DR. ADENAUER'S CHOICE
TWO psychological moves of considerable interest and potential importance have been made in the past week. One is the assembly of an economic conference in Moscow, the other the tendering of a reciprocal guarantee of assistance and defence by Great Britain to the members of the European Defence Community. There are, of course, other elements than the psychological in both of these—in the case of the Moscow Conference an economic element, and in the case of the British guarantee a military. But it is the psycho- logical effect in each case that is the more immediately important. The Powers principally concerned are Russia in the one case and Germany in the other, for the real significance of the British guarantee is its value to Germany. As a member of -N.A.T.O. and a signatory of the Brussels Pact of 1948, Britain is linked by mutual defence agreements to all Western .European States except Spain. But with Germany there is so far no direct link, for she is not, as yet at any rate, a member of N.A.T.O. It is quite certain that in the event of an attack from the East, Britain would join immediately in the general defence of Germany, but there is an advantage in putting the pledge unambiguously on paper; what goes without saying is usually better said, as the reception given to this particular pledge in Germany shows. The reasons which prevent Britain from becoming a full member of the European Defence Community (and liable in consequence to be committed to policies to which various autonomous mem- bers of the Commonwealth might take exception) are well understood even in quarters where the abstention is regretted. But the latest British move ties Great Britain up with Europe more firmly than ever, thereby making for the creation of that general confidence which gives the strongest assurance of security and peace.
The dominant question in Europe is still whether Federal Germany is to be integrated with the West. The alternative is not integration with the East; there is no question of that, as Russia knows well. It is the maintenance of an armed or unarmed neutrality which would leave her at the mercy of a sudden and treacherous assault from any quarter. There is no danger in any circumstances from the West; what the danger from the East amounts to is problematic. It is Russia's task to persuade Germany that it is non-existent; it is the West's to persuade her to take no risks and unite her fortunes with a bloc of States strong enough to make any aggres-ion increas- ingly improbable. There is some temptation to Western Germany to play off West against East and Vice versa for her own advantage. To her credit she shows no sign of yield- ing to it. • Dr. Adenauer has never swerved from a Western policy, bitterly though his political opponents: the Social Democrats, have assailed, him for it. He is not, of. Course, prepared to abandon what he considers just demands. Negotia- tions with the Occupying Powers over such matters as the proportion of Germany's general defence contribution to go to the upkeep of the Allied forces in Germany have still to be concluded. The sooner that can be achieved the better. Progress has been more rapid lately, and there is talk .of the draft of something tantamount to a peace treaty being ready for initialling next month. If and when that happens another milestone on the road to settled peace will have been reached.
But for Germany a Western policy does not mean for a moment writing off the severed East./ Far from it. Few Western Germans are ready to write off the provinces east of the Oder and Neisse occupied by Poland,. much less the. so-called Russian Zone, with its Moscow-propped Communist Government. German unity is still the political aim of every German in East and West—provided it can be got on the East's or West's terms. Here is a situation of which Russia is making the most. Her recent Note to the Allied Powers put German unity in the forefront, linked with approval for a German national army, such as appeals to the patriotic sense of many even in the present anti-militarist Germany. The proposal made some impression. In the opinion of many Germans the Allies in their reply might have been more con- ciliatory than they were (though it is hard to see how) with a view to keeping the door wide open for further interchanges. It has, in fact, remained open. The Russians have replied to the Allies' reply, and the latter are now considering their next contribution to the discussion. On its nature much may hang, and it is satisfactory that, though the Russian Note was not addressed to Germany, the Federal Chancellor is being taken into full consultation by the Allies. Russia's motives are obscure. They always are. She could stop the Korean war with a word. Yet while she talks peace in Europe the word is not spoken. But whether the Allied Foreign Ministers believe in her sincerity or not, they must frame their answer as though they did. No charge must lie- against them of repelling any advance, however meagre and however suspect.
The second Soviet Note, published last Saturday, lays stress on one point on which Russians and Allies are agreed-- the desirability of free and secret all-German elections for an all-German Parliament with which a peace treaty can be negotiated, but rejects (on quite insufficient grounds) the Allied proposal that the elections and the preparations for them be supervised by a United Nations Commission. It wants instead supervision by a commission of the four Occupying Powers. There would be no grave objection to that in principle, but the supervision would have to be thorough and businesslike and with no question of a veto on particular arrangements by a single Power. Here there is clearly room for further explora- tion. There is, it must be admitted, little room elsewhere. The Soviet Government shares with a certain famous character in nineteenth-century literature the conviction that triple reiteration is decisive. The second Note in all essentials repeats the first, and if there is a third it is likely to repeat the second. At one point there is ambiguity, calculated or other- wise, which must be decisively resolved. Russia stipulated that Germany should join no coalition or alliance directed against any one of her former enemies. She now explains that this involves "no impermissible limitations on Germany's rights as a sovereign State "; it does, however, preclude her from entering any grouping of Powers "directed against any peace-loving State." No such grouping of Powers exists west of the Iron Curtain. The only grouping there is purely defensive, directed against no one except an aggressor, and conforming 'fully with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, to which Russia herself subscribes. Does Russia, or does she not, challenge the legitimacy of such a grouping ? That is the crux of the whole matter, and the Allies would be wise to put a plain question on it and ask for an unequivocal answer. On it all -future progress will depend.
Meanwhile Russia pursues her ends by other means than diplomatic Notes. The recent economic conference was a case in point. The whole thing is a little mysterious, for the function seems to have assumed more the nature of a trade fair, and British Labour M.P.s, familiar hitherto as essentially uncommer- cial travellers, appear to have concluded agreements between not very clearly. identifiable parties for commercial transactions totalling some tens of millions—pounds, not roubles. There may be a propaganda element in this, but it is by no means to be dismissed as that and nothing more. The Soviet Government did not see fit to issue visas to any British journalists, but enough information has come through to sug- gest that the conference was efficiently conducted, that the conduct of the Russian authorities was open to no criticism and that some welcome stimulus to international trade may result. It is quite true that no conference was necessary for that. China has been mentioned as an extensive purchaser. There are many goods whose export to her from any member of the United Nations is prohibited while she is fighting the United Nations in Korea, but except for these she could always buy, most conveniently through Hong Kong, any con- sumer goods she chose. She has not so far chosen. If, as the result of the Moscow Conference, she has changed her attitude, that is very much to be welcomed, and if she prefers a Chinese Trade Mission in London to the usual Hong Kong channels, there could be no objection to that. It is through the growth of trade that barriers may be lowered and tension relaxed, and if the engaging assortment of Britons who made the pilgrimage to Moscow have helped to achieve something in that direction acknowledgement of their efforts will not be grudged.
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