Fitzgerald's limitations
George Brock
One of the grimmest legacies of the bomb at the Grand has been the slow-dawning perception that in Ireland itself nothing has changed. In a British government dominated to an exceptional degree by a single individual, Mrs Thatcher has left her thinking on the subject largely to others and there is no evidence so far that the events in Brighton have prompted any change in Ireland's lowly position in her agenda of priorities. There was certain- ly no sign of such change after similar murders at the House of Commons, Mul- laghmore, Hyde Park and Harrods.
And across the water, busy raising hopes for the forthcoming summit, Dr Garret Fitzgerald stands just about where he stood before: on the sidelines. Perhaps the single most important characteristic of the rela- tionship between the Republic and Britain is the least frequently remarked. For their different reasons, neither side likes to advertise it. The North, the issue which competes with the economy as the domi- nant question of Irish politics, is ranked by the British political establishment as a minor irritant. A somnolent blanket of boredom and indifference descends on the topic once the spasm of emotion following each mainland bomb has passed. Bombs in Northern Ireland itself no longer even rate a spasm. This inequality of importance governs and colours every dealing be- tween the two countries.
To be sure, the relationship between officials in the two capitals is transformed from the enmities of the late Sixties and early Seventies, and to a lesser degree this applies to the respective sets of senior politicians as well. To be sure, British feelings about Ireland and its government were strikingly muted after Brighton, probably because of the real efforts made by Fitzgerald and his London ambassador after the Harrods bomb last Christmas. They refrained from the time-honoured Irish ritual of linking sympathy for bomb victims with hints that Brits could do better at understanding the motives of those who plant them.
It is a true pity that Fitzgerald is so powerless to affect the grisly stalemate. After a prolonged phase of volatility, Dublin has a reasonably stable coalition — as well-disposed to Britain as any ever will be — co-existing with a secure Conservative government in London. It is the best set of governmental conditions for improving matters which has cropped up for several years and it will not be bettered for some time to come. This is a matter of indiffer- ence to those who argue that, bleak as the situation might appear, there is no alterna- tive to the British Government continuing to do precisely what it does now without variation. To everyone else, Fitzgerald matters.
Fitzgerald has shown some ability to arrest drift — but it has been in economics and not politics. Fitzgerald's Fine Gael fought Mr Charles J. Haughey's Fianna Fail at three general elections during 1981 and 1982 and the period saw an improbable shift in Fitzgerald's favour. Once, the ,mention of Mr Haughey's name in his own country would elicit a small, sly smile. Charlie, said the smile, may be a rogue, but he's one of the boys after all. The equivalent expression for Fitzgerald We one of protective affection or even pity -- the look one might give a rather innocent child. Garret, said the face, isn't street- wise. In fact, he's probably wearing odd socks today. Haughey slid into a mess of faction - fighting and scandal so deep that even he could not fix his way out. SimultaneouslY, the Irish electorate suffered a bad ec0,110" mic scare — there were rumours of 1Mr intervention — and decided to opt for the safer Fitzgerald medicine. It is proving predictably unpopular. While Fitzgerald may well not solve the problems of high inflation and huge public debt, he can at least notch up the small achievement that the budgetary arguments are now fought on his ground. He is often described as an economist born and bred. In repose, his face settle into an expression of slightly solemn sur" prise, lending itself to absent-minded' professor caricatures. He actually learnt his economics working for Aer Lingus an as a journalist. He is notorious for love calculation. Much of his political reputa: tion was made by a ten-hour stretch 01 virtuoso television psephology in the general election of 1965. He is proud of the fact that his antece.- dents blend opposing Irish traditions. HI father, Desmond, was a poet, friend 0' Yeats and Pound, who married the daugh- ter of a Belfast Unionist family. The young couple joined the IRA and they htlt,,i/ fought in the GPO building during t"'".. 1916 Easter Rising. Fitzgerald pere lateis took the pro-treaty side and serval minister of both defence and foreie. affairs. He passed his francophilia to hi" son, who emerged from his own stint 05. foreign minister with a well-polished rePti
tation, particularly in Brussels. He was regarded as so 'communautaire' that one search for the President of the Commission Prompted British feelers to find out if he might be interested in the job. He wasn't. The party leadership was already in sight.
Fitzgerald is a well-liked, mature politi- cian, a member of the club open only to those who know how terribly difficult all these problems are. He is, above all, nice. But is he actually competent enough to Make much difference? He launched a 'constitutional crusade' during one short- lived government three years ago, but It has not been revived. It was supposed to tune down the Catholicism of the state's constitution, but was put beyond the reach of revival by a jabbered, press conference commitment made by Fitz- gerald himself on the hustings. He agreed to hold a referendum on whether the Prohibition on abortion should be incorpo- rated into the constitution, the very same document which he was so keen to secula- rise. It remains unchanged, save for the addition of the ban on abortion.
It has been hard to tout the New Ireland Forum as a major diplomatic triumph. itilgineered by Mr John Hume of the ouLP as a vehicle to unite the fractious southern parties behind a moderate n. ationalist platform, it ended by confirm- ing the old divisions. Fitzgerald's govern- ment has engaged in a feverish campaign to holster the SDLP against the increasingly successful Provisional Sinn Fein by acting as the beleaguered party's diplomatic Megaphone. Cabinet ministers in the Re- public have acted as a verbal rapid deploy- ment force against evidence of British Prejudice, and have only succeeded in snunding less and less substantial. One s, c h protest was so hastily mounted that fitzgerald confessed on radio that it had packfired. The same hyperbole has led thein grossly to inflate expectations for the summit.
Fitzgerald is probably Ireland's best t%%liable economic leader and advocate at tiro-summitry. But he is not the giant _iequired to effect real change in the rela ri- n.ship between Ireland and Britain. The tvients of his action are largely laid down by „,r,. Hume and by the automatically. Lionalist assumptions of the Republic's !ctorate. Fitzgerald has shown more rAi.rage
than many of his colleagues in
ins people home truths they do not wish INC) ilear, but he has elections to fight as "ell. He has no force majeure to apply to ',:trs.Thatcher, although the slow creep of .'?ritish policy (it could hardly be called a i„hru. .st) is in his favour. The real limits of .u.ritish action are laid down by the Pro- !onals and by Dr Paisley. His bargaining ,P.°Irlts Over the next few months amount to these: he can play on London's fear of gv.erning a worse Northern Ireland in tiveleh the principal political representa- ar_es of the minority Catholic community the political wing of the Provisional r.KA. And he can gently hint that if he isees, his replacement will be less helpful.
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