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A Short History of World War L Compiled by Sir James E. Edmonds. (Oxford University Press, Geoffrey Cumberlege. 3os.) THERE could be no better guide to the First World War than Sir James Edmonds, who modestly describes himself as the " compiler" of this book, though it is highly individual in tone, and bears his mark in every chapter. The 30 grim volumes of official history which he edited may perhaps intimidate the unprofessional reader ; not so this manageable volume, which is based upon " the précis he made as the history progressed in order to keep a grip upon the narrative as a whole." General Edmonds allows himself to be much more critical in the précis than in the official volumes, and reveals himself an ironist—a master of irony by under-statement. There will be some, as well as the present reviewer, who will welcome his robust defence of the Western Front Policy, and even his defence of Sir Douglas Haig who so neglected the art of self- advertisement. In that war, General Edmonds insists, the Western Front was, and had to be, all-important. " When the opposing forces are equally balanced and there is no way round, attrition, as Grant had shown in 1864-65, may be the cheapest way in the .end ; to plan for victories without heavy losses in such a case usually produces heavy losses without victories."
The allotment of space to the different campaigns and political events reveals the author's predilection. He might have been wiser to call his book a " history of military operations," since only a few pages are devoted to submarine warfare, American intervention, and the Russian Revolution. Here, however, he stands his ground : " Most space has, naturally [my italics], been allotted to the opera- tions on the Western Front, for time after time, the French and British Governments declared it to be the ' principal theatre.' The Germans evidently took the same view, as the Supreme Command remained on the Western Front for the whole war. It was in the West that the great changes in the methods of war were introduced and developed."
Although this book is not documented, it is solidly based upon statistics. An interesting study is that of the casualty returns which are given for every operation. In all the central battles of the War, it appears that the losses of attackers and defenders were about equal. Deplorable as the years 1916 and 1917 seem in retrospect, this book will serve to convince the younger generation that there was a plan, and that British officers were not all nincompoops.
C. E. CARRINGTON.
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