Who'll kill Cock Robin ?

NON-PROLIFERATION LAURENCE W. MARTIN

Laurence Martin is Professor of International Relations at the - University of Wales at Aberystwyth and Defence Correspondent of the

SPECTATOR.

If Russia and America have now jointly agreed to table a non-proliferation treaty at Geneva, they have probably done so too late for nego- tiations to reach fruition during this. year's session of the General Assembly. A Soviet- American draft was expected in February. But the Disarmament Conference, adjourned until May, reconvened only to be frustrated again. Meanwhile the objections and obstacles to a treaty have been so thoroughly aired that there is little excuse for believing that a draft is as good as a treaty, still less that a treaty ensures non-proliferation.

The Soviet-American draft has a blank third article which should spell out the arrangements for verification. As this was the chief remaining bone of contention the immediate achievement is hardly heroic. Indeed, it was only in May that Lord Chalfont told the House of Lords that it `would be wrong and, as they say, counter-' productive to put a treaty on the table before an important issue of that sort had been fully agreed.' The stumbling block is apparently still the Russian desire to replace the controls with- in EURATOM by those of the non-proliferation treaty operated by the International Atomic.' Energy Authority. This ironic appearance of the- Soviet Union as leading advocate of inspection — not, of course, of Russia—is the result of a singlemindcd attempt to use the treaty as a way of suppressing German nuclear aspirations of any kind.

The United States, which, throughout the years of negotiating this treaty and the previous- test ban, has spent much money and ingenuity to spare the Russians the trouble of revising their prejudices, would apparently go along with the Russians on inspection—as it has already abandoned the so-called 'European clause'—but has met fierce reaction from the European Six, especially Germany and Italy. The difficulty is very real for, so long as France will not sign the non-proliferation treaty. dis- ruption of the EURATOM system would leave France utterly free of constraint and sharpen the existing division between her and the other members who are not militarily nuclear powers.

The sharpening of this issue has been only one of the indications in recent months that the potential nuclear powers are going to put up more resistance to a non-proliferation treaty than was once expected. To the countries most able to produce nuclear weapons and with the greatest temptations to do so, the non-prolifera- tion treaty seems to be a device requiring con- siderable sacrifice and inconvenience on their part in return for a pledge by three out of the five existing nuclear powers not to disseminate nuclear weapons to others (something which the three show no sign of wanting to do anyway). The treaty is, therefore, in reality a non-acquisi- tion agreement. There is already, 'however, a fairly effective non-acquisition treaty as a result of the test ban; the most important innovation in the non-proliferation treaty is thus the im- position of inspection on the non-nuclear states. This is, also, of course, the most discriminatory part of the treaty.

According to what might be called the overt ideology of non-proliferation, the incentives for the non-nuclear powers to accept this dis- crimination are, firstly. a general, unprovable but not implausible belief that the more nuclear powers there arc, the more dangerous the world will be; secondly. the hope that the treaty may inhibit a potential enemy of a signatory power from acquiring nuclear weapons; and, thirdly, the belief that it may be a step toward wider measures of disarmament. If a treaty inhibits new nuclear programmes it may also, of course, save the signatories a good deal of money.

For the moment the nuclear candidates whose signatures will really count are in an ungrateful mood, and their objections are likely to delay the treaty for some time. There may ultimately be few refusals to sign -some individual re- fusals could be decisive -- but there will be hard bargaining over the terms of the agreement. America, and Britain in its role of eager second beaver, have both been surprised at the inten- sity of criticism and at the emergence of almost a united German-Italian-Indian-Japanese front.

Resistance from NATO powers has had several sources. While there have been few articulated objections to the military discrimination in- evitably involved in a non-proliferation treaty, the rather cavalier way in which the United States threw the 'European clause' overboard has been privately resented. One cannot help feeling that only latent military anxieties and resentments could account for the virulence with which ostensible civil objections to the treaty have been voiced: for they seem either exaggerated or not too difficult to remedy.

Fears of industrial espionage probably mis- conceive the type and intensity of inspection, much of which-could be done by accounting de- vices and ultimately become almost entirely automated. More serious. perhaps, have been fears that the development and export potential of civil nuclear industry would be impeded in countries subject to control because investors and customers would be anxious to avoid re- strictions and unforeseen complications.

Outside Europe, while economic arguments have some force, the objections to the treaty are more overtly strategic. Israel, India and Japan are commonly regarded as possessing the most dangerous combination of capability and incentive, and each illustrates different aspects of the problem. Israel's recent military victories can be argued two ways: eithef her overwhelm- ing conventional superiority and improved strategic position reduce her need for nuclear weapons or, on the other hand, the same factors mean that she could safely go nuclear without fear of preemptive Arab attack. For the mo- ment Israel is vulnerable to diplomatic pressure and may not hold out against a treaty. Few would expect her, however. to be much inhibited about changing her mind when she thought it wise to do so, and the non-nuclear powers will almost certainly insist upon an escape clause that would make withdrawal from the treaty legally possible.

Reluctance to undertake long-term commit- ments has become increasingly apparent in India, where anxieties about China and a rising tide of desperate nationalism have increased interest in a nuclear force at the same time as economic difficulties, changes in personnel and the daunting scale of Chinese nuclear efforts have magnified the objections. The conclusion of those who have followed the Indian debate closely seems to be that, within the last year or

so, India has simultaneously become both less inclined to sign the treaty and less likely to make a bomb in the near future.

Hopes of preventing proliferation must rest in the last resort upon persuading the noh- nuclear powers that they would not profit from acquiring nuclear weapons—and keeping them persuaded. There are several possible strategies, some already in use, for exercising this per- suasion; unluckily, some of them tend to be mutually contradictory.

One strategy is to argue that nuclear weapons do no one much good; the corollary of this is that everyone might as well give them up. Pre- sumably the notion of reciprocal disarming ges- tures by nuclear states as the price for a non- proliferation treaty falls primarily into this category. But this flies in the face of another non-proliferation strategy, which attempts to persuade countries that they do not need nuclear weapons because they are protected by those of some other nation. Lord Chalfont himself has conceded that somewhere along the line of dis- armament by the nuclear powers they will lose their capacity to protect others.

Even with their nuclear arsenals intact, the great powers will find it hard to evolve an ade- quate system of guarantees for the non-nuclear countries if these are demanded during future negotiations. In essence the problem is to com- bine sufficient certainty to satisfy those who are guaranteed with a degree of discretion on the part of the guarantor, the whole within a frame- work of mutual respect. The more nuclear weapons become essentially diplomatic instru- ments rather thaqi things that people really expect to fire, the more, one suspects, it will be- come difficult to make guarantees an adequate substitute for a national force.

The daunting task of the advocates of per- manent non-proliferation is to ensure that under no circumstances do the incentives to acquire a national nuclear force become irresistible. Measured against this standard it is clear that a treaty like the present proposal may be a useful stopgap, a support for opposition to nuclear weapons in a variety of domestic debates, and perhaps a symbol of the gravity with which the prospect of proliferation is regarded. It can have a prolonged success, however, only if it becomes the façade for a much more intensive and sustained non-proliferation strategy.

This is recognised by most responsible offi- cials, if not by all the more uncritical exponents of disarmament. There must be serious doubt, however, as to whether the object is attainable. Will it really be possible to ensure that the cal- culation of advantage never results in favour of nuclear weapons for any currently non- nuclear power? Will America and Russia be able to sustain a ubiquitous, stabilising role of guarantor when they are joined by a third large nuclear power? Can Japan, so rich, so techno- logically able and so strategically placed, in- definitely remain among the guaranteed?

The treaty may be worth a try, and a broader non-proliferation strategy even more so. Some- where, at least in a back room, however, one hopes there is someone working out a post' proliferation strategy; wrestling with the theory of stable dissemination and the problems of helping-those determined to have a nuclear force to have as safe a one as possible.

In the meantime the wisest course for Britain would be to seek less of the limelight at Geneva, than she has in the past. Little gratitude is likely to accrue to those who take the lead in thrust- ing the present treaty down the throats of nervous nations.