The Spanish labyrinth

Simon Courtauld

A t the end of March, 1939, Pope Pius

XII wrote to Franco: 'Lifting our hearts to God, we give sincere thanks with your Excellency for the victory of Catholic Spain.' It was one way of looking at it; the outcome of the Spanish Civil War was also seen as a victory of fascism over com- munism. But it was not so simple. During much of the war Franco and the Na- tionalists did not consititute a fascist regime in the sense of a dictator and a one-party system; the Church in Spain did not play the subordinate role that it did in fascist Germany and Italy. The two main factions on the Nationalist side — Carlists and Falangists — were often at odds, both with each other and with the generalissimo. In the Republican camp the differences bet- ween communists and anarchists were even stronger.

Before the war was a year old, Franz Borkenau wrote in The Spanish Cockpit : 'On the battlefield of central Spain, today, the Comintern and Fascintern are meeting in their first military battle; the course of history has involved the Spaniards, but the Spaniards are only auxiliaries.' The most

'Spanish' of the auxiliaries were the anar- chists and the Carlists. Both causes were honourable but, as unwilling tools of com- munism and fascism, and in their desire for, respectively, revolution and counter- revolution, they were not effective in pro- secuting the war. They became submerged in the larger conflict.

The revolution was halted by the Rus- sians; the anarchists were suppressed, and the International Brigaders found themselves — although they may not have discovered it until later — fighting not for freedom but for the interests of Stalin. The ideals of so many Republicans were shat- tered — in the streets of Barcelona, in the snow at Teruel, on the banks of the Jarama and the Ebro.

It is a pity that Anthony Beevor's The Spanish Civil War does not explore these wider perspectives. It is a straightforward account — a good summary of the conflict, a good book for someone wishing to read about the war for the first time. But Mr Beevor's approach to the subject, despite the fact that he has written the book since Franco's death, offers no new insights, nor does it appear to provide any new facts.

Faced with Hugh Thomas's definitive work, with Ronald Fraser's remarkable eye- witness history, Blood of Spain, and with the perception of the origins and causes of the war afforded by Raymond Carr's fascinating book on 19th- and 20th-century Spain (just republished with additional chapters to the end of the Franco era), it is

hard to know what more can be written. A

new book should rather concentrate on cer- tain aspects of the war, giving them separate and more detailed consideration. Mr Beevor occasionally has a go at this — there are chapters on 'The Atrocities' and, 'Dissidents and Heretics' — but he could have done so much more. His accounts of the major battles of the war are admirably clear (as one would expect from a former pupil of the military historian and strategist, John Keegan); how much more interesting, and original, it would have been if Mr Beevor had gone on to consider not just the comparative strengths and tactics. of the two sides, but also the qualities of their commanders. Colonel, later General, Yagtie could well have had a chapter to himself. Described by Mr Beevor as 'the most aggressive of all the Nationalist field commanders', YagOe's vance with the Army of Africa through Estremadura in the summer of 1936 was remarkable for its speed and achievements' He had reached Talavera de la Reina by the first week of September. Later, he made a major contribution to the Nationalist vie" tories in Aragon and Catalonia. Yagtie was not afraid to disagree with Franco's con- duct of the war: he was replaced when he argued against the Toledo diversion (Where one of the young officers defending , Alcazar was Jaime Milans del Bosch, Who was still trying last week, as a jailed genera'' to overthrow the elected government of Spain); and he referred to the Germans and Italians as 'beasts of prey'. Mr Beevor does not mention it, but in 1938 Yagiie pleaded publicly for Hedilla s release from prison, and he was in touch with Prieto over the possibility of a eon' promise peace settlement. Yet it was Yagiie's Moroccan forces who were reslion" sible for one of the worst massacres of the, war, when some 1,500 militiamen and civilians were killed in the bullring at Bada- joz. How did he compare, as a commander, with the Nationalists Varela, Astray, Queipo de Llano — and with the Republicans Modesto and Lister? Mr Beevor is qualified to make such an assess- ment, f

, and it.

Time book would have been the Time and again the Republicans failed to thrust and consolidate — which were the tactics employed so ruthlessly, and With such success, by Yagtie. They wasted tunes. intent upon reducing small pockets 0' resistance when they should have concen- trated their forces on the main objective. Thirteen days were spent in taking the salon town of Belchite, held by a few hundred Carlist requetes. (Franco decided against diverting his forces from the north in order to save Belchite; its ruins remain, 45 Years, on, as a memorial to 'one of the most glorious episodes of the crusade'.) As Mr Beevor points out, advantages were again lost in the offensives at Teruel and Gandesa. But I think he understates the tin' portance of Teruel: the attack was made in

order to bring the Nationalists to a negotiated peace and, even though it failed, it did compel Franco to abandon his plans to take Madrid after winning the war in the north. In view of the odds against them, the

Republicans did surprisingly well to last un-

til 1939; the decisive factor was probably the superiority of the Nationalists in the air, Catalonia was one of the last areas to fall to the Nationalists; it might have fallen

much sooner had the anarchist revolution not been frustrated. The communists, under Russian direction, were able to regain control in Barcelona, but not before the anarchists and the POUM militia (later to be hunted down by the Republic and brand- ed as fascist agents) had gone to the bar- ricades for four extraordinary days in May 1937. Mr Beevor unravels this tangled episode with great skill, describing why the CNT-FAI agreed to back down, and how the POUM, who wanted to seize power from the Generalidad, were persuaded reluctantly to follow. Those events are remembered today for a different reason: among the POUM militia, sitting with a rifle on the roof of the Poliorama cinema and reading Penguin Paperbacks, was George Orwell. Had he not been there, Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four might not have been written. Orwell wrote in Homage to Catalonia that he went to Spain to fight against fascism and for 'common decency'. (Little did he realise that he would end up fighting against communism as well.) It is the qualities of decency in Orwell's own life which emerge most clearly from T.R. Fyvel's memoir. As a friend for the last ten Years of Orwell's life, Mr Fyvel is able to add usefully to the biographies already Published. While Orwell spent much of the Thirties trying 'to find some way of getting out of the respectable world altogether,' he retained, throughout his life, a nostalgia for (also Past and an old-fashioned patriotism kalso an old-fashioned anti-Semitism, though Mr Fyvel tries to absolve him of this). Orwell's love of country life is also evident: he was completely happy on Jura, according to Mr Fyvel, fishing, growing vegetables, keeping chickens. In Animal Faro? the countryside is described in un- mistakably loving detail. There are Passages, too, in Keep the Aspidistra Flying and Nineteen Eighty-Four, where Orwell writes about love in the country. After Orwell had been a plongeur in Paris, and a tramp in London, and had been to the north of England and to Spain, he still continued to live more of a spartan, working-class life than his financial posi- tion demanded. Can he really have enjoyed living in that draughty flat in Islington (it was not the best place in which to bring up his adopted son, whom he adored), and drinking strong tea most of the time? Was it not something of a Wedgwood Benn-style affectation? In a revealing memory, Mr FYvel tells of Orwell asking his housekeeper to go and buy him a pair of working men's braces; when she returned with a pair of ordinary braces he made no complaint.

Never mind these little idiosyncrasies: Orwell was, by Mr Fyvel's convincing ac- count, a decent man. It was because of his decency — and 'sense of responsibility', which he admired in Kipling — that he did not join the International Brigades when he went to Spain. Harry Pollitt refused to help because he judged Orwell to be an unreliable party man. This led him to the anti-Stalinist POUM, and to the May Days in Barcelona. When he joined the POUM Orwell knew little about the party; when he learnt that it considered the war and the revolution to be inseparable, he thought of transferring to the International Brigades, as he wanted to get on and win the war.

But he stayed with the POUM, and the witch-hunt started. The party was labelled 'fascist' — and so described in England by the Daily Worker — and declared illegal. Many of Orwell's friends were jailed, and he was lucky to escape from Spain. (He recalled that, as an Englishman, he could never quite believe that he would be ar- rested, as he had done nothing wrong.) He had come face to face with the Totalitarian Lie, with Newspeak; thereafter the course of Orwell's life was set. 1984 began in 1937, in Barcelona.