THE LATEST REPORT FROM RUSSIA.
WE arc not, as a rule, much inclined to trust statements about Russian policy coming only from Vienna. Magyars, Austrian Jews, and agents of the House of Hapsburg, all regard Russia with such loathing and dread, and are all so anxious to alarm England about her course, that they will in all sincerity believe St. Petersburg capable of any action which England may dislike. They will credit any rumour, and even invent rumours, not out of mendacity, but because their imaginations take fire at the smallest hint. The positive statement published by the Vienna correspondent of the Times on Wednesday is, however, so serious, and accords so well with much information from Berlin, that even if unconfirmed it is worth more than a moment's consideration. It was always possible, to say the least, that the Czar, whose initiative is hampered in every direction by the League of Peace, might revert to the older policy of his House, renew the alliance of the three States which partitioned Poland, and, with his frontier secured upon the West, recommence the secular march of his people towards the Southern waters. It is Constantinople that he must always seek ; and his alliance with France, though it might lead there, could do so only after a tremendous struggle, in which even victory would leave Russia terribly, exhausted. The correspondent declares that the possibility has become more than a probability ; that the Czar has finally resolved to make a change in the direction of his policy ; that he has given up all idea of the alliance for which the French have struggled so hard ; that he intends, now Prince Bis- marck has departed, to be reconciled with Germany ; and that, when the Emperors meet in June to witness the Russian manceuvres at Krasnoe-Selo, the new arrangements conse- quent on his conversion will be reduced to form. Clearly the essence of that form must be that Russia would be received into the League of Peace. It is not possible for the German Emperor to betray Austria by exchanging her friendship for that of Russia, and not possible for Austria to stand apart sullenly and alone. Her danger would be too extreme, for France could not help her in the South- East, and the Hapsburgs will not recommence at this time of day their endless attempt to obtain supremacy in Italy. The Magyars may be furious, and the whole Balkan in commotion ; but if Germany and Russia desire to draw together, the Hapsburgs must accede, or run risks contrary to the whole character of their policy, and, in view of the Slav feeling of more than half their subjects, not to be seriously expected. The great Alliance, if the story is true, must be widened so as to include Russia among its active supporters.
Such a change, though improbable, for Russia is boiling with antipathy to the Germans, is at least possible ; and it would so profoundly modify the situation throughout Europe, and, indeed, all over the world, that it is useful to consider what its first consequences would be. To begin with, the fear of the great war which for years past has dominated all policy in Europe, has governed all alliances, and has even been the first factor in internal legislation, will be temporarily at an end. There does not exist on earth the physical power to cope on land with such an alliance. Nothing but despair could tempt France to rush alone into such a conflict, and Great Britain neither could nor would give her the necessary assistance. Whatever her rage— and her statesmen would be choking with it—France must perforce remain quiet, or employ her strength in the distant expeditions which her peasantry so detest. She would no doubt remain quiet, and the competition in armaments which now cripples all treasuries would for a moment be suspended. Next, the Russian Court would be compelled to decide, and decide very quickly, towards what design it would direct the energies of its people. It would, we think, be nearly impossible for the Czar to remain passive and at peace. He has his Army to reckon with ; and his Army has expected a great war so long, has been so inflamed with jealousy of Germany, and is so eager for opportunities of service and distinction, that a long and assured peace not preceded by victory would seem to it intolerable. The Czar would be despised as a man who had shrunk from a great struggle after making every preparation, and assuring his soldiers that, however much he appeared to give way, he only waited the fitting hour for asserting the right of Russia to supremacy among all Slays. Even the Russian people would not be free from this feeling, for though peace may be their interest, they are strongly moved by any decline in the reputation of their country, and quite aware that as yet she has failed to beat down the resistance of Bulgaria. a little State which they regard as "ungrateful," and even "rebellious," to the Czar. Unless the Governmentis to become unpopular, it must direct its strength towards some great achievement, and it will have before it two alternatives. One, as we have so often pointed out, is the final and complete conquest of Persia, which can now be invaded from two sides, which cannot by itself resist, and which offers a prize singularly tempting to the Russian people, who are so eager for fertile land that they are beginning to swarm even into Southern Siberia. Persia is as large as France, and needs everywhere nothing but irrigation to produce the richest crops ; it may be said to be nearly empty of people, its whole present population scarcely exceeding that of Belgium ; while the Kingdom offers a clear road from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf and the whole of the Asiatic seas. We can conceive of nothing more tempting to a Russian Em- peror than the power of making such a gift to his peasantry. It would be worth a war with England ; and we greatly doubt whether, when it came to the point, England would risk her fortunes and those of India on the nearly impossible task of defending in a great land campaign a kingdom whose strength has been eaten out by incurable misgovernment. We should, if we succeeded, have to govern Persia ourselves, and so march our frontiers at two points for hundreds of miles with those of the Russian Empire. We doubt our people's making any such effort ; and if they did not, Persia might be made in three years the greatest and the richest of all Russian provinces, and one, too, the possession of which would facilitate to all time the destruction of the Turkish Empire. asking another,—What motive has he to refuse ? He respects, that a hero is not always a man of insight.
under arms, have been aware that if a single man of in- the order they have produced reveals unexpected treasures calculable impulses gave the signal, Germany would be to be won by digging or felling or manufacture ; but they flooded with hostile armies advancing from two sides at shrink with no hypocritical reluctance from conquering for once, armies each of which might prove in battle the equal the sake of cash. Such an appeal only makes them of her own. Mere respite from such a strain would be a doubtful of their own motives, and by depriving them of great advantage, and one which would make all Germans self-confidence, deprives them of half their strength. Men declare their Emperor the most successful of diplomatists. laugh at their eagerness to do good and earn 15 per cent. ; Their country would be secure, though Austria might not but, in truth, the herd of " promoters " who appeal to the be, while France would be left to gnash her teeth in double motive know their countrymen well. The English despair, as powerless for invasion after all her enormous want to be rich, but they want to do their duty too ; and if sacrifices as she was in the year after Sedan. Russia you require of them their highest effort, it is to the latter pacified, and France defeated,—that would be the meaning motive that the appeal must be made. It is the French, of the Czar's entry into the great Alliance. Such a not the English, who conquer a State avowedly to "find prospect would be quite enough to attract a young posts for the sons of respectable men." Sovereign of Germany, even if he were not embarked on a semi-Socialistic enterprise, and if he were not intent on fulfilling his grandfather's last command, to stand well with Russia, the only Power, in the old man's judgment, which was at once Conservative and possessed of strength sufficient, if she were hostile, to expose his great edifice to risk.
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