16 SEPTEMBER 1911, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

TELe MOROCCO NEGOTIATIONS. FRANCE is meeting with more difficulty than she had expected in her wise policy of bringing the negotiations with Germany to a head. Nothing is more dangerous than delay, because it multiplies the oppor- tunities for taking false steps and also tends to let popular opinion jockey the disputing Governments into a position from which there is no honourable escape except by war. The French Government therefore wants to know the worst at once, quite calmly and confidently reasoning with itself that the worst could not be worse than the suspense and the alarms of the past few years. When the French draft of a solution was sent to Germany in the middle of last week it was hoped that Germany would admit that there was at last no difference of opinion on vital principles. We have no precise information as to what the German reply was which reached Paris last Saturday, but it is obvious from what has happened since that it opened up a substantial new area of dispute. The com- monly accepted report was that Germany demanded, not only a great tract of French territory in Africa, but also special economic privileges in Morocco. What, then, one may ask, is France required to pay a great price for ? The whole basis of the French willingness to cede a large part of her Congo colony is the advantage of being given a free hand politically in Morocco. If France is still to be subjected to intermittent challenges, reproaches, and interferences from Germany in Morocco why should she give away territory ? She can have all these things, as we know, without buying them. To the general run of statements that Germany required economic privileges in Morocce—such, for instance, as a thirty per cent. share in any public works undertaken by France—there was, however, one notable exception. The Lokalanzeiger declared that Germany asked for no privileges whatever in Morocco ; she proposed only that equal commercial opportunities should be guaranteed to all the Powers. Well, if that is all, the German policy would be the policy of us all. We all know that France, as a Protectionist country, does not find it easier, to say the least, than other Protectionist countries to refrain in her colonies from putting obstacles in the way of foreign trade ; and all Powers interested in Morocco would wish to exact an assurance that if a French protectorate were established the equality of commercial opportunity should be a reality guarded by the most formal and explicit pledges. If that were done we cannot conceive why anyone should grudge France the expensive task of acting as policeman in Morocco on behalf of Europe. That part is assigned to her and to Spain as it is in certain areas by the Act of Algeciras. All that she wants now is authority to do her work more thoroughly. One would say that logically Germany ought to be the last to object to this; as in February, 1909, she went further than the wording of the Act of Algeciras in assur- ing France that she recognized her peculiar and important interests in Morocco. If any country might be expected to object it is Spain, or perhaps Italy, which has had less to say in the whole matter than her geographical position would warrant. The interests of these countries alone require that whatever special political authority be granted to France in Morocco should be confirmed by international consent. The more one tries to piece together a coherent plan out of the disconnected fragments of information as to German diplomacy the more one is impressed by the bungling of it all. There is apparently no controlling idea, no master mind. It is a case of Bismarckianism without Bismarck. The statement of the Lokalanzeiger is, we fear, too definite, too simple, and too pleasing to be in keeping with the course of the German negotiations.

The bewilderment of Germans at the policy of their rulers has been reflected by their curious alternations of hopefulness and gloom during the week. There has been no more valid reason for one feeling than for the other. An amiable newspaper article one day has sent the spirits of Berlin up, and an angry and bellicose article another day has sent them down. The most notable depression has been in finance. Last Saturday the break in prices on the Bourse amounted almost to a panic, and a startling series of runs began in various places on municipal savings banks. At Stettin, Metz, Randow, Cologne, Essen, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Konigsberg the confidence of small investors gave out, and they rushed to withdraw their savings. In a suburb of Berlin a run on a bank was caused by a schoolmaster, who dragged the Morocco negotiations into a lecture on the Franco-German War. His pupils thought matters looked grave, and their parents, among whom the nervous con- tagion quickly spread, ran to secure their money, followed by their neighbours. Banks in Germany have not any- thing like the cash reserve which British banks hold ready against emergencies. A financial panic on a large scale might mean a crash of several quite reputable banks, and we venture to hope that the omens of the week will induce the German Government to end the crisis, for it is in its hands to end it at any moment it pleases.

Nothing has been stated officially as to the nature of the latest French reply which has just reached Berlin. But the avowed policy of the French Government makes it fairly easy' asy to divine -its general principles. First, France cannot give away her hardly won and industriously developed territories in Africa for nothing, and she therefore probably demands once more a free hand politically in Morocco. The Sultan would be kept on his throne as the symbol of authority, but France would administer the country in his name. Secondly, as such a protectorate would be impossible without the consent of the Powers and without guaranteeing them an open door for their trade, the idea of granting Germany a privileged commer- cial position is out of the question. (By what right, after all, could Germany demand it? Her share of the foreign trade in Morocco is nine per cent., while that of Great Britain is thirty-seven per cent.) Thirdly, Germany must give her word in black and white that the bargain is a real bargain, and that she will not go back upon it as she has gone back upon the understanding of 1909 and on the Algeciras Act by sending ships to Agadir. We earnestly hope that this latest French com- munication, which we feel sure is as firmly expressed as it no doubt is courteous, will succeed in bringing matters to a head. Englishmen wish for nothing more than for an arrangement between France and Germany which will truly satisfy both. All British diplomacy has been directed to this end. If the solution should be only a partial solution, leaving Germany sore and determined to formulate a new grievance as soon as possible, the peace of the world would be in jeopardy from now onwards, and the expense of the naval and military rivalry would reach a figure not yet dreamed of. We take it that France recognizes this, and behaving honestly and sensibly by her neighbours will gladly make a great sacrifice to avoid such a state of affairs. If she really offers, as is said, a piece of the Congo half as large as France, with a port giving access to it, it cannot be said to be a niggardly offer. It is a handsome offer. If Germany should refuse the substance of the offer France will face the consequences with perfect calmness, well knowing that a quarrel cannot, after all, be postponed with those who wish for it.