Ticking time-bomb
ADEN PHILIP GOODHART, MP
Visitors to the offices of the British high com- mission at Al Ittihad, the headquarters of the South Arabian Federation, still have to edge past workmen repairing the recent bomb damage. The physical damage will soon be repaired, but now a political time-bomb being gingerly handled by the high commission threatens to blow up the whole federal govern- ment on the verge of independence.
This explosive issue is the question of when responsibility for the control of Aden should be handed over by the British government to the federal forces.
The federal ministers argue that they must have full authority in Aden itself at least six months before the date of independence— which the British government still seems deter- mined to proclaim on 1 January 1968. 'How can any federal government have authority and respect,' they ask, 'if it is not allowed to con- trol the largest city in the country and the economic heart of the country?' But in their eyes security is much more important than prestige or economics. The back streets of Aden are swarming with thousands of young men who are opposed with varying degrees of violence to the tribal sheikhs who dominate the federal government. If Nasser does plan to launch an overt attack on South Arabia after independence, he will need some excuse to intervene. The federal ministers argue that if they are not given a proper chance to con- trol Aden before independence there is no hope of avoiding bloodshed. This view is eloquently supported by their British advisers.
On the other side of the fence, many senior British officers and officials in Aden doubt the capacity of the federal forces to do the job. The federal army itself is expanding from six battalions to ten with the help of a training team from the Brigade of Guards. This work will not near completion till September.
At the moment four British battalions are tied down by internal security problems in the town of Aden itself, but federal ministers argue that this can be done more economically by their own forces. 'We are Arabs,' one federal minister said to me, 'this is an Arab problem. There must be an Arab solution: 'An Arab solution' means the use of enough extra force to send chills up and down the spines of those British ministers who must remain answerable to Parliament for the con- duct of affairs in Southern Arabia until independence.
To add to the complexity of the situation there has, as yet, been no agreement about the precise constitutional relationship between Aden and the rest of the federation, while a UN dele- gation of three is about to begin its own contribution to confusion. There can be no doubt even before they begin their tour that they will submit a report which is funda- mentally hostile to the federal government.
The response of the South Arabian federal government to the buffets of a generally un- kind fortune has been a policy of strength through weakness. The ministers of the federal government know that they are Great Britain's only professed friends in South Arabia. After the unilateral abrogation of our defence agree- ment with them they believe that any further kicks will have serious repercussions on British influence in the vital Persian gulf states. At the same time there is open talk of complete [federal disintegration if the British govern- ment does not soon hand over responsibility for security in Aden itself. The federal minis- ters, it is argued, would go back to their states and de facto withdraw themselves from the federation—a policy which is already being partly followed by the Sharif of Beihan.
The odds are, ' however, that a federal government of sorts will continue to exist until independence if only because of the amount of British aid that is channelled into the country. In the course of the next financial year the South Arabian Federation should re- ceive nearly f20 million of aid from Great Britain with rather more than half this sum going to the federal armed forces. The loyalty of the federal army meanwhile is uncertain, but it seems clear that there has been consider- able penetration by the National Liberation Front, a nationalist organisation which at the moment combines a nodding acquaintance with Syrian socialism and a degree of anti-Nasser- ism. Traditional tribal loyalties in the army, combined with the fact that almost every adult countryman in the federation is already heavily armed, may impose unusual local variations on the impending military coup. There can be little doubt, however, that all the main conditions for a military coup exist—a weak government, a divided country and a swollen military establishment.
What will the federal army do with the in- crease in political power that must come its way after independence? Few observers would rule out the possibility of a deal with Nasser, while King Feisal has yet to deploy Saudi Arabia's prestige and oil wealth behind any political group.
What is certain is that the new government will be faced with economic calamity in the town of Aden itself. The dismantling of the British base will throw 25,000 Adenis out of jobs by 1 January, and it is highly prob- able that there will be additional heavy civilian unemployment. It is also certain that our forces will be faced with mounting frustration in the next few months. For the 4,000 service families who must leave by the end of July there is the fear that the accommodation wait- ing for them in England will be substandard. For those directly concerned with security there is the frustration of knowing that the British government's reaction to the Amnesty allegations of maltreatment of prisoners in the interrogation centre has effectively closed our only important source of information. When suspects are questioned now they either laugh at the interrogation or fall to the floor scream- ing that they are being tortured. Some pessi- mists foresee a tenfold increase in terrorist activity before the withdrawal is complete.
Could the whole dreadful problem have been avoided by more far-sighted action taken years ago? If an earlier attempt had been made to unite the port of Aden with the rest of Southern Arabia we might have created a tradition of Partnership that is lacking today. Divisive tribal loyalties, however, were at least as strong ten years ago as they are today and no form of government has yet been devised which would be equally acceptable to the intellectual leaders in the port and the tribal leaders in the hills.
Can anything be done now to retrieve the situation? It seems to be clear that there is genuine desire in South Arabia to be inde- pendent—and not to be ruled either by Nasser or some Yemeni administration. Fear of Nasser could be the cement that holds South Arabia together, but this cement can only do its work if it has time to set. There are signs that our Government now appreciates this. We should agree to the maintenance of a small military force—with a fighter squadron—in Aden until Nasser withdraws his forces from the Yemen. Our withdrawal could have been used as a lever for getting Nasser out of the Yemen. Perhaps it still can be.
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