THE WAR SURVEYED : THE THREAT TO HOLLAND
BY STRATEGICUS
IT seems possible that we are on the eve of great events which may put an end to the quiescent period of the war and completely transform the general situation. It is even possible that the hour may have struck before this article appears. The direction of the attack is sufficiently indicated. The precise temperature of the threats or preparations varies from hour to hour. Viewing the posi- tion, with every counsel of caution, at its worst from our point of view, it is impossible to escape the impression of an exceedingly febrile condition in the German alarums and excursions on the frontiers of Holland and Belgium, and no one can say with any assurance that they mean what they seem to mean. Even if they do suggest invasion, once more it is impossible to say whether they involve invasion of both countries together, or of Holland alone.
The naval factor, at least, can be excluded. No suggestion of humanity will be allowed to bias the German Staff. It will be guided solely by the consideration of military advantage. The affront to world opinion will probably be discounted as it was in 1917 when unrestricted U-boat warfare was decided upon in spite of the consequent peril of immediate intervention by the United States. But if we attempt to imagine how the German decision will fall we must first make some guess at the objective. If the Staff have advised an advance against the Allied line and an attempt to initiate a war of movement, there is no need to invade Holland except in so far as an advance via the Lim- burg area would turn the main line of the Belgian defence. Belgium has a well-trained army of about 600,000 men and the Meuse has been strongly fortified. The Ardennes country, to the east of the Meuse and to the south, is not suitable for large-scale movements. Its wooded area lends itself admirably to delaying tactics, and it would be used for that purpose. A German advance through the Limburg area, which dips from Holland deep into Belgian territory, would turn the Meuse line, and it would only find the withdrawn flank along the Albert Canal in its way. This is also fortified but it could not offer anything like the resistance of the Meuse line.
It seems therefore that Holland would inevitably be attacked, either as a direct objective or as easing the way into Belgium, if either country is to be attacked. And at the moment Holland seems to have come under the more imminent threat. In any case it is late in the season for heavy campaigning and it would normally be considered time for the troops to go into winter quarters. Moreover once Holland was overrun Belgium would be much easier to conquer in the spring ; and in the meantime, Germany would be immune from Allied attack in that quarter.
If Holland were attacked, Germany would hope to secure bases considerably nearer England for an intensive air and submarine campaign. Bombers have range and carrying power ; but they are vulnerable and they would require the assistance of fighter planes, which are designed neither for range nor carrying power but for speed. By shortening the distance to England this condition would be met. The invasion of Holland, therefore, directly threatens England. It admits by implication, that the Maginot Line cannot be breached by a sudden and violent thrust. It admits that what are really involved are siege conditions, different in scale but not in kind from those which were used against Verdun in 1916. Such a campaign demands the most elaborate preparation of material and effectives ; and it seems that Germany is little more prepared for this " war of usury " than are the Allies.
It is for this reason that the conquest of Holland may commend itself to the German Staff. England is regarded as the reservoir from which will be drawn the immense resources in munitions and men necessary for a successful reduction of the West Wall. It is the British navy that safeguards the merchantmen which will bring the resources of the United States to France. An intense, organised and persistent campaign against the munitions-centres of England would be designed to disorganise the production of planes, shells, siege artillery and training. By repeated attacks on our naval bases an attempt would also be made to force the fleet to keep the seas where the submarines, from these new and handy bases, would hope to take their toll. In a word such a campaign would strike at our grand strategy. It is further commended because of its probable by-products. The Germans would hope, incidentally, to break down our morale, and, now that Hitler has convinced himself that we mean to fight, this is regarded as an attack on the morale of the Allies. And, finally, it will naturally be assumed that, even if the maximum result is not obtained, the campaign will compel diversion of interest and resources, especially in planes and anti-aircraft guns, from France.
What Germany demands as a preliminary condition for such a campaign is, in effect, te stretch of Holland between Rotterdam and Hushing, which really comprises the Rhine and the Meuse deltas and the Scheldt estuary. It would be admirably suited for submarine and seaplane bases and for aerodromes. But the northern part of this area and Ymuiden can be inundated, and thus rendered immune against land attack. The use of cavalry is no reply to such conditions, since a few resolute machine-gun units can dismount them. But the inundations demand time. It is said that Holland, having discovered the plan for a German invasion, took immediate action, and that the plan has therefore been abandoned.
This is as unilluminating as most of the statements which secure currency at present. The plain fact is that Holland between the Rhine and the Ems would not seriously detain the Germans until the Zuider Zee and the Yssel are reached. If this northern and eastern part of Holland were quickly overrun, the fate of the rest of Holland would depend upon the defence of the Meuse, and it is impossible to think it could, under these circumstances, be long maintained. Tha Limburg area up to the Meuse could not be held, and a suc- cessful crossing of the Meuse would throw open all Holland south of the river and up to the Scheldt estuary. Even with the resolution to inundate her main industrial area Holland could hardly hope to hold the sort of violent attack by shock troops which the Germans would probably deliver. The invader could then hope to secure almost at once the Scheldt- Flushing area, and a greater or less part of the terri- tory to the north either saved or recovered from inundation. The Dutch are brave to a fault, and the army is well trained; but the army is small and Holland is, like Poland, betrayed by its frontier. Even if, in time of peace, Belgium and Holland wished to achieve the security which the times demand, the burden of fortifying the frontier would be almost intolerable. Divided, they fall. Even at the cost of industrial suicide, it is difficult to think Holland can gain more than a respite for part of her country ; and she cannot keep Germany out of an important section of the coastal area for long. At this point, Belgium cannot materially help her, neither can we.
The question arises how far would a rapid success, within the limits I have stated, affect us. Would Germany be able to affect our grand strategy? Even at the most pessimistic estimate I cannot think it would change the situation appre- ciably. In the last war we survived Zeebrugge, and at length seriously weakened the submarine threat from the Belgian bases. The aeroplanes present a new and possibly more dangerous factor. But it is winter. Our anti-aircraft defences are sound. Our fighters are skilful and full of mettle. We should suffer most in our nevres.
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