CORRESPONDENCE.
THE STATE OF THE NAVY.
I.—THE NEED FOR INQUIRY.
11.0 THE EDITOft 01 THE "SpEcTAT0R."1 Sin,—Of late there have been many indications that public confidence in the administration of the Royal Navy has been shaken. The chorus of praise with which radical changes of naval policy have been received during the last four years has been interrupted. Each of the changes has been heralded by official and officious descriptions of its novelty and prospective beneficial effect. The literary activity of the Admiralty in the production of Parliamentary Papers has been prodigious. Communications made to the Press by the Admiralty have been remarkable and unprecedented. Mr. Bellaire, M.P., in his place in Parliament and elsewhere, has
thrown a strong light on the charaeter of these communica-
tions and on the pains taken to influence public opinion in favour of Admiralty action. For a time these vigorous
attempts succeeded. It was natural they should do so ; public opinion properly inclines to favour and support responsible authorities until good reasons are shown to the contrary.
In this case the Board of Admiralty was responsible for what was officially described by Lord Cawdor as a series of reforms " all related and interdependent, having their founda-
tion in the reorganisation of the personnel and in the redistribution of the Fleet issued by my predecessor in the
December of 1902 and 1904." But while the Board of Admiralty accepted responsibility, from the nature of these changes primary responsibility necessarily rested on naval members of the Board. It was notorious also that the present First Sea Lord—Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher, G.C.B.—was chiefly responsible for the initiation of the new policy. His portrait, exhibited at the Royal Academy, showed his hand resting on a Blue-book inscribed with the legend " Naval Education, 1902." The Order in Council of August, 1904, and Board Minute of October 20th following, effected considerable changes in the distribu- tion of business at the Admiralty, and largely increased the powers of the First Sea Lord ; these important changes took effect when Sir John Fisher received that appointment. Statements made in Parliament by representatives of the Admiralty brought into prominence the leading part which the First Sea Lord took in framing new schemes and carrying out the work of Committees. The principal credit and re- sponsibility for new departures were attributed to or claimed for him in the Press and not repudiated. It was stated, no doubt, that his colleagues heartily endorsed the action, and that it was supported by a great body of naval opinion ; but over all the personality of the First Sea Lord predominated. In the public eye he has appeared as the great reformer who has broken away from tradition, appreciated modern require- ments, and devised novel methods of organisation and train- ing, as well as schemes for mobilisation and distribution of our fleets, surpassing all that has gone before. In these circumstances, it is impossible to discuss recent naval policy without frequent reference to Sir John Fisher. It will be understood, however, that no personal attack is made on that distinguished officer, no reflection cast on his motives, nor doubt expressed of his honest belief that the drastic changes initiated by him should tend to greater naval efficiency. On the other hand, having a deep conviction that in many respects these changes must be highly prejudicial and dangerous to future naval efficiency, the writer feels bound to state his opinions and to give reasons for them in the plainest language. The national and Imperial interests at stake are of enormous importance, and it is essential that both sides of the question should be understood.
For a time no heed was paid to those who ventured to dissent from the official and popular view. They included a considerable number of experienced and able naval officers and civilians whose only motive in raising objections must have been the maintenance of naval efficiency. All who criticised or opposed alleged " reforms " were branded as members of a " Syndicate of Discontent," or had unworthy and personal motives attributed to them. Great difficulty was experienced in attempts to get a fair hearing for 'state- ments of their views. Some of the leading journals declined to admit letters or articles setting forth objections to official schemes, or criticising official methods. It was an uphill task for two or three years, but those engaged in it did not quail under the storm of opprobrium. They persevered, and at length are in sight of their goal. The necessity for further, thorough, and independent inquiry, by a competent and im- partial tribunal, into changes recently made in naval policy and administration is now recognised. Blind acceptance of Admiralty " reforms " is ne longer the fashion. The Times, which has supported almost the whole official action, has recently urged the necessity for independent inquiry into, or official justification of, important matters on which Admiralty decisions have been announced. Other influential journals, hitherto advocates of the new schemes, have made similar recommendations. On all sides there are indications that public opinion is tending towards the conviction that the
"great series of reforms " for which so much has been claimed do not rest upon the solid basis of exhaustive preliminary inquiry or command the support of the Naval Service. These changes fundamentally affect the present and future efficiency of our "first line of defence " ; they involve radical departures from methods of training and administration which have been proved by long experience to be well adapted to the require- ments of peace and war•. Such changes ought not to have been made without thorough investigation, including the collection and analysis of the opinions of leading representa- tives of the Naval Service and of those having large experience of naval administration. It was pre-eminently a case in which calm, dispassionate, and deliberate investigation was required, and where the personal opinions of individuals, however eminent, should not have prevailed.
No urgent necessity for immediate decision existed or• was indicated in previous official utterances. The Memoranda of Lord Selborne accompanying the Annual Navy Estimates immediately preceding this period expressed favourable opinions of existing methods of naval training and organisa- tion of the Fleet, while recognising the fact that progressive advance and change were required to meet continuously changing conditions. A careful study of these Annual Explanatory Statements—which up to December, 1902, sufficed to disclose Admiralty policy—shows no indication of impending radical change. For example, in February, 1902, Lord Selborne dealt with the "system of naval educa- tion," admitted that it must be continuously improved, but ended by saying that " judged by its results—the excellence of the officers trained under it—[the system] is a good one." In the following December Lord Selborne issued his famous Memorandum introducing an entirely new system of education and training. The only new condi- tion apparent to outsiders was the appointment of Sir John Fisher• as Second Naval Lord ; and that fact did not explain or justify such hasty action. No evidence has been produced to show that proper• preliminary investigation by a Special Committee or by the Board itself was made. Ten months only intervened between the two Statements, an in- sufficient period for such an investigation. The Board of Admiralty claimed the right to deal with this matter. No one disputes their right to final decision thereon ; what is disputed is the possibility of the conduct of a searching inves- tigation, the collection and analysis of evidence, and the thorough consideration of all sides of such a subject by members of the Board in the time at their• disposal after performing regular• and essential duties during the interval between February and December, 1902. It has been stated openly and repeatedly that Sir John Fisher• brought the new scheme with him to the Admiralty in a practically complete form. Neither Parliament nor• the public has had any infor- mation in regard to the extent to which the opinion of the Naval Service was ascertained; but it is certain that a large number of naval officers whose opinions and suggestions would have been of the greatest value were never consulted. The fair presumption is that the Admiralty acted without full inquiry and with unnecessar•y haste in dealing with a question of vital importance. Having "decided in haste," it is not surprising to find only two years later—before any experience had been gained beyond that obtained in the training at Osborne of little boys whose ages ranged from twelve and a half to fifteen year•s- that modifications were made in essential features of the scheme put forward in 1902. Again there was unnecessary haste. Most of the modifications related to matters which can have no practical effect for many years, and Lord Tweed- mouth has since admitted this to be true. Yet the decision on them, like the promotion of the original scheme, was " rushed." Lord Cawdor was then First Lord : in his State- ment of Admiralty Policy (November 30th, 1905) these modifications of Lord Selborne's arrangements were announced, and much was made of the Recommendations of a Special Committee which had been appointed to inquire into the matter. Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas had presided over the Committee, and that fact alone was officially stated. No information was given as to the constitution of the Com- mittee, the terms of reference, or the details of procedure. The Report was refused to the House of Commons, but as the result of severe pressure in the House of Lords it was pub- lished after a long time had been taken "editing ".it. Prior to its publication writers in the Press, who claimed to be in possession of authoritative information, had dwelt upon the representative character of the Committee, the comprehensive nature of the inquiry, the great weight of evidence given by eminent naval officers in favour of the modifications. Similar representations have been made in the Press respecting other sections of recent " reforms," for, curiously enough, that method of explanation and advocacy has been preferred to direct official statements. As this is the only case in which a Report has been published, it may be of interest to examine it somewhat closely, and to compare official with officious statements.
In the first place, the constitution of the Committee was not representative, and its Report was not unanimous. Its proceedings were hasty and ill-considered, sufficient evidence was not taken, the witnesses as a body were not representa- tive or sufficiently numerous, their evidence did not support the recommendations made by the Committee. It is extremely probable from internal evidence that the Report was virtually written beforehand. The Committee was appointed on December 14th, 1904: its Report is dated March 7th, 1905. In this brief period the Committee is supposed to have examined into the training of all classes of junior• naval officers, as well as the best methods of per•- for•ming vitally important duties in the engine-rooms. They had to deal with many difficult questions relating to " speciali- sation" in gunnery, torpedo work, navigation, engineering, the corps of Royal Marines, engine-room staff, and other departments of the complements of his Majesty's ships. All this was accomplished in less than three months. Their• recommendations were taken as the basis of Admiralty decisions and used as sufficient reasons for• great changes. • The decision might have been deferred without inconvenience for many years. Officially this was described as a thorough inquiry by a competent tribunal. If this is a specimen of the inquiries made by other Committees whose terms of reference and Reports have not been permitted to see the light, that refusal to publish is intelligible. But there is a most serious side to this matter•. If it be true that no more complete investigation has been made in regard to equally important subjects than is disclosed in the Report of the Douglas Committee, what must be the conclusion reached by every impartial person P A demand for further and thorough inquiry into recent changes is inevitable, and it must be ascertained beyond doubt whether these changes shall be maintained or modified.—I am, Sir, &c., Crvis.
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