PERJURY AND THE OATH
Sia,—Protests against the procedure in the case of Gerhard Eisler are, of course, merely* formal, since nothing could be more obvious than the relief of all parties concerned over the simple result. Might we not, however, have looked for some discussion of the important questions involved in the court decision ? The magistrate laid it down that there could be no charge of perjury in respect of statements not made on oath. Is this so ? Are we not all aware of possible instances to the contrary ? If there is no perjury without the oath, what is the position of the increasing numbers of men 'and women who choose to affirm ? Most of us, I believe, are inclined to pay tribute to the Quakers by taking for granted that they are less liable than their fellow-citizens in general to seek refuge in falsehood. Does the Bow Street dictum imply their com- plete immunity from danger ? And again, what of Gladstone's Affirma- tion Act which brought to an end the distressing Bradlaugh episode ? Is that famous statute to be taken as establishing a legal fiction, that the Courts recognise two grades of lying ? In this connection, too, an esteemed American friend of mine inquires, what of the word of an English gentleman ?—Faithfully yours, S. K. RATCLIFFE. Whiteleaf, Princess Risborough.
[The Magistrate was surely meaning it to be understood that " oath " covers " affirmation " as of course it legally does.—En., Spectator.]
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