The Cost of Imperial Defence
eLTHOUGH there is some satisfaction in the reduc- tion of expenditure on the fighting Services; the Estimates make one long for such a scrutiny and co-ordination of expenditure as would, apparently, be possible only if there were a Ministry of Defence. It js true that the Committee of Imperial Defence is said to be a good substitute for a Ministry of Defence, but practice, unfortunately, lags behind theory, and the outlay on the fighting Services needs to be entirely re-proportioned.
The Navy is to cost £1,435,000 less than in 1928. The Array will cost I505,000 less, and the Air Force 150,000 less. This total saving on the three Services of nearly £2,000,000 is, no doubt, a proof of good intentions. But does it go far enough ? We think not—although America will not be -able to say that we have been agitated into a fresh flutter of naval building by her decision to build fifteen large cruisers. Three cruisers were dropped from the British programmes of 1927 and 1928, and there has been no suggestion of going back on that decision. This must be gladly admitted. But is it necessary, when the financial distress of the country is so acute as it is now, to spend even as much as is proposed on the Navy and Army ? Mr. Bridgeman speaks of " the absence of any disturbing feature in the general naval position." Last year he noted "-the continued placidity of the general naval situation." Yet in spite of " placidity " one year, and " absence of disturbing feature " the next, we go on with an expenditure which makes the Budget a nightmare.
Who is the naval enemy against whom we have to defend ourselves ? There is none in Europe. And we are continually told that war with the United States is " unthinkable." The typical " Navalist " in America, of course, regards the British Navy as the criterion of his own naval needs. Our naval experts—who cannot be blamed, for they necessarily and rightly think in terms of their own business—have an eye on the American Navy when they are calculating the British margin of safety. And so a sort of competition goes on although all the time competition is repudiated. The repudiation is sincere enough in itself. Nobody really thinks of war, yet everybody is dragged along by the circumstances.
We are not among those who rush to the extreme of saying that flying has deprived navies and armies of all use, but we do think that, in such expenditure on defence as is necessary, the amount spent on the Air Force should be increased and that on the Navy and Army should be reduced.
In a most interesting debate in the House of Commons on Thursday, March 7th, it was shown that the British tax-payer has been saved no less than £40,000,000 in the Middle East simply through the ability of the Air Force to do what used to be done by military expeditions. The normal punitive expedition is now carried out very cheaply by aeroplanes, and nobody will need to be reminded of the brilliant success with which the beleaguered Europeans in Kabul were recently removed by air.
We are by no means insensible to the needs of national security. We want security as much as anybody can. But, after all, how can it best. be obtained ? It is obvious that an adequate financial reserve is one of the chief lines of defence for any nation. If we had not had that reserve in the Great War we should not have been able to lend freely to our Allies, and they might have involved us in a common defeat through want of money. At present we seem to be spending all our reserves. Yet there is now a period of calm during which it is perfectly safe to try many experiments in economy. If it turned out after a trial that economy on the fighting Services did not advance general disarmament, it would still not be too late to resort to the traditional means of defence— and in the meantime we should have built up our financial reserve.
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