RUSSIA — 1
Caviare for the General
From DEV MURARKA
MOSCOW
THE Gaullist concept of Europe now stretches beyond the Urals to Novosibirsk at least, judging by the General's plan to visit the fabulous science-city of the Soviet Union in the heart of Siberia. This symbolic departure from the routine VIP rounds of Leningrad. Kiev and other ancient cities only heightens the cir- cumspection with which the Russians are plan- ning to treat de Gaulle when he arrives here next week.
The days are long gone when Stalin could treat him with condescension : for Moscow now, de Gaulle is the great man who has come in from the cold, even though materially France repre- sents only a small part of Europe. De Gaulle, too, after his reckless anti-Sovietism of the RPF days, has returned to his previous search for a Franco-Soviet understanding—alliance would be too strong a word for it.
The Soviet attraction to the General's Euro- pean policy, in so far as it coincides with their own, is obvious. What is more, the Russians are prepared to go a long way to avoid offending him. As a practising advocate of curtailing the American presence in Europe, he is invaluable as an ally. The Russians recognise that whatever views about de Gaulle may be held by other European governments, he is undeniably a spokesman for a widespread sentiment through- out Europe.
The problem is how this coincidence in their political views can be turned to advantage. For all their enthusiasm for de Gaulle, the Russians take a realistic view of the situation. And for all de Gaulle's groping for the Franco-Soviet under- standing, his own foreign office is putting brakes on the speed with which it can be achieved. For irmance, the French have dissuaded the Russians from holding a Franco-Soviet friendship rally in the Kremlin. That the Russians were willing to hold such a rally puts de Gaulle in the camp of the nominally non-aligned. At the moment the word from the Quai d'Orsay is to play the visit down, so that the expectations are not aroused to too high a pitch.
The Russians are aware that de Gaulle will not commit himself any further than he has already, and that, despite his anti-American posture, he will not be prepared to sign an agree- ment which in any way can be construed as a betrayal of the western world. They also recog- nise that his desire for closer relations with the East includes, from the Soviet point of view, a built-in contradiction. The General seeks the rapprochement with the East not only as an end in itself, but also to improve his bargaining Position with the United States and Germany. So the discussions which de Gaulle will have here fall into four broad categories. On general questions such as Vietnam, the Russians believe they will have little difficulty in persuading him to issue a rousing condemnation of the folly of present American policy, even if America IS not named. On the broad European questions, too, there will probably be an agreement in prin- ciple. But specific European issues are bound to result in disagreement. On the German question, he will get a patient hearing, provided he is pre- pared to give one to the Russians. On bilateral ssues, apart from some strengthening of eco- omic and especially scientific co-operation, there will be little novel. There remains the big ques- tion of renewing or signing a fresh Franco-Soviet friendship treaty. While discussions may take place on some such move, it is doubtful if it will actually be proclaimed.
It is in this context that the obstacles to any startling new departure become insuperable. It is all very well to say that European problems should be discussed among Europeans and that there should be more give and take among them. But, so far, de Gaulle has not endorsed the idea of a European conference which the Russians want. Nor, indeed, can he do so unless he can be certain that the appeal will be heeded. As for East Europe, the Soviet response will be cold if de Gaulle suggests that East European coun- tries should move further away from the Rus- sians. Since the Russians themselves are -only too conscious of the present trends among their neighbours in Europe, they are not very willing to hear them discussed by outsiders. On the contrary. they are likely to argue that chances for a European settlement will be better if the Eastern bloc follows a coherent policy rather than if fragmentation of the area takes place. Besides, the Russians do not at present consider the situation really ripe for such a revolutionary settlement in Europe. Nor do they think that the General disagrees with them.
On the really knotty problem of Germany, confusion reigns: de Gaulle cannot endorse the present status quo for fear of alienating the West Gerinans, and the Russians are unlikely to con- sider seriously any other alternative. The Russians do not want reunification in the foreseeable future, nor, for that matter, does the General. But they cannot say so and they both have to be very wary of the 'Germans. Yet it is not without relevance to the General's visit that in the few weeks pre- ceding it there has appeared the possibility of a dialogue between the West and East Germans. Its acceptance by the West Germans may also not have been unconnected. This demonstration of an opening to the east for the Germans is a suitable indication to de Gaulle of his limita- tions. He may speak for Europe, but he has no authority for it. He can therefore exchange ideas, but he cannot negotiate on behalf of Europe. The paradox is that the more a concrete achievement is avoided, the greater will be the success of the visit. Bearing in mind the inherent limitations of de Gaulle's position, the Russians are unlikely.to press him to take any positive step. They will be content if he talks and acts in a way which gives the impression he is the em- bodiment of the European resistance to America and a bulwark against a nuclear Germany.
But this cautious line of approach does not take into account the one element which may upset it all. Where de Gaulle is concerned, no one can be certain of exactly what he will do. He may well produce a political surprise if he thinks it necessary.
For, leaving aside the political questions, there remains the personality of Charles de Gaulle, an enigma to his friends and a mystery to others, Russians included. This will be the first occasion since the Revolution when the Soviet public will be fully exposed to an outstanding political per- sonality from the West. No one can deny that de Gaulle has a style of his own, and in cavalcades and on television he will undoubtedly display all his considerable magnetism. It will be so unlike his previous visit to Moscow in 1944 when he was taken for a ride on the Metro.
No one paid the slightest attention to him and his feet were trodden on badly. Will the General, for instance, halt the cavalcade to shake hands with people lining the route? What will be the effect of such a calculatedly spontaneous gesture on the Soviet public, for whom he is merely a remote legend? Will he mention or talk about Stalin when he visits Volgograd, the post-Stalin name of Stalingrad? What kind of European ideology will he put across to the people when he speaks on television?
These are the possibilities which make the pros- pect of the visit so tantalisingly promising.
Change of bowling . . .
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