A SPECTATOR'S NOTEBOOK
VERY distinguished American was arguing that it was essential to deny Formosa to the Chinese Communists because of its strategic importance ; it threatened (he pointed out) Hongkong, the Philippines, Okinawa, French Indo- China. In point of fact, Formosa (a) threatens nothing at all unless it is occupied by a Power disposing of important naval and/or air forces, and (b) threatens nothing which is not already threatened by the Communists' position on the mainland of China. It is indeed slightly nearer to the Philippines and to Okinawa than the nearest point on the China coast, but the margin is not a significant one in terms of modern air warfare. From a purely strategical point of view, the occupation of Formosa by a non-maritime Power with a small and not easily expandible air force would really suit both the Americans and ourselves very well ; and why (incidentally), if a Communist-held Formosa is a matter of so much military moment, did nobody even canvass the desirability of defending Hainan Island, which " threatens " all the same places (except Okinawa) at considerably shorter range. The Americans may have been right on political grounds to commit themselves to the defence of Formosa ; but in so far as their decision was influenced by strategy, I think it was strategy of a specious and unimaginative kind.
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