are lasting: and they may even be accurate or valuable. So, on the first morning proper of the campaign — last Monday—I went along to see the two principal gladiators perform at their press conferences, and immediately jotted down my impressions.
A Tory leader inevitably comes better out of such a comparison—at least at the outset of a campaign — because his supporting organisation is so much better. There is, this time, no Conservative Campaign Guide — the invaluable and bulky reference book normally produced by the Conservative Research Department — though there is practically everything else. There were bits of paper set'ting out Mr Heath's schedule, and even bits of paper giving the constitutional run-up to the election date itself, including information about proxy votes, postal votes, and dies non (the Sundays that do not count in the campaign). At Transport House there was a great deal of bustle, and little factual information useful to man or beast. And then, of course, there are the settings: the Central Office press conferences take place in a semi-circular auditorium designed for the purpose. Those at Transport House — this time, at least: they were in a different room in 1970 — happen in a rectangular hall possessed of rotten acoustics and a sufficient number of pillars to obscure the leader of the party from the press even when that function is not being performed successfully by cameramen or the pretty lady whom Mr Ron Hayward — the Labour national agent — feared might fall into Mr Callaghan's lap on Monday morning. To cap it all, while Mr Heath could be heard clearly at Central Office even without the battery of microphones in front of him, the microphones at Transport House were just not working on that first Monday.
Does all this really matter? Perhaps it Should not, and perhaps it will not — Mr Heath, after all, was a walking disaster at his 1970 conferences — but one tends to feel that party machines, reflect to some extent the decisiveness or otherwise of their respective chiefs. On the first morning Mr Heath appeared flanked only by Lord Carrington who made no contribution to the exchanges. Mr Wilson's conference was chaired by Mr Hayward, and the leader of the opposition was accompanied by Mr Callaghan: each morning, indeed, a different Shadow minister sits with him. Mr Heath's sense of being alone and in command was indicated by the moment when he seemed to think that Lord Carrington was Sir Alec Douglas-Home; Mr Wilson's need for support by his constant side glances at Mr Hayward and Mr Callaghan, and his exceptional willingness to toss questions to his former Chancellor and Home Secretary. Mr Heath's answers were abrupt and off the cuff; Mr Wilson's rambling, in
volved and — in the case of the extraordinary revelation that he had discussed with the National Union of Mineworkers the possibility of a return to work before Mr Heath's public appeal to them to do so — scripted. Both men appeared in better physical shape than they have done for some time; but it was in Mr Heath that the adrenalin appeared to course.
On the other hand it is clear that Mr Wilson does not intend to peak this week. While Mr Heath has already committed himself to a single line of attack which will become increasingly difficult to vary, Mr Wilson is like a skilled wrestler, gripping his opponent's shoulder, but looking, not into his face, but down at his feet, seeking to find the right place to apply pressure, searching out the weak point. Mr Heath seems almost oblivious of the fact that he has an opponent, save only in this, that he has gone deliberately and with success on the offensive.
All this reflected in the underlying themes of the two campaigns. It is essentially Mr Heath's proposition — and this was clear in virtually his first remarks on Monday morning — that there is no very fundamental national crisis — or that there would not be if only the miners went back to work. For, says Mr Heath, once offshore oil starts to flow, the country's financial problems will be over. This is, to a great degree, a more subtle version of his earlier and unhappy remark about the problems of success. For Mr Wilson there is a profound national crisis, one exacerbated by Conservative incompetence, and by the skulduggery of Mr Heath's attitude towards the unions. But, in the Labour view, it is a profound and deep crisis even apart from the Conservatives and their conduct; and their argument is that the country can trust a rejuvenated Labour Party to handle it.
The tip of the iceberg of crisis — whether short term, as in Mr Heath's view, or long term as in Mr Wilson's — is the mining dispute. On how he would handle that if given a new mandate Mr Heath was unclear. A striking sentence in the hastily rushed out Conservative Manifesto suggests that he would do a deal. "It must be the aim of any responsible Government," the manifesto reads, "to reach a settlement of this dispute at the earliest possible moment." At his first press conference, however, Mr Heath appeared to insist — though not without ambiguity—that Phase 3 could in no circumstances be breached. Mr Wilson, of course, simply says that he would settle with the miners, and tries to shift the debate on to other grounds — most notably prices, and the broken promises of the Conservative campaign of 1970.
Issues do matter in an election, but they
have a funny way of appearing in different guise from those worn at the outset, or in tile first week, of a campaign. The way they alr pear tend, further, to be influenced by the pressures of the campaign itself. There is variably, for example, a net movement in opinion polls towards an opposition duringd the three weeks when cases are being argue„, ceaselessly up and down the country: fre"' this the Tories benefited in 1970; and from Labour must hope to benefit this time. But the point at which the movement begins to take, place is one watched for eagerly by the aralie' of advisers crowding round the two leaders when they are in Smith Square. It is the pa tobest ready to spot this point, and best readY,;e take advantage of it, that then begins to tP:, the offensive. What each party must fear w the possibility that, when the moment cal', it will already be committed to a line of attac it cannot vary. Mr Heath may already have so cornalitfte,dr1 himself. There is very little room ,`",1 manoeuvre in the line he laid dovvne Monday morning. There are, of course, tb,9,;e ambiguities and uncertainties in the nb"is which may yet be exploited, possibly te advantage as much as to his disadvannie But the line itself, riding high and hard the general arguments about the state of Pk' e tam, is an inflexible one indeed. At moment when the shift to the opPosinnis begins to take place he may find that therev little he can do but shout more loudly to rna himself heard. Mr Wilson, on the other hand, has yet given e no hostages to fortune, save those which "ft: been given by the Labour Party as a whn,7iiie its movement to the left since 1970. WhNie must fear is that the absence of a line, muzziness around the edge of the campaign, reflected as it is in the deficien'a, of the party machine, will cause a deteltre tion in the fabric of the campaign itself bt, he has found, or managed to begin to exPi° Mr Heath's weaknesses. One suspects that this is an election that k5 be decided not over the whole three weet'he but in the last week. There is, of course_,' II) missing fourth week — that which nornye follows the announcement that there is t°0 of an election, but which precedes the oPenin7be the campaign — and it may be that ain manoeuvring for position which we saw biielve last Monday is akin to what would ;:ther happened had we been allowed that fti–o, week. However it may be, there is ari ten• traordinary tension inside both parties,A3 well sion as evident below the smooth and the drilled surface of Central Office as it is oneiii faces of those operating across the squ.3nterr Transport House. The existence of this ,iar sion suggests that, as soon as one of tne,ti.ves ties begins to crack, or begins to alloW tale to get the upperhand, a flight from the t" the will begin to take place. It is as thougnbee parties and the party machines have tore infected by the conviction that their 001 leaders are locked in what is to be a c10016 struggle, for it is unlikely that either , long survh.e a defeat.'on: " This has begun as a very tough electi, will end as an even tougher one: all the I result for whomever is defeated could ld toughest consequence of all.
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