TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUSSIA AND GERMANY. THE Times of Wednesday publishes an article from " a Correspondent," whom it describes as " ex- ceptionally well informed," which if based on facts, as we believe it to be, is of great importance. The article in question asserts that Germany has at last been able to realise her essential aim in the field of international relations, and has come to an understanding with Russia, —an understanding which, though nominally only con- cerned with the Far East, in reality must influence the whole policy of both States, and so is bound to affect indirectly the external relations of all the Great Powers. Germany has a double policy in regard to Russia. In the first place, she has always strongly desired to stand well with her great neighbour in order to free herself from the danger of " the war with two fronts " ; and next, she has of late aimed at an understanding with Russia in the Far East which would enable her to exploit, politically and commercially, that portion of China which is outside the sphere of Russian ambitions. She desires, that is, to see Russia predominant in the North and East of China, while she, with the goodwill of Russia, is allowed, working from her base at Kiao-chau, to extend her influence and authority over large portions of the Yangtse basin. Up till this year her efforts in both eases seemed to meet with but small results. In Europe Russia was not willing to compromise her relations with France by listening to Germany, while in the Far East itself she showed herself indifferent to, if not indeed some- what jealous of, German aspirations. The war, however, gave the German Emperor the opportunity he had so long and so ardently desired of layingRussia under an obligation, and of paving the way for an understanding with her in regard to the Far East. As soon as the unfavourable turn of events in Manchuria made it clear that Russia would be glad of sympathy of a practical kind, the German Emperor acted. He began by giving Russia " explicit assurances of support," as the Times corre- spondent puts it, " amounting to a practical guarantee of immunity from all danger of interference in Europe, which enabled the Russian War Office not only to with- draw from the Western provinces of the Empire some of its finest troops of all arms for service in the Far East, but even to dismantle to some extent the Western fortresses, in order to provide siege guns for Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Liau-yang, and Kharbin. ' This spontaneous demonstra- tion of German friendship, it is pointed out, "was followed by a variety of smaller services, down to the arrest and surrender to Russia of deserters who had escaped across the German frontier. Every facility was given for the execution of Russian contracts for war material at Essen and in other German workshops more or less directly controlled by the German Government. The two great German shipping companies, the North-German Lloyd and the Hamburg-America, were allowed to transfer several of their ocean steamers to Russia to be con- verted into cruisers, and to enter into large contracts for coaling Russian cruisers on their commerce-destroying errands, as well as the Baltic fleet on its way out to the Far East, if circumstances allowed of its despatch. It has even been stated that torpedo-boats from Schichau have been transported in sections across the German frontier." Even when German steamers were seized and sunk by Russian cruisers, the German Government refused to make any unpleasant protests, but con- fined itself to the mildest representations. At the same time, the semi-official Press, instead of being given the cue for hostile criticism, as in the case of our interference with German shipping during the Boer War, was " furnished with all manner of explanations and assurances in order to minimise the importance of these incidents." Finally, the German Government agreed to, or possibly suggested, a plan which, if it had proved successful, would have been of immense benefit to Russia. It was apparently intended, when the whole of the sea-going fleet in Port Arthur made their last sortie, that they should make for Kiao-chau. According to the Times correspon- dent, arrangements had been made there for the reception of the Russian ships, " and for at least coaling with the utmost despatch such of them as might be able to take the sea again, as was, indeed, done in the case of the Novik, thus enabling her to get out and away again within the 24 hours' time-limit. The four other Russian ships were, however, past such temporary help as might otherwise have been given, and, under existing conditions, the German authorities had no option but to have them dismantled and intern their crews. The disgrace into which Prince Ukhtomsky has fallen, in spite of powerful connexions [Prince Ukhtomsky, it will be remembered, failed to respond to Admiral Witoft's last signal to follow the Czarevitch ' and so bring his ships into the safe harbour of Kiao-chau], gives the measure of the importance attached in St. Petersburg to this move. Had it been successful, it would have assured the preservation of a large part of the Pacific fleet under the protection of a friendly Power, and in a state of merely suspended animation. The ships might then have proved a very valuable factor, in the hands of German diplomacy, for exercising some pressure upon Japan at the critical moment when peace should become a necessity."
In confirmation of this view, we note that the Globe in a leading article on Tuesday states that information has reached it " which leaves no doubt as to the plan which dominated the movements of the ill-fated Russian com- mander." This plan was that already described,—i.e., a rush to the German harbour. " There," to quote the words of the Globe," the Admiral of the Atlantic would be able to afford comfort and refreshment to the battered ships of the Admiral of the Pacific. There would be no breach of International Law, the perfection of correcti- tude ' would be observed, no pretext would have been given for such exploits as the cutting out of the The ships would have been dismantled and disarmed, and the crews interned in German territory for so long as hostilities might last. For the moment the Russian Fleet in the Far East would have ceased to exist as a fighting force, but it would still have subsisted as a menace, and as a menace to other Powers beside Japan." The Globe goes on to point out how immensely the power of the German Emperor to intervene at the psychological moment would have been strengthened had the Russian fleet been interned at Kiao-chau. " With half-a-dozen Russian battleships, to say nothing of cruisers and auxiliaries, secure in her dockyards at Kiao-chau, the German Emperor would have done something to readjust the proportion of things. With his own Far Eastern Squadron, and with the remnants of the Port Arthur Fleet rendered seaworthy and manned by their original crews, he would have a most formidable fighting force in reserve, and would be able to intervene in the cause of his ally with an authority that is now entirely lacking. The existence of these ships at Kiao-chau in a state of suspended animation would have robbed the Japanese of all sense of security." But though the plan failed, or only very partially succeeded, it is possible that another effort may be made, and that in a few days' time we may hear of another rush to safety and Kiao- chau by the last remnants of the Russian fleet. At any rate, the German Emperor has shown his goodwill and his desire to help Russia, and thus has made himself the virtual ally of the Czar. The Times correspondent adds that these acts by no means exhaust the active benevo- lence of Germany, and he declares that " if the German Government is of any avail, we shall before long see fresh and substantial proofs of its goodwill towards Russia in the shape of a large Russian war loan to bo floated in Berlin."
It will naturallybe asked what are the precise benefits that Germany expects to reap from the help thus given to Russia. We have already noted the relief afforded to Germany in regard to the risk of a" war with two fronts," and the hope that when the present war is over—the German Emperor, it is understood, believes that Russia will ultimately wear down the power of Japan—Russian aid will secure to Germany a greatly extended sphere of influence and power in the middle regions of China But in addition to this Germany will immediately secure the advantage of a commercial treaty on exceedingly favourable terms. The Times correspondent closes his paper by declaring that an official dementi will no doubt be issued to controvert his statements, but he insists that the importance of the new agreement " exceeds even that of Bismarck's ' rein- surance' treaty, in the same measure as the scope of William IL's Welt-politik transcends that of the old Bismarckian diplomacy, which was mainly confined to the European balance of power."
"How are British interests affected by this new develop- ment in the region of foreign affairs ?" is the question which at once presents itself. In the first place, it is clear that if the German policy succeeds, we shall suffer in the Far East, for the region in which Germany hopes to extend her influence is that of the Yangtse, which we are accus- tomed to regard, though not as exclusively our own, as one from which we do not mean to be shut out by the action of any other Power. If China cannot control the Yangtse, it shall not be controlled by any other Power than ourselves. That is our policy. Since, however, Japan is not yet beaten, and Russia, therefore, is not yet in a position to help Germany in the Yangtse, it is somewhat premature to discuss these eventualities. On general considerations the drawing together of Russia and Germany demands the anxious attention of those responsible for our foreign policy. If, while Germany draws closer to Russia, France recedes, there is no great danger to us. If, on the other hand, Germany comes to an understanding with Russia while Russia and France are still in close alliance, and France becomes, if only for Far Eastern affairs, a partner to the understanding, the situation would resemble that which arose when the intervention of Russia, Germany, and France robbed Japan of what she had gained by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and might involve us in difficulties and dangers of the most serious kind. It is obvious, then, that we should, before matters develop further, take counsel with France as to the new developments produced by the Russo-German understanding. France, we may be sure, is not eager to follow the lead of the German Emperor, though she might find difficulty in giving an answer if a pistol were suddenly presented at her head in the shape of the dilemma,—" Will you help us to assist Russia to settle the Far Eastern question, or else admit the hollowness of your Alliance with the Russians ? " In a word, what we should make clear to France is that if she would like to follow the example of Germany, and " reinsure " herself against eventualities, we shall be willing to come to an understanding. Russia could not complain of France doing " a deal " with Britain when she has just done " a deal " with Germany. After all, we are not so much the enemies of Russia as Germany is the enemy of France. One more point remains to be considered. Is the German Emperor wise to run the risks he is running ?- for, after all, he is running risks. He counts, no doubt, upon the fatuity of our Government, and upon a soothing word or two making them believe that the new agreement is really not in the least injurious to British interests. He cannot, however, count upon any such foolish complacence in Tokio as he is accustomed to find in London. Japan will understand ; and if Japan wins, which is, after all, not impossible, how will the German Emperor like to receive a polite reminder that Kiao-chau belongs to China, and that the surrender of the lease of that port would be an act which would greatly conduce to the peace of the world ?
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