COLONEL CHESNEY ON IMPROVED FIRE-ARMS—BARON Kal7RICE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE IN

ENGLAND..

WHEN the particulars of the late revolution in France became fully known, every thoughtful politician saw that this country was threat, cued with danger, not merely from the alliance of Continental des- pots, or from the liability of a general war, but from the total dis- regard of public usage and moral principle which President Bonaparte had displayed in effecting his purposes. In spite of national apathy— of the fashionable principle of laissez-faire, so dear to laziness—and of a seeming prudence, unwilling to mention disagreeable topics, or to rouse a tiger supposed to be at rest—the question of our na- tional position and prospects is making its way to the surface. The probabilities of war, the possibility of invasion, as well as our preparations and means of defence, begin to be openly considered. " Letters " and "leading articles," almost in spite of their writers, will discuss the questions, especially that subjedt of subjects our national defences, or rather our national security. The two publications before us are among the writings that bear upon these topics, with different degrees of fulness and closeness.

Colonel Chesney's Observations on Fire-Arms is a useful and valuable work, though of a smewhat desultory character and scope, and rather professional than general. The first object of the Colonel is to render the British Artillery more efficient, by changing its organization from troops to battalions, to give greater unity to the force, and by increasing the number of grades among the officers to render promotion more rapid, and have the higher class of Artillery officers in the maturity of strength and

• Observations on the Past and Present State of Fire-Arms, and on the probable Effects in War of the New Musket: with a Proposition for Reorganizing the Royal Regiments of Artillery by a Subdivision into Battalions in each special arm of Garrison, Field. and Fort Artillery ; with Suggestions for promoting its Efficiency. By Colonel Chesney, D.C.L. and F.R.S., Royal Artillery. Published by Longman and'Co.

On National Defence in England. By Baron P. E. Maurice, Capitaine du Genie de VEtat-Major de la Confederation Suisse, Sec. &c. &c. Translated by Captain J. E. Addison, Adjutant and Secretary to the Royal Military Asylum, Chelsea. Published by Parker, Furnival, and Parker. vigour, instead of, as is now the ease, in their decline. This proposition is limited to the force as it stands, and involves very inconsiderable expense. But Colonel Chesney considers the Artil- lery too weak, whether in reference to the present prospect of affairs or in proportion to the rest of the Army. lie suggests an increase of 3000 men to put the force on a proper footing.

In addition to these propositions, the Colonel gives a history of artillery from the earliest times ; somewhat encyclopedic, but curious, and not without interest of an antiquarian kind. He also takes a comparative survey of the artillery of the four great Eu- ropean powers, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and France, as well as of the East India Company; bringing together in the course of his examination many facts of considerable use to the military inquirer.

The part devoted to the Observations on Fire-arms contains a minute description, with diagrams, of the principal inventions that have been brought forward of late years, and an account of the authoritative trials that have been made. It likewise gives a sketch of the plan promulgated last year under the name of Prince Louis Napoleon, for a simplification in the artillery, by confining the force to one kind of gun, instead of the several classes at present in use, with the arguments pro and con. Colonel Chesney's opinion is, that improved small-arms will not make so great a change in war as some suppose, or materially alter the present relative importance of artillery and cavalry ; both sides of course adopting the new weapon. There are a good many facts and reasonings in this section interesting to military men, or to those who interest themselves in the subject of fire-arms. The most satisfying information is, that the Duke of Wellington appointed a commission to inquire into the merits of the re- spective inventions ; with this result—" it is understood that the Government has decided on the adoption of a musket on the French pattern for a considerable portion of the army." Better late than never.

Baron P. E. Maurice's essay On National Defence in Engkind is a work of a more popular character in its subject, especially at the present moment, though the treatment is rather technical. The Baron is a Swiss officer of distinction, whose attention has been turned to the subject, as to a military problem, by the writings of Englishmen, including the Duke of Wellington's celebrated let- ter. From those writings the author makes a selection in his first part, by way of introduction or justification ; and then proceeds to examine the question of invasion, winding up with a consideration of the various means of defence.

Baron Maurice considers the subject of invasion in extenso, and with as much minuteness as if he were charged with the practical responsibility of drawing up the plan for an actual operation. He calculates distances; he prescribes routes ; he estimates the entire force necessary for the undertaking upon his plan of a regular campaign ; he distributes the force into its three proportionate divisions of infantry, cavalry, and artillery ; he considers the means of transport ; and when the army has landed on the shores of Great Britain, he chalks out its plans of operation till its ad- vance upon London. He also inquires into our military means of resistance,—which he pronounces decidedly inadequate' as at present constitued ; and discusses various indispensable means for the protection of London. The most perfect—a regular fortification —he confesses will not be practicable, since public opinion would not consent to it. The next best defence of the metropolis, he de- cides -will be intrenched camps.

The Baron's production seems chiefly valuable in a statistical point of view. It is a repertory of military facts of all kinds re- lating to the invasion of this country. Baron Maurice brings to- gether data respecting the transport of an army in a steam- fleet, or a mixed fleet of sailing-vessels and steamers ; and then calculates the number necessary for the conveyance of a French army to our shores. The real data for the movement of large bodies of troops by railway are not so available ; but he enters into calculations of the weight of men, guns, ammunition, &c., and comes to the conclusion that our railway system is not so available for such marvelously rapid military transport as we have been led to suppose. His military statistics are also of an interesting kind, especially at present. His theoretical plan of the campaign is probably perfect, but for the obstacle of the sea, and the writer's unaequaintance with nautical affairs, which he candidly acknow- ledges. That narrow channel of salt-water which has so often baffled • Continental foes, has we think, introduced elements of failure into the Baron's plan,—always supposing that the people of this coun- try choose to make use of the means of protection which Nature has provided to their hands. There are two plans by which the French might invade England.

1. By an army sufficiently large to carry on a regular cam- paign with an established base in this country ; their success re- ducing Great Britain to the same condition as Austria and Prussia when Napoleon Bonaparte ruled the Continent, and failure involv- ing the total destruction of the invading force as an army. The strength necessary for this purpose has often been estimated at 150,000 men ; probably a repetition of the force fixed by Napo- leon for his Boulogne armament.

2. By a force large enough to seize London by a rapid march or dash, with a view to plunder, and to sell a peace, through the fears of the mercantile and monied interests that would be brought to bear upon the Government. The risk to the enemy would in such case be great, and failure absolute destruction. The direct injury to England would be the sums extorted; the indirect injury, from commercial panic, individual plunder, the violence and licence of war, the shock to order, and the national disgrace, cannot be mea-

sured. The Duke of Wellington, in his celebrated letter, seemed to think that forty thousand men, in our present defenceless state, would suffice for this purpose. But it must not be overlooked, that if a French army were once established in this country, efforts would be made to throw in reinforcements, let the risk of destruc- tion on the passage be what it might. The first plan is the one which Baron Maurice considers and exhibits in detail. He assumes that an army of 150,000 men is to be assembled at Brest and Cherbourg, properly proportioned into infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with horses, ammunition and such carriages and provision as might not readily be procured on landing. This armament would be divided into three separate expeditions ; one to land at Rye, one in the neighbourhood of Ply- mouth, one near Bristol. The Baron seems to consider that no direct movement upon London should be made till Portsmouth, Plymouth, Dover, and places adjacent, have been captured. Inde- pendently of moral effects, -the possession of these ports would be of great advantage. They would furnish the means of ready communication withFranoe: the capture of the stores, &c. would not only be a great gain to the French, but a greater loss to the British, since they could not be readily supplied. The two armies at Bristol and Plymouth would possess the whole of the country in their rear, whence to draw supplies and as a strategetical base. When the two arsenals were captured, and everything ready, the com- bined forces not in garrison would move simultaneously on Lon- don. Baron Maurice thus replies to the objection, why divide the army into three ? "An united army of 150,000 men would find it far less easy to obtain horses and means of transport for its stores, parks, and provisions, than three separate corps d'armee ; and also, that the weak point on the side of the defence being the great numerical inferiority of the regular army, much more is gained by obliging that force to divide and act separately against three assailants than against a single one." It may be observed, that in such a ease of extremity, the whole of the move- able British force, estimated by the author at about 70,000 trained men, might be thrown upon the army of Rye at once, with a view if possible to crush it ; or it may be said that the delay in- volved in the capture of Portsmouth and Bristol, with the probable losses and necessary detachments, might give time for the Govern- ment to gather from Ireland and England itself a force sufficient to check if not to fight the united armaments. These and some other arguments to the same effect, as well as several minor mat- ters in connexion with nautical affairs, may be passed; because we think the Baron's plan, however clever upon paper, and however excellent for its military statistics and mode of statement, is based upon assumptions that would be found fatal in practice.

I. He admits that the whole of the French navy, amounting to 325 sail including steamers, with upwards of 650 mercantile ships and steam-vessels, would be necessary for the simultaneous trans- port of the forces. And he assumes that this gigantic fleet of nearly a thousand vessels, could be collected in the Channel ports before a declaration of war, without leading to counter-prepara- tions on our part; an impossible supposition.

2. He assumes that the three expeditions would be allowed to pursue their course unmolested; an assumption as unlikely as the former. He also overlooks the fact, that the dividing of the expe- dition would facilitate an attack at sea by an equal or even a superior British naval force ; and that the destruction of one arma- ment before its landing would go far to defeat the success of the other two.

3. There is an implied assumption, that an overladen steamer or a crowded ship of war is equally efficient with one that merely carries her naval complement; a great mistake, and one that would probably prove fatal. It may be doubted whether steam will work the wonders that many expect from it in another war, where large bodies of men are to be moved. It may be conceded that such a state of wind and weather as permitted the French expedi- tion to regard only their destination, instead of their safety, would permit the operations of an English squadron. Men of war, car- rying on an average 700 soldiers and their accoutrements, and steam-frigates of from 450 to 640 horse power crowded with 2000 men and their accoutrements, and the smaller vessels proportion- ately laden, would lose much of their efficiency as regards s fighting, or manceuvering. The weight of the vessels diminis their speed, would allow the British men of war—also assisted, be it remembered, by steam—to attack when and where they pleased, and at great advantage. Ship for ship, we may rate an Englishman equal to a Frenchman ; and, no doubt, a British man of war would be able to give an account of a Frenchman who should have 600 or 700 extra men on board, perhaps without their "sea legs," almost certain to be little better than in the way. But probably men of war would not be the first mark. Think of broadsides from a two or three decker, placed by a steamer, poured into a steam-ship crammed with two thousand men. Think of a steam-frigate rush- ing among crowded mercantile sailing-vessels or mercantile steam- ers, firing, and running down, and literally fulfilling the Admi- ralty formula, "burn, sink, and destroy." We believe that an armament of invasion, whether of fifty or of a hundred and

thousand men, encountered in any wt of its passage by a Bri fleet, would present a scene of sudden destruction to which the annals of war could hardly furnish a parallel.

But to win such a victory—or rather, to prevent the ne- cessity of attempting to win it—we must have the ships : we must have a sufficient naval force both of sailing-vessels and steam- ers on our most exposed coasts, say from Sheerness to Plymouth, sufficient to encounter on equal terms any naval armaments that I I might be suddenly brought against us. For it must be borne in mind, that though Baron Maurice necessarily encumbers his steam- ers and men of war, a smaller expedition despatched by the French President could and most probably would avoid this error, so that the odds would be more equal with the smaller force. We also require, for the purpose of collecting in- telligence, some Government steam-vessels built wholly for speed— capable, for- instance, of equalling any crack Channel passenger- boat that sale. Till these things be done, this country cannot be considered in a state of security, and may even be said to court attack. The Ministryovhich does not take steps to put our mili- tary and especially our naval forces into a sufficient condition, neglects its primary fluty. The more quickly, quietly, and un- ostentatiously it is performed, the better ; but done it should be. It may be said that France does not desire war, nor the Presi- dent either. That the bulk of the French people, including per- haps all the respectability and better intelligence of the country, have no such desire, we know very well. The most cordial, per- haps the only truly cordial alliance that ever existed between this country and France, was during the period of the late Republican Assembly. But for this peaceful feeling on the part of the ma- jority of France, and the high honesty of General Cavaignac, Eu- rope might have been plunged into a general war in 1848. It is also very possible that the President would prefer a peaceful rule, for various reasons, and especially this sufficient one,--failure in war would precipitate his downfall ; success would raise up a greater than he in the person of his general. It is not what he may like or dislike' but what he may be driven to do, that we have to consider. Hostilities, which would be imminent under any circumstances have a peculiar danger from his position : he is desperate, and he is not merely unscrupulous or unprincipled but without restraint. When he plunges into hostilities, it will be the dimes last throw.

It may be objected that preparation involves expense. This is true, and also unpleasant ; but it cannot be avoided. Nor would any of the objectors allow the objection to operate in their own particular case. Which of them having a shop or a factory, whose business was threatened by a new competitor in the trade, would withhold the necessary expense to enable him to meet the new cir- cumstances? If the competitor threatened new modes of busi- ness, and showed plainly an intention to conduct his business in a pushing, unscrupulous way, which of them would refuse to draw his purse-strings to prepare for the competition, so as to hold his own as well as he could ? They had rather that the new com- petition had kept away : so it had been better that constitutional government had continued in France ; but we cannot always have what we wish, and we must meet our difficulties as best we can. As not one of the peace-at-any-price people would scruple to spend his own money when threatened by a probable business danger, he cannot reasonably object to a similar conduct on a national scale to avert a national danger and disgrace.

The additional expense, however, need not be great. The sums annually, squandered for thirty years on useless works and useless stores cannot be recalled ; but a thorough reform of our dockyards and arsenals would probably suffice for the manning of additional men-of-war and war-steamers. At all events, manned they should be, and that upon the soundest principles of economy. The best chance of preserving peace now is to be prepared for war. If war should inevitably come, a mere raid at Brighton or Hastings might

i inflict more loss n a few hours than would suffice to put our Navy into a perfectly efficient state. •