BOOKS OF THE DAY
Czech Tragedy
AT the end of the last war the experiment was made throughout practically the whole of Liberated Europe of co-operation in the Government between Communists and Democrats. It was very rapidly abandoned—in the East by the Communist seizure of power and in the West by the Democrats' exclusion of the Communists. Alone in Europe the Czechs persisted in the experiment through three patient years, and it was probably only the serious deteriora- tion in the relations between Moscow and the Western Powers which dictated its abrupt conclusion by the Communists in February, 1948. But throughout those three years there was an unremitting struggle for power between Communists and Demo- crats. The detailed history of that conflict is now told for the first time, and has especial interest for the Western world because it was fought right up to the end on democratic lines and in a highly developed political and industrial State.
Hubert Ripka, as a Minister in the Czechoslovak Government, first in exile in London during the war and subsequently in charge of foreign trade in the Government in Prague, was in a strong position from the first both to witness and to participate in the struggle for power between Democrats and Communists. He gives the whole story, from the passivity of the Communists during the period of German-Russian alliance and their successful bid for position in the Czechoslovak Government formed in Moscow in 1944, to the end of the long, relentless battle fought by the Demo- crats in every sphere of public and private life, both for co-operation with and resistance to domination by the Communists. ' Ripka was always associated with the policy of co-operation, both with the Czech Communists and with the Soviet Union, and this book is im- portant because it is in, no sense a recantation. On the contrary, Ripka is still convinced that it was not merely the only possible policy, but, indeed, the right policy, was already bearing fruit, and would have succeeded, given adequate support from the West. In his opinion the Democrats were gaining strength, and would have considerably improved their position at the elections which were due to be held. It was, he considers, fear of this, together with the deteriorating international situation, which led Moscow to inter- vene and pass the word to the Czech Communists to seize power before their failure to win democratically became apparent. .
As Stransky points out in his book, if the Czech Democrats had had anything like the backing which the Communists enjoyed in the Soviet Union, the battle for democracy could have been won by purely democratic means. As it was, the two fundamental premises on which Czech Democratic policy was based were re- moved simultaneously : co-operation between Moscow and the Western Powers broke down, and the Czech Communists gave up the pretence of playing the game according to democratic rules, respecting constitutional forms, permitting the free exercise of opinion and abiding by its decisions. It had been an unremitting battle to force them to do so, but Ripka thinks that in the main the Democrats were succeeding ; even such revolutionary institu- tions as the National Committees set up after liberation had been transformed into a form of democratic local government.
In one important sector, however, that of control of the police, the battle was anything but won, and it was in this sector that the Democrats decided to precipitate the crisis: "-We fully realised the gravity of the situation: in order not to leave the Communists a free hand, in order not to permit them to institute a police regime, admitted or camouflaged, without firing a shot, it was necessary for us to . . . take the offensive."
The twelve Democratic Ministers resigned from the Government on the understanding with Benes that he would not accept their resignations until after new elections. The Democrats hoped that Communist control of the internal security services was still in- sufficient to prevent a free vote in which Communist strength would be reduced. For four. days Benes held to his word, but on the fifth he suddenly gave way to the Communists: " We were never to see Benes again ; never again did we receive any message from thim. To this moment we have never been able to find out what happened in the Hradcany during that fatal morning of February 25th, 1948."
As one reads the account of those days of crisis, one is struck by the helplessness of Democrats confronted with a revolutionary situation. While the Communists seized key buildings, called out their followers, arrested their opponents, prevented paper from reaching printing presses, occupied the radio station, organised mass demonstrations, the Democrats waited for President Benes to exercise his constitutional right of forming a Government. " In order not to permit them to institute a police regime . . . without firing a shot ..." No shot was fired, and the police regime was insti- tuted, just as Munich was accepted ten years before, with full legal forms and the consent of President Benes. And yet no one doubted, either inside or outside the country, that once again the. Czech people were broken-hearted -slaves. Hard words were said at the time about the Democratic leaders whose policy was thought to have led to this catastrophe, and yet, if one reads Jan Stransky's book together with Ripka's, one cannot but contrast the fearless, upright, unfaltering attitude of men like Ripka, Drtina, Zenkl and Jan Stransky's father, Jaroslav Stransky, with the corrupt, frightened, greedy and self-interested attitude of the " little man " who went through the German occupation and the Russian liberation and sought safety in the Communist Party.
Stransky's book is a brilliant picture of the psychological atmo- sphere obtaining in the Occupied countries after the war, and it is a terrible indictment of the means which the Communists use to turn free men into Communist sheep Stransky's book is as passionate and biased as Ripka's is restrained and nobly unbitter, and yet both should be read if the way in which a democratic country goes Communist is to be understood. Ripka has proved that, whatever his political future, his powers as a historian will be of great value to the Western world. His present book, like the one he wrote on the Munich crisis eleven years ago, which has been quoted by historians from Churchill to Wheeler Bennett, will be one which no historian of the post-war world can afford to ignore.
SHIELA GRANT DUFF.
Previous page
