GERMANY AND SPAIN.
-TYING ALFONSO of Spain recently visited the German Emperor at Homburg, received at his hands the highest honour he could confer, and was treated in all respects as the Sovereign of a great and most friendly people. Moreover, he was assured that his rank in Europe should be acknowledged by the elevation of the Ministers representing Germany and Spain in Madrid and Berlin to the rank of Ambassadors, a promise which is to be carried out immediately after the Prince's visit. And now the Crown Prince has been directed to return King Alfonso's visit as his father's direct repre- sentative, and to travel to Madrid in Royal state, crossing the sea under the escort of a German squadron. It is not likely that a Court like that of Berlin pays elaborate honours like these without a political motive, if only because it fully understands that a political motive will be ascribed to them and it is not difficult to guess what that motive is. Prince Bismarck does not dread France, but he does dread a coalition with France for its centre ; and the first object of 'his policy is to convince French statesmen that their country is isolated, that it is surrounded by hostile or calculating Powers, and that France must perforce abstain from any attempt at revenge. The Prince does not believe that Frenchmen have either forgotten or forgiven the invasion, or that they despair of reversing its results ; but he does believe that they will make no movement, unless they have fair grounds for expecting reasonable success. He over- rates, rather than underrates, French prudence. He sets him- self, therefore, deliberately to make his strength and the isola- tion of France as visible as possible, and is especially anxious to secure the countries which border upon the object of his fear. He has secured Italy, and if he can secure Spain, France will be ringed-in with Powers who could invade or threaten her from the north-east, from the south-east, and from the south-west all at once. She is in fact throttled, and unless she could secure the alliance either of England or Russia, could not with- out folly attempt a war with the ever-prepared German Power. England, the Prince thinks, probably with truth, would not intervene on the Continent, where armies are now so huge ; and Russia is reluctant either to run such risks as war would involve, or to trust a Government so hostile as that of France to every form of Monarchy,—another reason for the preference felt in Berlin for a Republic in France. Europe, therefore, is separated from France, and so long as that is the case, the German Chancellor calculates on peace.
It is an astute calculation, and it is not for us to say that the most successful statesman of the age can commit blunders, but Prince Bismarck seems to us to be running very great risks. He can hardly obtain much from Spain, for he does not want a fleet, certain if it threatened France to be destroyed, and Spain has no army mobile enough to cross the Pyrenees in force. She has not adopted universal military service. Twenty thousand men could defend the Passes from the French side, and it is not from want of men to collect at separated points that France will ever be in any danger.
The diversion to be created by Spain could not be a for- midable one, while in arranging for it, or seeming to arrange for it, Prince Bismarck is rousing a rage in France which, far more than any diplomatic combination, may threaten peace. The peasantry dread war, but all signs combine to show that French politicians, together with the people of the cities, are rising to a dangerous height of irritability. They see insults everywhere, detect in every newspaper article a tendency to menace, and may yet, under some sudden impulse, lose their heads, and decide to risk all rather than endure longer what they think humiliation. In such a temper, nations will promise much and give up much, and Prince Bismarck may find that he has not yet quite realised what France " raised to the height of circumstances," as Danton put it, could offer to the enemies of Germany, open and secret, for their alliance, and even for a slowness in mobili- sation which would have many of the effects of neutrality. It is dangerous by such steady pressure to drive a nervous and susceptible people into a condition of mind in which they may take counsel of despair, and decide that if war is suicide, suicide is preferable to life under such conditions. Prince Bismarck should remember, if his real object is peace, that he is not immortal, and that his successor will not inspire that personal awe, either in Paris, Vienna, or St. Petersburg, which is now so visible among the factors that make for peace. We have repeatedly condemned French susceptibility as unreasonable, but even Englishmen would fret if they saw a victorious enemy calmly marshalling country after country into rank against them, and France is not an island. She is in real danger, if defeated, of losing provinces, or even of a dismemberment, which might terminate her national existence.
Nor is it quite certain that the King of Spain, even if desirous, can give Germany any effectual assistance. His people are very insular, little disposed to profitless war, and apt to calculate that whatever comes, they will for cen- turies have but one important neighbour, and that is France. They are proud, and may be delighted with promotion in European rank ; and they are dignified, and will be sure to show honour to so highly placed a visitor, who, moreover, has in no way injured or affronted them ; but if they are to do more, they will want a quid pro quo, and what has Germany to give them ? She might conceivably, if victorious, give Portugal ; but do the Spaniards wish for Portugal as an un- willing dependency, an Ireland in which every discontented party would find friends? Their statesmen have hitherto hoped to gain Portugal as we gained Scotland, not as we gained Ireland. Germany could also hold the ring while Spain conquered Morocco ; but Morocco, though every Spaniard thinks of it as his reversionary heritage, is hardly worth the permanent hostility of France. Germany could give effective guarantees against an invasion from the North, but the Spaniards do not dread one, and have an even ex- aggerated idea of the inviolability of their country. In their own judgment, they drove out Napoleon I. There are no colonies to be obtained by German aid, nor are Spaniards seeking an ex- tension of their colonial dominion. It seems as if Germany had little to offer to the Spanish nation, and she has nearly as little to promise to the -King. Prince Bismarck is very strong, but he could not prevent a revolution in Madrid, or debar the French from secretly encouraging it, or shoot the Generals who led a pronunciamiento. Already it is reported the Spanish Repub- licans stand aloof from the grand reception of the German Crown Prince, and to the Republicans must be added that important party, strongly represented even in the Cabinet, which holds that the friendship of France is the one per- manent interest of Spain. We shall see very shortly to which side the body of the people incline ; but it is most improbable that in a country like Spain the sup- port of a foreign, a Northern, and a Protestant Power will help to consolidate the throne. It is difficult, therefore, to avoid a doubt whether this new stroke of policy will pro- duce great results, and whether Prince Bismarck may not pay too dearly for a great diplomatic success. That he does not think so is evident, for it is now thirteen years since he accepted the throne of Spain for a Hohenzollern ; but even he, within his own special domain, may be capable of mistake.
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