LORD SALISBURY AS FOREIGN MINISTER.
LORD SALISBURY'S management of Foreign Affairs on the two occasions on which he has held the office of Foreign Minister in his own Cabinet, has won the approval even of his political opponents, conspicuously that of Mr. Gladstone,—at least as regards the Eastern Question. If the same approval is not extended to his .first. tenure of that office, it ought to be remembered, in justice to him, that he had not then a free hand. The ruling spirit was Lord Beaconsfield, as a masterful Prime Minister must always be. The Foreign Secretary has, of course, the alternative of resignation if he cannot carry out his own policy. But that is an alternative which in- -wolves serious responsibilities, and a Minister may con- scientiously persuade himself that he is choosing the less of two evils in subordinating his own views in some measure to those of his chief. When the secret history of the controversy on the Eastern Question from 1876 to 1880 is published, it will probably be found that Lord Salisbury's was the most potent influence for peace in that Cabinet, in spite of external appearances to the contrary. Rumour has it that at a certain Cabinet Council in the crisis of the contro- versy, the question of peace or war trembled in the balance, and that Lord Salisbury carried the majority of the Cabinet with him in favour of peace against the Prime Minister. However that may be, it is a matter of notoriety that Lord Salisbury's public utterances on the Eastern Question were in the opposite direction to that of his chief down to.the date of his succeeding Lord Derby. We all remember his ridicule of the Jingoes in his "large map" speech, and the anger which the speech aroused in that camp. His appoint- ment as Plenipotentiary to the Conference of Constanti- nople was greeted with as much enthusiasm by the liberals as it was condemned by the Turkish party. And all through the Conference, the diplomacy of England's special Plenipotentiary was as steadily opposed by the organs of Lord Beaconsfield's policy as it was supported by the organs of the Opposition and by independent journals like the Times. Undoubtedly a change seemed to pass over the -policy of Lord Salisbury as soon as he took Lord Derby's place. It may be that unsuspected facts came to his know- ledge, or that the secession of Lords Carnarvon and. Derby had so weakened the peace party in the Cabinet, that Lord Salisbury believed that war by England on behalf of Turkey could only be averted by a more energetic diplo- macy against Russia. These are secrets which must remain unrevealed for some time yet. What is certain is that Lord Salisbury's attitude on the Eastern Question, when- ever he has had a free hand, has been in general accord with the best traditions of British policy. His first inter- vention in the matter was very early in his public career. In a great debate on the subject in the House of Commons, in 1858, he separated himself from Mr. Disraeli and Lord Palmerston, and. in a brilliant speech supported the policy of freedom advocated by Mr. Gladstone and Lord John Russell. In that speech he denounced the Turkish Govern- ment as "the most oppressive and rapacious of all Govern- ments," and "trusted that the House of Commons would show themselves upon this occasion to be the sup- porters of freedom." The public had probably for- gotten this speech when the Eastern Question was reopened, eighteen years afterwards, by the conduct of the Turks in Bulgaria and. the Herzegovina. Yet, with that intuitive instinct which sometimes outstrips reason in the discovery of truth, the voice of the nation eagerly ratified the choice of Lord Salisbury as England's representative at the Conference of Constanti- nople. The Conference ended in failure. Turkish diplomacy -triumphed for the moment over the diplomacy of Europe, to the great delight of the Jingoes, and Lord Salisbury incurred no small share of the discredit which usually attaches to failure. He was violently attacked by the Turkish party in this country as a sympathiser with Russia and a dupe of General Ignatieff, the Russian Plenipotentiary. The official evidence entirely refutes this accusation, but very few people read official evidence, and lord Salisbury's friendly language towards Russia in his speech the other evening at the Mansion House, has revived the calumny in some quarters. It may be useful, -therefore, to clear up a point in the history of that period upon which there has hitherto existed a considerable degree of misunderstanding. Of all the British statesmen who took a leading part in the controversy on the Eastern Question in 1876, Mr. Gladstone and Lord Salisbury were the two who under- stood best the problem that was to be solved and_ the only method of solving it. Lord Derby, on the other hand, was, of all our public men, the one who had. the feeblest grasp of the question ; and he was, unfortunately, in charge of the Foreign Office. He began by describing the outbreak of insurrection in the European provinces of Turkey as "a petty, local disturbance,' and urged the Porte to use expedition in putting it down. He refused to recognise a fact patent to all the world besides—namely, that insurrection in Turkey has almost invariably been provoked by intolerable misgovernment—and therefore he offered. a steady resistance to every project of reform suggested. by the other European Powers. "Her Majesty's Government,' he wrote to the British Ambassador at Constantinople early in 1876, "would not assume the responsibility of advising the Porte, who must be guided by what they thought best for the welfare of the Ottoman Empire." In a subsequent despatch, he defined his policy in the following explicit language :—" Her Majesty's Government have, since the outbreak of the insurrection in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, deprecated the diplomatic action of the other Powers in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire." Having adopted this dog-in-the-manger policy, he calmly reviewed the situation, and arrived at the conclusion that war was too remote a contingency to be taken into serious con- sideration. He assured a deputation, which was introduced to him by Mr. John Bright, that France did not want war, nor did Italy, nor Germany, nor England; while the in- ternal condition of Austria and Russia was a guarantee for a pacific policy on the part of those two Powers. A great war, he said, "seems to me one of those hypotheses which are so remote that it is scarcely worth while to specu- late upon them. I do not see the quarter from which the war is to come." This was in July, 1876; and within a month the danger of which Lord. Derby had not the sagacity to discern any premonitory shadow loomed on the horizon. In the beginning of November the deice far niente policy of the Foreign Secretary was swept aside by an indignant country, and Lord. Salisbury was sent to Constantinople to coerce the Porte into submission to the will of Europe. Lord Salisbury's paper of instruc- tions was probably drawn up by himself, though bearing Lord Derby's signature. At all events, the instructions were quite admirable, and were a complete reversal of Lord Derby's policy up to then. The key-note was coercion. The Porte must do the bidding of Europe, or engage in a mortal struggle with Russia, not improbably ending in the destruction of the Ottoman Empire,—a catastrophe for which Lord Salisbury plainly told the Porte "the Sultan and his advisers" would be alone responsible. On his return from Constantinople Lord Salisbury declared, in the House of Lords, that "Russia was the motive-power of the Conference," because she had an army on the frontier ready to invade Turkey in the event of the Porte refusing to yield. The Turks never believed them- selves able to cope single-handed with Russia ; yet they adopted a policy which made war with Russia inevitable. How shall we explain their infatuation ? They explained it themselves afterwards. Server Pasha, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared in pas- sionate language in a London newspaper, and. Midhat Pasha explained afterwards through the medium of another journal, that the Porte had been misled by the British Government into the fatal belief that, once war broke out, England would again take up arms on behalf of Turkey. This was a serious accusation. Was there any foundation for it ? Let us see. The key-note of Lord Salisbury's instructions, as we have seen, was the coercion of the Porte into submission by the threat of the Russian Army. That was "the motive-power of the Conference," to quote once more Lord Salisbury's expression. But no sooner was Lord Salisbury, gone on his arduous mission, than Lord Derby's constitutional timidity returned again and: para- lysed him. He sent a despatch after Lord Salisbury, declaring "that her Majesty's Government had decided that England will not assent to or assist in coercive measures, military or naval, against the Porte." That was bad enough, even if there had been nothing behind. For this unfortunate despatch was directly in the teeth of the instructions, bearing Lord Derby's signature, with which Lord Salisbury had started on his mission. But there was worse behind. Lord Derby communicated this despatch to the Turkish Ambassador in London. In other words, having commissioned Lord Salisbury to threaten the Porte with coercive measures, in case if proved recalci- trant, Lord Derby -privately informed the Porte that "her Majesty's Government had decided that England would. not assent to or assist in coercive measures." From that moment Lord Salisbury's mission was doomed to failure. Lord Derby had, in fact, sent him on a fool's errand; and he would have acted more wisely and justly if he had at once recalled him. The Turkish Ambassador, of course, telegraphed to his Government at once the important communication which Lord Derby had made to him, and received from the Foreign Minister of the Porte a tele- graphic reply, of which the import may be gathered from the following quotation :—" I have, read it to the Grand Vizier. His Highness received this communication with deep gratitude, and begs you to express to his Excellency Lord Derby his ackne,wledgments. You will explain to his lordship, in the name of the Grand Vizier, that the Sublime Porte reckons more than ever on the kind support of the Government of her Britannic Majesty under the difficult circumstances we are passing through." We are not charging Lord Derby with anything worse than a singular incapacity to understand the elementary factors of the situation ; but the fact remains that he betrayed Lord. Salisbury most' completely, however unwittingly. Nor is this a mere inference on our part, although the inference is inevitable. In one of Lord Salisbury's own despatches from Constantinople he says that "the Grand Vizier believed. that he could count upon the assistance of • Lord Derby and Lord Beaconsfield.' The Grand Vizier had good grounds for his conviction, having received Lord Derby's comforting assurance two days before the Con- ference met, and two weeks before the important announce- ment was made known to Lord Salisbury. It is evident, moreover, that Lord Salisbury's British colleague at the Conference was actively, countermining the policy of the Special Plenipotentiary. We have dwelt on this episode in Lord Salisbury's diplomatic career, both because serious injustice has been done him in the matte; and also because it helps to explain his subsequent success when he was no longer hampered by the paralysing influences which discredited his first tenure of the seals of the Foreign Office. The Eastern Question will be reopened again, sooner perhaps than seems probable at present, and it is, therefore, well that we should recognise and thereby avoid the grave blunders into which some of our leading men fell twelve years ago. Mr. Forster, for example, supported the policy of Lord Derby rather than Mr. Gladstone's and Lord Salisbury's. Summarising one of his speeches after his return from Constantinople in 1876, his able biographer says :—" The autonomy of the Christian provinces, he pointed out, could not be obtained without war,—a state- ment which subsequent events most fully justified." Subsequent events justified. a precisely opposite inference. The responsible Ministers of the Porte declared publicly and emphatically that the Porte would have granted autonomy to the Christian provinces without we.; if they had not been led to rely on the armed intervention of England. The policy of coercion, which Mr. Forster, in common with Lord Derby and. other distinguished men, resisted, was the only policy that could have averted war. It is laid down in the Sacred Law of Turkey, to which the Sultan must- yield implicit obedience, that the Commander of the Faithful cannot make war or accept a declaration of war without a fatva, or dogmatic sanction, from the Grand Mufti. The Grand Mufti did issue such a fatva after the Russian declara- tion of war in 1877, but it was on the express condition that the Sultan "is assured that his State possesses the force necessary to resist the enemy, and that the war will have a result favourable to his country." The Sultan knew well that his State possessed.. nothing of the kind. He relied on the active sympathies of the anti-coercionists in England, and. thus led his country to ruin. England can never cease to have a lively interest in foreign affairs, and it is no small boon to have at the head of the Foreign Office a Minister who has proved, on more than one critical occasion,, not only that his knowledge is accurate and com- prehensive, but also that he can rise superior to the prejudices and narrow claims of party obligations. The friendly language which he has lately used towards Russia has alarmed some of his political supporters ; but it is in full harmony with the general tenor of his diplomacy as we have endeavoured to explain it. Lord Salisbury is too acute a man to build a policy on any belief in the senti- mental friendship of Russia for England. Nations are ruled by their interests, and not by sentimental considerations. But it is the interest both of Russia and of England to live on friendly terms with each other; and if they both recognise this fact, and Germany and Italy are equally pacific, the war-clouds that have recently hovered on the horizon may pass away. Turkey is still the seat of danger, and if Lord Salisbury succeed in persuading Russia to moderate her policy in that quarter,- he will add greatly to his already high reputation in the field of diplomacy.
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