16 OCTOBER 2004, Page 77

Mr

Facing

Both-Ways

Robert Salisbury

SINGING THE BLUES by John Redwood Politico's, £18.99, pp. 310, ISBN 1842750763 (t) £16.99 (plus £2.25 p&p) 0870 800 4848 Lord Fraser of Kilmarnock was one of the greatest postwar Tory apparatchiks. He held that we should 'keep the backroom boys in the backroom'. Since his departure from Central Office, this limitation has been forgotten. Indeed, I have heard it said that in recent years there have been so many key staff nursing parliamentary seats that it is often difficult even for the present Soviet levels of staffing in Victoria Street to provide the front-line politicians with the service they need.

This does not mean that the backroom boys and girls should not move to the front room. The Tory party can furnish many examples of politicians who helped reinvent the party in the backroom and who then adorned the front bench in the House of Commons. Maudling, Macleod, Powell spring to mind. It is interesting to consider whether John Redwood is one of those who has made the transition to the front room successfully.

There can be no doubt that he was an extremely successful backroom boy, and a clever one at that. He is a prize Fellow of All Souls who arrived at his political opinions, if we are to believe his account, by cerebration. He saw that capital markets work and that management by government does not. He observed that liberty for the individual opens the gates of opportunity to the poor to rise as he did, while rule by civil servants and quangos does not. He observed that high taxation kills growth, stultifies society and stops innovation. He, therefore, had no option but to become a Conservative.

He is perhaps lucky to have seen the light so clearly. Most of us do not possess Mr Redwood's intellect and the few who do often, like the rest of us, allow their emotions occasionally to challenge their reason. As a result, our political views and reactions are often prompted by tribal and visceral, as opposed to merely intellectual, triggers.

Was this one of the reasons why John Redwood found it so difficult to make the transition from back to front room? His obvious ability and clarity of thought gave him an intellectual self-confidence that led Margaret Thatcher to install him as head of the Downing Street Policy Unit when he was only 32. There he became the father of the privatisation programme, an even more relentless opponent of European integration and a forerunner of President Clinton only in the sense that he too believed that 'it's the economy. stupid'. Interestingly, he emphasises his doubts about certain government policies which a number of his more ignorant colleagues did not realise he entertained at the time. For instance, he deplored the monetary squeeze of the early Eighties, had doubts about the poll tax which his constituents' first reaction overcame and was worried about the divisive effects of Tory triumphalism in the wake of the miners' strike. It seemed likely that this star player would be tempted to try his luck in Parliament.

When he did, he eventually found himself a safe seat in Wokingham, following, incidentally, a predecessor who was in style and content almost comically his antithesis. The parliamentary party he joined cannot have suited him. Margaret Thatcher's power, as he observes, was ebbing. The pro-EU barons were on the march. The country was tiring of the hard edge style of crusading Thatcherism and felt it had earned a period of quiet and marshmallow ease. The body politic was less interested in Redwood's views than it had been. It was even less engaged by his style. The party itself has always been a bit of an old tart who loves to be seduced by charm. There have been signs since 1997 that Redwood realises that he needs to work on that aspect of his game. Perhaps it is the reverse side of his virtues that he sometimes finds the task a difficult one.

Worst of all, he found himself a member of an increasingly weak government which was split over questions he felt strongly about. In spite of his protestations in this book, he did not always remain true to his principles. His decision to stand against Major in the 1995 'put up or shut up' leadership election was at best a serious error of judgment committed, as he half admits, in a fit of pique. At worst, it was an act of disloyalty which further enmired a disintegrating government in the midden. However, given the wholly admirable views he holds on the European Union, rather more extraordinary was the Fox/North coalition he cemented with Kenneth Clarke in a subsequent leadership contest. However wrong Mr Clarke may be about Europe, no one could accuse him of compromising his views. Indeed, as Mr Redwood points out, they cost him the leadership of his party not once, but twice.

The book itself is nevertheless worth reading. It is very clearly expressed and it is in character an extended pamphlet which makes some extremely helpful suggestions on policy that the new chairman of the Research Department would do well to take to heart. However, a page-turner it is not. So, if you are a backroom boy you should take it seriously. If you are a clubbable Tory backbencher you may prefer the soufflé-light confections of Disraeli.