THE MEETING AT SALZBURG.
fr HE subdued, and yet earnest and suspicious curiosity with which Europe is watching for the results of the Con- ference of Salzburg, between the Emperor of the French and the Kaiser, to come off, it is arranged, on Monday next, is un- fortunately only too intelligible. Two such Conferences have occurred since Napoleon has mounted the throne of France, -each has been followed by a great war, and this one, if it produces a war at all, will produce a greater one than any seen in Europe since 1815. The cycle has come round at last, and the heir to Richelieu's labours is compelled to see if he cannot undo Richelieu's greatest work. The Emperor of the French goes to Salzburg with his Foreign Secretary to see if it be not possible to find in Austria the firm and great ally whom, for the second time in his career, he so sorely needs. The rise of Prussia has suddenly, in less than a year, rendered Napoleon doubtful of his own unaided strength, and in all Europe there is only Austria whose alliance can be of any service to his immediate designs. The position of France is, for the moment, singu19,rly isolated, and not so completely without danger as English publicists are apt to assume. The Emperor, even supposing that he contemplates no war on Prussia, is aware that a war may at any moment be forced on him by opinion—the French, for example, would expect him to fight if Wurtemburg declared itself Prussian—and he azaust, to fight with reasonable safety, be sure of three things, —the quiescence of Italy, the neutrality of Spain, and the active friendship of some one of the great Powers of Europe. His need for the neutrality of Italy goes, as his subjects say, without talking. Italy now commands 300,000 very efficient -soldiers—Englishmen think them inefficient, but they are at least as good as Frenchmen outside the corps d'e'lite—in Savoy they would be in a friendly country, and even a serious menace from them would paralyze a third of the strength of France. Victor Emanuel does not love- the man who took his ibirth-place, and Italy would risk much for a certainty of Rome. Queen Isabella, again, is Bourbon, rules 17,000,000 of persons not friendly to France, can put 120,000 very excellent infantry in motion, and might if she chose compel Napoleon to keep 100,000 men within a hundred miles of the Pyrenees. it is said—we do not vouch for the statement, but we incline strongly to believe it—that she took the oppor- tunity of the Luxemburg affair to demand terms for Rome,—not for Spain, but Spain is as eager for Rome as for herself,—which startled Napoleon more than any incident in that negotiation, and revived his enthusiasm for a levee en masse. At all events it is essential, in the judgment of M. Guizot as of Marshal Niel, that Spain, which is far nearer to France than Ireland to Great Britain, which has no foreign policy and an ultramontane bigot as sovereign, should be at least secure. And then, these points secured, Napoleon wants the alliance of one great power. The stakes to be played, if he challenges Prussia, are of frightful amount. It is by no means certain that France must win in such a contest, it is in truth exceedingly doubtful, and nothing less than success will justify the risk in French eyes. . Granting, as we should grant freely, that France could never be conquered, that she could throw out by a convulsive effort any invader, or any coalition of invaders, that no statesman with the brain of Von Bismarck would ever .ask from France territorial cessions, we must still perceive there is no certainty for Napoleon himself. France will not accept humiliation and Bonapartes together. The Emperor 'lies his throne to think of as well as France, and to make his throne secure he must make victory nearly a certainty, or at least so probable that defeat will be only a proof of the uncer- tainty of war. He is searching, therefore, for an ally, and an ally worth having is very hard to find. The Russian Court, it seems clear, has finally refused his overtures. He cannot grant the one bribe which at St. Petersburg would cancel all engagements,—the possession of Constantinople,—and short of that the Czar has more to fear from Frederick William, who could raise Poland with a wave of his hand, and send 30,000 fine Polish troops to lead the insurrection, than from any other potentate or power. Scandinavia is friendly, not to say coquettish, but modern war is on a scale too heavy for Scandinavia, which, despite all the speeches now uttering by enthusiastic Danes, could not occupy 50,000 Prussians, and would risk extinction or a Russian Protectorate in occupying them. She might shell Memel or Dantzic, but that would be of little more assistance in the war than tearing off a man's coat-tails in a set-to. The nationalities are of no use, for Posen cannot rise with both Berlin and St. Petersburg opposed, and Posen excepted Prussia is homogeneous. The minor Ger- man States have been sounded, and do not respond to the half- hesitating touch. Hanover is not keenly loyal, perhaps, but as against Frenchmen Hanover will give her last man. Davoust settled that for his master's nephew, and Napoleon knows too much to believe the assurances of the Duke of Cumberland. Hesse would be powerless even if the Grand Duke were more than tolerated, the Lower Chamber of Wurtemburg has just announced that it will fight, if fight must be, with and not against North Germany, and ultramontane Bavaria is slowly yielding to resistless attraction. Her statesmen know their own history too well to believe in France. There is no hope there or in Italy, where the Government has no money for a great war, claims Rome as the reward of mere neutrality, and is bit- terly sensitive to French imperiousness. England, if friendly— and England's opinion is by no means certain—is not disposed, indeed, is not able, except under improbable provocation, to land battalions on the Continent, and in a war with Germany battalions may prove more useful than what we are pleased to call moral support. If Prussia had her fleet, England, might be invaluable, but then that fleet is only one of the certainties of the future. There is no ally except Austria upon whom France can calculate, and it is to secure Austria that the Emperor Napoleon is gone to Salzburg with his Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Will he secure Austria? It is very difficult, it is nearly impossible, to answer a question which still depends mainly on the will of one singularly reserved and not over able man, but we should say he would not. It is possible that Napoleon may, as in Lombardy, enchant or captivate his interlocutor. It is possible, also, that he may offer such a chance of glorious vengeance that the Kaiser, who is Haps- burg and Ultramontane, devoted to his dignity and his Church, both of which have suffered fearfully, may resolve to stake all upon one more throw, to be master of all South Germany— that must be the bribe—or King of Hungary alone. This is possible, but all the probabilities are the other way. The Kaiser cannot have forgotten what France has inflicted on him, the loss of Italy, the loss of his brother, the rejection of his alliance after Sadowa. He is German at heart still, and though there is loyalty left in German Austria, it is by no means certain that it is strong enough to bear alliance with a foreigner, and a hated foreigner, for the sake of break- ing up the now visible German unity. The Kaiser is King of Hungary, and it is by no means the interest of Hungary to reunite herself to Germany, or to fight heartily against Prussia, who can offer her a protected autonomy, and who would have done it if the late war had lasted another month. The Kaiser is King of Bohemia, and Bohemia prefers the present state of affairs, under which she hopes, very irration- ally, that an enclave of Germany, with a population of five millions, a German aristocracy, and a separate dialect, may become—something no Czech quite knows what. Doubtless amidst all this the troops would move as they were bid, and. they are numerous and brave ; but they could not get at France at once, and while a Prussian victory on French soil would excite in Vienna a fever of pro-German enthusiasm, a French victory on Prussian soil would cause an explosion of anti-Gallican hostility. The Kaiser, moreover, has an empty treasury, and though a suspension of interest on his bonds would relieve rather than injure his finances, it would destroy his last chance of German sympathy. Frankfort hates Prussia, but it dearly loves dividends paid in cash on the day they are due. And, finally, there is no certainty that Russia will remain quiet if Austria moves ; and if she does not, Austria will be compelled to post at least half her Lorca in Galicia and the valley of the Danube, far away from the immediate scene of action. She cannot see her own pro- vinces in rebellion, or the key of her house in Russian hands. It is possible, we admit, but it is scarcely probable, that the Kaiser, with his personal pride wounded by the fate of his brother, a fate due, when all is said, mainly to Napoleon, with his German subjects hesitating, his Hungarian subjects intent on autonomy, his Polish subjects looking at Russian bribes as if they thought them tempting, and his army still without breech- loaders, will run the tremendousrisk. The Hapsburgs have never been madmen, never unable to wait, seldom disposed for ventures in which the stake covered more than they could pay. Unless an evil destiny, as half Europe believes, is making sport of the House, its fortunes will not once more be placed on the green cloth. Much may depend on Baron von Beust, and Baron von Beust hates Prussia ; but then he is not a Hapsburg, not a Catholic, not a friend of France, and not an original, but only a criticizing genius. No man in Europe sees a coining colli- sion more clearly, and no man in Europe is less likely to shut off the safety-valve, and trust to the momentum of his speed.
Napoleon will return, we conceive, with the alliance un- made, and then what will he do ? Will he fight, or "crown the edifice," or gloomily await what fate may send, or turn upon smaller powers, or what ? We doubt if there is a man in Europe, himself included, who can yet form a definite idea ; but the balance of probabilities would still seem to be greatly in favour of war. It is but power to power, after all, for none of the reasons which would impel the Kaiser to reject an alliance with Paris would impel him to form one with Berlin. Napo- leon might win, and then all is smooth for him; and if he loses, it is but giving way to the Revolution, after all. The real alternative is to grant liberty at once, and if there is a man in Europe to whom the role of constitutional sovereign must seem impossible it is Napoleon, who has accomplished so much by secrecy and surprise. His greatness and his weak- ness, his dreamy but still grand statesmanship and his fears for his personal ease and security are alike opposed to concessions which would in his view terminate his authority. His is not the temper to play the role of King's cloak, not the intellect which can make itself master of a free Cabinet. He will probably fight, even if he is alone ; but if he wins the Kaiser he will certainly fight, and that is why the meeting of Salz- burg is watched with such intense anxiety.
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