It is believed that M. Gambetta strongly adheres to the
English alliance in Egyptian affairs, and certainly the
1Upublique Francais°, which is his paper, does. That good feeling, which is strongly reciprocated here, is not, how- ever, sufficient. The French will not throw over the bond- holders, whose greed is the cause of all the trouble ; and if the Control is to be maintained, actual force may have to be employed. It cannot be exerted through the Turkish Army, first, because such a proceeding would be too shameless— imagine England sanctioning an extension -of Turkish power for money !—and secondly, because the Turks would get the money, and not the bondholders, which would not suit France. It is indispensable to decide, therefore, before the crisis arises, how force is to be applied, or a quarrel is certain, either at first., or a few weeks after the joint occupation. The arrangement is needful, too, because Germany is openly hinting at a European agreement to decide the destiny of Egypt. That would not do, for we could not obey the award, if Egypt were handed over to a first-class Power.
