Jensen's reply

Anthony W. Clare

Educability and Group Differences A. R. Jensen (Methuen 0.90) Arthur Jensen is the man who, in the words of an American professor of biology, has split " technically competent scientists into ' let's look' and ' let's hide' groups." Such a striking achievement resulted from the publication in the Harvard Educational Review of 1969 of an article which stressed the importance of inherited factors in the determination of individual differences in human intelligence and which attacked the pervasive tendency to proclaim the all-importance of the social and cultural environment as the only significant source of individual and group differences in the mental abilities relevant to scholastic performance. Jensen mainly concentrated his attack on the failure of programmes of compensatory education in the United States to achieve their goal of remedying the 'educational lag of disadvantaged children yet it was his discussion of the genetic determination of racial differences in intelligence which stirred up a hornet's nest which buzzes merrily to this day. It is difficult to believe that anyone who is even remotely interested in the subject, having read Jensen's latest book, will contest his claim that there is a substantial genetic heritability of intelligence, anyone that is to say who does not manifest what Spencer has called "the ultimate infidelity" which is the refusal to seek out the truth lest it should turn out to be unpleasant. Jensen has joined a relatively small band of men whose names have been applied to ph ilosophico-scientific theoretical systems — Jerisenism is defined by its originator in the preface as "a biological and genetical view of human kind and of human differences, both individual differences and group differences — and this book is in the main a systematic, elaborate and professional attempt to justify what began as a disparaging play on his name as a genuine and original movement in contemporary psychology.

There are those who believe that Jensen has provided information which bigots who fear and hate the Negro can now utilise to make respectable as 'scientific ' their bigotry and prejudice. They must read this book, There are those who insist that Jensen has set back the cause of the educational rehabilitation of the American Negro; they must meet his accusation that environmentalists who tell the Negro that all his problems are due to racial discrimination are fostering a social malignancy.' There are those who insist that such is the sensitivity of the subject Jensen should leave it alone, for whether he turns out to be right or wrong the result in either case will be divisive and unproductive, and will do nothing to improve the social and educational situation in the United States. Jensen's reply is to quote Dwight Ingle's declaration that "all possible causes of peoples.

being disadvantaged should be investigated and hopefully the application of knowledge their advancement will be guided by mots, principles." In the light of the manner in which critics coped with the relatively simple statistics contained in her article, this reviewer does not hold out much hope that they will do yell much better with this latest offering. For tll's is a book which markedly contrasts with EY' senck's Race, Intelligence and Education' where the latter is discursive, tendentious. patronising to his readers and in places doell' right misleading, Jensen makes no concession to his audience, marshals his case with e0°' siderable expertise and relentlessly sets about his critics. One by one the sometimes elab0° rate, sometimes naive efforts made by the critics to bolster the environmentalist ease are identified and attacked. The commonest objections against Jensen's reliance on a genetic explanation for the pool showing by Negroes on intelligence tests ; elude the assertions that the tests are Oil turally biased in favour of whites, that there, is a significantly inequality in the nature 0" the schooling received by the two groue1 that there is a lower expectancy on the earl of teachers with regard to Negro performance and that the black population is a socio-ec0 nomically deprived one. In reply, Jensen points out that among the eleven sub-tests of one of the main measures used, namely the Wechler Adult Intelligence Scale, the one on which Negroes differ least from whites is the Comprehension test, which is held up as an example of test items that might appear to be culturally biased against Negroes. Negroes score lowest on the B1001,t Design sub-test a non-verbal test which rout' res the subject to copy patterns of increasini complexity with a set of sixteen coloured one' inch blocks. It is recognisably one of the least culture-loaded sub-tests of the WAIS.

Jensen relies heavily on the Coleman Re' port to support his rebuttal of the argument that less adequate schools explain the lower level of Negro educability (defined as the abil' ity to learn the traditional scholastic subjects under conditions of ordinary classroom in' struction). That report was a bombshell whell it appeared not merely for what it had to Al,' with regard to the problems of the pea educational achievement of many N'egro children but for its pointed observations con' cerning some of the most cherished dogmas in educational theory. Small class registers, experienced teachers, financial expenditure, per pupil and modern facilities — none 01, these apparently correlated with exceptione; academic competence. The implications 0' , this enormous study for the American educa" tional system seemed to be that schools " bring little influence to bear on a child's achievement that is independent of his bacic' ground and general social context, The equalities imposed by home, neighbourhone and poor environment are the inequalities with which pupils confront adult life at the end of their schooling and any talk of equal' ity of educational opportunity implies 0 strong effect of schools that is independent 01 the child's immediate social environment; and that strong independent effect is not present in American schools," The evidence in support of the notion that a teacher's expectations may' affect a pupil's performance is dealt with somewhat less convincingly. Jensen maintains his breathless, .

statistically-peppered momentum yet Katz's, work, admittedly with timed experimental tests rather than standard intelligence testS,

does raise important questions. For examPle, Negro testers of Negro college students 0b' tamed significantly higher scores than white testers when the subjects were informed that they had little or equal chance of equalling the white norm for the tests. Jensen is eg' tremely critical of highly speculative oul' tural and attitudinal factors which have not r yet been shown to be correlated with either IQ or with race "yet in view of the extremelY

Complex and subtle forces which surround and influence black-white relationships in America is it unwise to express caution with regard to the findings of tests which, for all their susceptibility to complicated statistical analyses, are still relatively unsophisticated and to show interest in approaches which While speculative nonetheless hold out some promise of a greater degree of sensitivity to all the factors involved?

Jensen is struck by the fact that certain groups, such as the American Indians and the Puerto Ricans, groups more socio-economically and culturally deprived than the Negroes (using the relevant Coleman measures), doi better on intelligence tests. Yet it does seem that the American Indians tested are not a representative sample — being drawn from groups outside the reservations (Jensen dis,rnisses this criticism but it is far from clear Why) — and the Puerto Ricans' performance IS not significantly better.

Yet thereis a hint which crops up here and there throughout this book which suggests that the whole argument may be an elaborate blind-alley, a sophisticated yet pointless demonstration of slide-rule statistics. Jensen protests that he focuses on the Negroes and their poor showing rather than, for example, on the Jews and their excellent showing not because he does not believe that the latter bear out his claim for the heritability of intelligence (he does) but because the former suffer as a result of their inability to compete intellectually, educationally and occupationally. His studies he insists are an attempt to Make those in charge of educational programmes think again about the assumption on which such programmes are based. Yet it is not clear whether poorly-performing Negroes suffer any more than poorly-performing Whites — or that if they do it is due to their low IQ rather than their colour. It does seem that Jensen could make his case without having recourse to racial groupings.

Indeed the concept of race as an operational concept has limitations which are bound to increase. The average percentage of Caucasian genes in American Negroes is between 20 and 30 per cent and is rising. It would be too bad should Jensen, by insisting on his scientific right to establish the truth ' about race, imperil the valuable information he is marshalling concerning the heritability of intelligence. He continuously calls for an intensive, no-holds-barred approach to this question, clearly implying that those who opPose such an approach only do so through a serious lack of resolution and a wavering faith in the value of truth.

Yet moderation in all things applies to scientific inquiry to and it can have the added advantage in the present situation of ensuring that Jensen's observations concerning educational policies and teaching Programmes need not become, as they are in danger of becoming, buried in a virulent, bitter and even bloody dispute about race. That it is unedifying is a matter of taste; that it should be unnecessary may turn out to be a matter of supreme irony.

Anthony W. Clare is a psychiatirst at the Mandsley Hospital.

Hilton of Birmingham and J. A. G. Griffith of London declare: "We are concerned with the general principles. We are very doubtful whether any college or university should accept an endowment from a private com mercial or industrial organisation which has a direct interest in the subject-matter of the post to be created, especially when that sub ject-matter is a highly controversial activity with strong social, political and economic implications" (Times Higher Education Supplement, June 6, 1973, italics supplied).

The insertion of the qualifications ' private,' despite a prior protest that, "we are not suggesting that all private endowment is improper or dangerous," is one small but highly significant indication both of the socialist bias and of the true overriding concerns of this Council for Academic Freedom and De mocracy. But important general principles certainly are involved in this case, principles which would be equally but more dangerously involved if the initiating interest were some public and hence more powerful body. It is with some of these principles that Kenneth Minogue deals.

His anxieties in the matter of this particular proposed chair would not be only that work done under such an interested foundation might be or be thought to be distorted by those interests, nor at all that the interests are private and not yet nationalised, but rath er that they are practical rather than academic. For the untimely bold Minogue says of those "'Great Issues of Our Time' which circulate like punch-drunk boxers through the magazine sections of the quality press," that "All of these, being practical problems, are of no academic interest whatsoever."

Given its title it is remarkable that the book is so much fuller and stronger on what the properly academic is not than on what it truly is. Certainly Part One is called 'The Problem of Identification.' Yet most readers are likely to gain more even about this from Part Two, 'Imitations of the Academic' and Part Three, The Siege of Academe.' Thus, one thing which the academic emphatically is not is 'Journalism: Nutshell Truths for the Breakfast Table.' For although, like academic work, "Journalism arises from a generalised cu riosity remote from practical concerns," it necessarily presents whatever it chooses to present either as news or as background to news. Minogue sees these inappropriate principles of selection and presentation as winning an increasing baleful influence: "The journalistic view of reality ... has generated its own theory of educa tion ... that the business of education is to provide the knowledge necessary to understand the world we live in — i.e. the knowledge necessary to read the newspapers."

This (Edward) Short view of education involves that every course is obsolete as soon as it goes out of fashion. It also harmonises with the observation "that what is popularly called 'quality in a newspaper consists of large quantitiesof background," and especially the kind of background drawing the putative future as well as the past into the perspective.

Minogue might usefully have illustrated what he has to say about quality journalism with some quantitative analysis of' the posh Sundays.' In precisely what proportion of issues, for instance, is the lead story on page one of the Observer an account of what is allegedly going to happen rather than of what has actually happened?

Yet none of this constitutes direct elucidation of The Concept of a University. No doubt journalistic standards of relevance, of topical ity, and of importance are inappropriate to academic work. But the indirect approach reveals little about what different principles do fit, and why. One positive suggestion here is that university students must study texts rather than textbooks: "Where education is based on texts, the undergraduate has the responsibility of submitting his under standing to subjects he studies." Another suggestion lies buried in a reference to that paradigm academic, the philosopher John Austin. For, although he quotes one contemptuous reference to importance, Minogue does not quote "the implacable professor" at his most affirmative: "Importance is not important. Truth is."

Minogue is at his good best in fighting back against contemporary attacks upon university fundamentals: "Ideologists have not hesitated to take the extreme view that academic inquiry is itself nothing but the ideology of the ruling class." If that were, and could not but be, true; then Minogue's concept of a university could have no application. But this is, of course, one of many cases in which our revolutionaries falsely maintain that what is indeed the largely realised ideal of the fully socialist countries applies to us too; and they maintain it as a contribution to ensuring that it shall in due course, under their auspices, become so here also.

The argument supporting such wholesale radical conclusions is, as we might expect, wretched. In a contribution to Education for Democracy, Anthony Arblaster, for instance, asserts: "There are ... clearly conservative implications in the basic assumption on which so much contemporary linguistic philosophy is founded: that the job of the philosopher is not to invent new concepts or theories but simply to describe and analyse existing usages." This statement is still a very long way from the desired conclusion, that " whatever the intentions ... may be, ideological isissues are brought into the discussion "; unless, that is, it is intended as a description of the obsessional behaviour of the radical ideologues themselves.

But Arblaster appeals to a famous passage in Austin, and comments that "new and unfamiliar experiences or ways of seeing the world and human nature may require the formulation of new concepts and new theories, rather than efforts to cram them into old and established categories." If only his zeal for truth and justice had been sufficient to carry him a mere four pages further he would have found Austin insisting upon what Arblaster's conservative ideologue is required to ignore: "Certainly ordinary language has no claim to he the last word it is likely enough not to, be the best way of arranging things if our interests are more extensive or intellectual than the ordinary ... in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded."

Antony Flew is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading.