THE WAR SURVEYED : THE ITALIANS IN TROUBLE
By STRATEGICUS
THE " illness " of General Soddu appears to have affected the whole Italian army. The position cannot be changed by replacing him by a token leader ; and it is evident that no one can exercise the functions of Chief of Staff and, at the same time, that of commander in the field. In such circum- stances the former history of the Chief of Staff is of much less interest than the meaning of announcing a change which can at best be purely temporary. Certain obvious explanations spring to the mind. It is possible that the nominal command exercised by the Chief of Staff may be designed to cover an actual control carried out by a German ; but if this should be the case we are on the eve of great events, since the position in Albania is far from static, and in Libya there is no obvious reason why the future should not repeat the past. If this had been a matter of luck, or conditioned by circumstances which have now passed, Graziani might re-establish his reputation ; but his defeats appear to be coloured by a thread of defeatism, lack of enterprise or of strategic insight that runs through the entire range of Italian operations.
It cannot be denied that when they wish the Italians can resist. Klisura, the fall of which was the last symptom cf General Soddu's malaise, had formed an unyielding knot in the fibre of the resistance of central Albania for about a month ; and these stubborn knots had been experienced at Pogradets, Kalpaki and Argyrokastro. But what it is difficult for anyone to discover is any trace of sound strategy or even able tactics in the Italian conduct of the war. Real strategic insight colours the development of a campaign, running through it like the clear theme of great literature or music ; but nothing of the sort has been discernible in any of the Italian campaigns.
The attack upon Greece gives the impression of something into which the Italian armies drifted rather than something in which they deliberately engaged at the moment of their own choice and under circumstances they had themselves shaped. Yet there appears to have been a plan ; and, when General Soddu took over the command, it was approaching its foreseen climax. The troops were then converging upon the gate of Thessaly, Metsovo; but, somehow, the command allowed them to be taken in detail and bottled up in a defile when they should have been in the clear. The plan, presumably, was then to take the Greek Macedonian army in flank and rear, and, by an attack from three sides, destroy it and open up the way to Salonika. But the plan had none of the simplicity of true strategy, and it perished of its own confusions and inherent difficulties.
General Soddu could never retrieve the situation ; and the fall of Klisura is but the climax of his failure. Whether the Greek thrust is to be developed most vigorously towards Berat or not, it seems that the situation is now more fluid than it has been for some weeks. Any prolonged stand at Tepelini will halt the immediate advance upon Valona ; but an appreciable advance towards Berat must affect the position over the whole front, from the coast to the frontier lakes. Can Germany really dissociate herself from the possibilities that appear to lie on the surface? It is difficult to think so ; and yet it is pretty certain that any relief of the situation will demand clear and decisive action against Greece, not here, where she stands in her strength, but where she is exposed. The possibilities in the situation are obvious ; and the impulse to vigorous interven- tion is strengthened by an examination of the Italian situation in Africa.
It seems impossible that General Wavell has the resources for anything more than a tactical offensive in the Sudan, even with the help of the South African Forces. But native popula- tions are volatile; and there is evidence that the tribes of Abyssinia are beginning to catch fire. Here, once again, one can see the great opportunities missed by the Italian command. It must be admitted that the force in Italian East Africa has made itself a nuisance and a humiliation to us; but is that the sole strategic inspiration behind the operations, from the capture of Kassala onwards? A Wavell would have seen the capital tg the Sudan beckoning him in the distance, with a fair railway inviting an advance up it. He would have recognised that an advance with his full force must have chances that no other use of his troops could promise. When the Italian commands began to strike at every point of the compass, he was less corn. pelling dispersion in his enemy than reducing his own force to ineffectiveness. Even if the Eastern native judges largely by the superficial, he must have recognised that the British Co mand had, at the time and on the spot, incomparably inferii resources to meet any threat Italy could have made from h East African colony.
Badoglio had a great reputation, and, presumably, the gran strategy of the African campaign, at least, was his; but wb was he thinking of to miss the chance of a converging atta upon the Imperial forces when they had been left so lamentab weak by the defection of France? If he had put Graziani it motion from the west at the same time that the Abyssinian column marched upon Khartum, he would have had the chance he asked for. Instead of this, the Southern force was driven t pursue its researches into the barren, stony desert of Northern Frontier Province of Kenya. It may be, of tour that Badoglio's heart was never in the war, and that he nev• attempted to do more than show that Italy could make herself a nuisance if she wished. Certainly it seems impossible to find any Italian general who emerges with any reputation from the operations of this war.
That, perhaps, is the conclusion of the German staff; and the worst that Mussolini has done for his countrymen and their ambitious army is to confront them with the dilemma of being defeated by us or by the Germans. For it may be taken for granted that if Germany intervenes, she will allow no mi bungling of chances. The use of aeroplanes might be granted to ease the situation without demanding control; but is it n now past the phase of palliatives? If Graziani had originally 250,000 troops at his disposal he must still have about doubl the number he has lost. There is no means of knowing the dimensions of the force at Jarabub. But the position would n encourage any general to keep any great number of men there, though our attempt to capture it by a coup de main appears to have failed. There may also be some troops left in the interior, and some to guard the frontier of the French coon they most covet. Short of the possibility of getting transpo across at least 300 miles of sea against the threat of the Briti squadrons, much more imminent now than ever before, his sources, though considerable, are limited.
The investment of Tobruk is proceeding; and if the kali• will only oblige us by tying up in it a force similar to that whic was captured at Bardia, the conquest of the Italian armies attrition does not threaten to be a long process. If we coup occupy Cyrenaica within a week or two, that might serve as convenient penultimate chapter; for we have to recognise tb with the approach of spring and the growing decline of t' Italian armies the critical struggle may be transferred to Near East. The General Staff has acted with so much courage and foresight in this part of the world that the possibility of I land clash there does not appear unduly discouraging. The Staff talks with Turkey are reassuring, since much will depend upon her action if any of the projected interventions in Balkans should develop. The barrenness of speculation found upon a mere chain of inferences becomes evident as soon as we mention that possibility. Germany has, up to the present shown a marked preference for fighting upon one front at a bind and any attempt to intervene in Thrace could hardly be r stricted within the bounds preferred by Hitler. To lend genet• to Italy would be to strain the position almost to breaking-poin without giving the assistance which the case demands. We a in fact, in the region of the smoke cloud, preliminary to decisi action ; but it would still seem more likely that the Germ will direct their attack upon this country.
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