—And Germany
The crux of Mr. Churchill's proposal was, of course, that Western Germany should be included as an equal partner in European defence ; in other words, that Western Germany should be not merely permitted but encouraged to rearm. It is an astonishing indication of the change which has taken 'place in the last twelve months in the climate of Europe that this suggestion now raises more technical than political difficulties ; indeed, the main political objection to German rearmament comes from Germany itself. There are three main reasons for German objection: the first is the more or less pacifist distaste in any country for the idea of becoming involved in another war, or, as German speakers more usually express it, of " becoming a battlefield again " ; secondly, there is the consideration of expense ; and, finally, there is the fear of Western Germany's present leaders that a rearmed Germany would mean the revival of those forces of militarism from which Germany, as much as any other European country, has suffered. The first two reasons are no more and no less valid for Western Germany than they are for any of the other countries which are similarly menaced by Communist aggression. The idea of war, and the idea of preparation for a possible war, are no less loath- some to the victors than they are to the vanquished. But if the danger is one which embraces Western Germany as well as the rest of Europe, then it is logical that the burden of preparing a defence against it should be borne in common. The third objection has much more substance. The forces of nationalism and militarism in Germany today exist, but are still far more discredited and far worse organised than they were five years after the end of the First World War. The revival of a Wehrmacht in any form would give them a point d'appui which at present they lack. The con- ditional support which characters like General von Manteuffel have already brought to the idea of German rearmament shows that there is a reasonable basis for the fears and hesitations of Dr. Adenauer and those who think like him. The dilemma in Germany— and the same dilemma has to be faced in Japan—is that the care- fully sown and watered seeds of peace are in double danger of destruction ; by force of arms from without or by the habit of arms from within.
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