PRINCE BISMARCK'S VICTORY.
PRINCE BISMARCK has won, though at a great. price. In spite of a determined resistance, and after a contest of nearly twelve months, he has carried his test-vote, the prophetic Budget for 1884-85, and has thus released himself for eighteen months from the necessity of attending to Parliamentary opinion. The machine would go on for that time, that is, till about February, 1885, even if the Reichsrath did not sit ; and though it will sit, its votes will be unimportant, and a dissolution comparatively easy. The Executive may still want help from Parliament, but it is freed from Parlia- mentary control. This is precisely the situation that Prince Bismarck, who at heart passionately despises the Liberal leaders as mere ideologues, most desires, and it is difficult to doubt, from all the information that reaches England, that he has attained it by " breaking the heart " of his Parliamentary opponents. His recent successful attempt to conciliate the IT1tramontanes, though it has greatly facilitated his final victory, has not been his sole means. He has worn down the Opposition. He has for years acted upon two fixed ideas : one, that the people, in their dread of foreign pressure—a real dread of a real pressure—would not allow him to be dismissed ; and the other, that to pass his measures he might lawfully use any of the parties in the Reichsrath as instruments, irrespective of their convictions. He has not, in fact, regarded them as parties at all, but as fac- tious groups, to be played off skilfully against each other. This policy has been pursued with the persistence and courage of his character. No group has been too hostile, or too anti- national, or too extreme, in the Continental sense, for Prince Bismarck to seek its temporary alliance. He has used the Conservatives, the National Liberals, the Radicals, the Socialists, in turn, as he is now using the Ultramontanes. The consequence has been an utter disorganisation of parties, Opposition after Opposition crumbling away, as some heavy group went over to the Chancellor's side. A leader might spend years and energy which would have built a kingdom upon the organisation of a party strong enough to be a restraining force upon the Prince—nothing more than a restraining force could be hoped for—and then, without notice, the Prince would execute a vane- face which nobody expected, and which was at variance with his whole policy, and so there was a majority for him again. No vote of refusal produced on him the slightest moral effect. He simply, if refused a great Bill, cast about for means to buy-off a great group, found them, produced his Bill again, and carried it. It is as if Mr. Gladstone, to carry his Church Bill, had offered the Tories Protection, and then to carry a reform of the Lords had offered the Radicals universal suffrage.
These tactics, pursued with the almost Italian patience and finesse which underlie the broad brusquerie of the Chancellor's utterances, have gradually worn out the courage of the Liberals. They see that, the condition of Prince Bismarck's irremovability being granted, they can secure nothing, not even the right of veto, to which they limit their aspirations, and they have lost heart and energy. At last, Prince Bis- marck, who had attacked the Catholic Church to secure the Liberals, protected it to secure the Centre ; and his opponents, in exasperation and hopelessness, have thrown up the struggle. Herr Lasker, leader of the Radicals, worn out in health and hope, has retired from politics; and Herr Bennigsen, leader of the Whigs, has given up his seat, alleging that he can do nothing with his party, and can neither resist nor support the Chancellor. The Opposition, already dispirited, feels itself dis- organised, and the great vote has passed, leaving a sense in the minds of the great majority of Germans that Prince Bismarck, while he retains power, must be allowed to do as he pleases, • and that a useless struggle with him only destroys the moral dignity of his opponents. If he is determined on his Socialist Bills, he must have them, or he will purchase support again. That seems very weak to Englishmen, who have so often, con- tended against irresistible strength ; but it must be remembered that the German Liberals have fought very steadily for seven years, that in fighting they have gained nothing—not even strong popular support—and that they are fettered from the first by what they all acknowledge, the absolute impossi- bility of removing Prince Bismarck. His protection is not the Crown only. Their constituencies would not bear it,— would rather, it is gravely asserted, see the Reichsrath suspended by decree for the remainder of the Prince's rule, a contingency which, as many observers believe, is never quite off the cards.
Prince Bismarck must be considered Germany, for the time, and the only useful speculation is what he will do with his power. We should be inclined to say, for ourselves, that he would do nothing, but quietly continue governing as he pleases, leaving the future to provide for itself ; but that is not exactly the opinion of Germans, though, be it observed, they are very far from unanimous. As we understand the situation, there are in Germany two broad and different currents of opinion on the Chancellor's policy. One is that he is determined to maintain peace during the remainder of his life, and has arranged-the Tripartite agreement or alliance with the view of concentrating a mass of force so great that attack from the outside shall be impossible. He is not seeking the opportunity of aggrandisement, but the means of security, and does not wish either to change the relative proportions of States or to exaggerate the strength of Germany. That looks true, because it is in accord with the accomplished facts. No statesman in Europe would think it safe for any two Powers, say Russia and France combined, to attack the com- bined armies of Germany, Austria, and Italy, with their splendid position in the centre, protected on the north by the Baltic, and on the-south by the Mediterranean. They could not hope for success, and have little motive for trying so dangerous an experiment. They would fight outside of their own territories, and with forces inferior to those of their oppo- nents, who would be upon their own soil. That is obviously the conviction of the financial world, and it is, in our judg- ment, the one most in accord with Prince Bismarck's profes- sions, with the steady policy of the Hohenzollerns, who do not love war for itself, and with the known horror of purposeless war entertained by the German people.
Nevertheless, there are Germans who are not satisfied, who believe that,Prince Bismarck still doubts whether Germany is secure from a coalition, and who think he may still be deter- mined to place some final barrier, say a Kingdom of Poland, under a Hohenzollern Prince, between his people and the huge Slavic Power.. They doubt, in short, if the Prince has yet given up the idea of a war with Russia, in which the combined armies would drive Russia back, and decide once for all that the Romanoffs should rule neither the Poles nor the South Slays. That war, they say, if successful, would leave Germany finally a solid State, with good frontiers, and beyond danger even from a coalition. The Army, they say, would of course obey ; and the people, though inclined for peace, have an irra- tional dread and dislike of the Slays, which, if the Hohenzollerns gave the signal, would instantly become active. We confess we cannot credit this suggestion. That any ruler of Germany would like to weaken Russia, we can readily believe. It is not pleasant to see a million of soldiers constantly moving • over plains not separated by defensible frontiers from • your own dominions. It is too like watching the sea from a meadow which a storm-wave might flood. Nor have we the slightest confidence in Prince Bismarck's love of peace. If he thought that a rush upon Russia, and the loss, say, of 50,000 men would secure the eastern frontier for a century, he would rash, without needing any other reason. But we have much confidence in his intelligence, and much more in that instinct which teaches great dynasties like the Hohenzollern not to play for unlimited stakes. Adventurers may think it worth while to offer double or quits, but not rich winners. In declaring war on Russia, with France behind him, Prince Bismarck would place every- thing at hazard, and compel the most numerous and stubborn of European races to fight to the death. The Romanoff dynasty could not survive such a defeat, it is doubtful if Russia could ; and both would exhaust all their resources— and for defensive war those resources have scarcely a limit— before they would even consider the chances of negotiation. France could never be kept quiet, and if the war lasted at all—and there is no Paris in Russia to take, and no means of bringing an invasion to a sudden close— the enemies of Germany would find out every weak place. Such an adventure, to be ordered by prosperous men of large experience, is to us incredible, and we expect an armed and strained, but still solid peace ; but it is vain to discourse of Germany, without considering possibilities which experienced Germans take into account. Prince Bismarck has now the control, with his master's consent, of all the regular resources of Germany for eighteen months ; he has battled hard to get them, and he must have had before his mind some end worth all that personal. trouble and political disrepute.
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