THE EXPEDITION TO COOMAPSIE. T HE Government has decided on an
expedition to Coomassie, the principal kraal of Ashantee, and we wish it every success. The Chief of Coomassie—the word ." sheik" should be adopted for the head-men of all African tribes—has, it seems clear, deliberately broken his treaty with us, and is impeding commerce and threaten- ing friendly tribes ; but even if he had not committed these offences, his subjugation by force would, we think, be justifiable. It is believed that he claims independence, that he disregards advice, and that he has suffered human sacrifices to be revived ; and if Europe has any right at all to conquer Africa, it has a right to conquer an aggres- sive chieftain of that inhuman type. It is even a duty to extinguish him lest his example should spread, and the neighbouring tribes should come to believe that the Chief of Coomassie, in falling back into utter savagery, had renewed his fighting strength. A belief of that kind would be a fatal impediment to the spread of any kind, of civilisation, and the only way to dissipate it is to show, by the rapid defeat of the refractory chief, that civilisation once in motion is armed and is irresistible. That once conceded, the expenditure of a few British lives in Ashantee is far more justifiable than their expenditure in barring the road of Russia to open water, or in preventing France from establishing a new India in Morocco.
There are, however, two points in connection with this expedition -which we would strongly press upon Mr. Chamberlain, One, and the most immediate, is not to trust too confidingly in British good fortune. There are breaks in that good fortune occasionally, and we do not want to see him ruined by one of them. We have advanced from the Cape to the Zambesi with a kind of glacier-like irresistible- ness, but we have had at least two big disasters en route—the defeat of Majuba Hill and the catastrophe of Isandlana- and we may sustain one in Western Africa also. It is quite possible that Prempeh, the Chief of Coomassie, will not fight ; but if he does, the Ashantees, who know that this is their last chance of independence, who are furious at the loss of their ascendency over smaller tribes, and who may be in a state of " religious " exaltation, may fight as they have never fought yet,—perhaps arrest our march, perhaps leave us masters of Coomassie with the victory still not won. A very small repulse would be fol- lowed by a rising of the tribes now supposed to be friendly, and nothing is so costly as a second expedition to repair defeat. The blow given should be a crushing one, and for this the force to be employed does not look to outsiders quite sufficient. We entirely admit that Lord Wolseley, who conquered Coomassie before, and who is now Mr. Chamberlain's official adviser, must know the work to be done better than any civilian, that our knowledge of Ashantee is indefinitely greater than it was in the Campaign of 1874, and that the Maxim-gun has added greatly, not only to European strength, but to the impression which that strength makes upon the imagina- tion of savage races. They do not like being cut down in swathes. The probability is that the expedition will pass through the enemy on its road to Coomassie as easily as a knife passes through cheese, but still there is always the off-chance, and we should have liked to see a greater force held on the ships in reserve. Three handred Europeans and less than twelve hundred drilled negroes, even though the latter are West Indians and Houssas, do not form a large force with which to subju- gate as well as scatter eighteen thousand Ashantee blacks with rifles in their hands, with a possible ally behind them—what is Samory doing there ?—and with their courage raised to the boiling-point by the knowledge that this is their last chance of continuing to live the savage life in which they have been bred. It is clear, too, that Prempeh is relying on something, and the something may be better arms, or an adviser who has introduced new discipline into his ranks. There must be somebody with some knowledge by his side, or he would not have sent his recent mission to Europe.
The second point we wish to discuss is the one we have so frequently pressed. Is it impossible, if we conquer Coomassie for the second time, to get rid of the "Royal" family altogether, and appoint a Governor, whether white, quadroon, or black, who can be trusted to govern with the intention of introducing civilised order. We are uneasy about the way in which we utilise African victories. If we have any right to win them at all—if, that is, we are not dacoits intent on pecuniary gain alone—we are bound to give the people in return for the loss of independence, as decent a system of government as they can be induced to bear. We are doing this in East Africa, though we burn villages and slaughter " rebels " a little too readily, but in West Africa we have a trick of leaving native chiefs in possession of nearly absolute power, and only controlling them when they begin to inter- fere with trade. We left this man's father for instance, and his son, or some one behind the throne, has been killing people ever since, and has at last re-established human sacrifices. Even if, after our victory, we appoint a Resident with right of advice, Prempeh, if he is retained, will re- main an utter barbarian, and the Resident, even if he is respected in Coomassie, will have no means of knowing what goes on in the jungles. No subject of Prempeh will ever be really secure, nor will the people ever be safe from exactions fatal to quiet trade, and even to suc- cessful agriculture. An Indian Prince, even when an oppressor, is never hostile to native civilisation, and has no wish to ruin any class of his subjects, but a negro chief may be, and often is, a kind of enemy of mankind. Cannot the officials of the Gold Coast suggest an alternative to the continuance of such a r6gime,—some substitute for the princedom which would not be so absolutely intolerable ? Are there no educated negroes whom we could insist on maintaining as Viziers, with a distinct understanding that their lives must be as safe as those of European traders or of the Resident himself ? We understand that direct white govern- ment would be too expensive, and perhaps too lenient for such savages, who need a vivifying tyranny ; but is there no compromise possible between this and the system of leaving tribal chiefs more abso- lute than before, because protected from dethronement by fear of the white men's interference ? We should like very much to try the experiment of governing Ashantee as we govern Uganda, and seeing whether we could not get revenue out of it sufficient to pay expenses. That must be our course in the end, and we are not satisfied that it is either wise or right to postpone following it, unless we as a temporary expedient pick our negro chief. If we are to accept him without picking, he will be a savage, and we shall have made a conquest without securing to the conquered any benefit whatever. It is a tiresome subject ; but just think how big a work it is to which we are just about to put one of the last strokes. It is the conquest of the biggest continent which Europe has decreed, the subjugation of all the black section of mankind. We are surely bound to find some way of governing them decently, that is, for the present, of so governing them that they shall have a generation or two of life as quiet peasants and artisans,—that is, of life which is not that of savages unable even to wish to advance because unable to escape perpetual terror. It is terror which makes wild beasts of these savage tribesmen, and terror which we ought to end, if we are to give them any compensation for being conquered.
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