Non-persons
Sir: I cannot speak-for those whom Cato ('Another Spectator's Notebook,' August 11) terms the abortion lobby; nor for abortionists, whom Cato mistakenly equates with those favouring legal abortion. I can only express my disagreement that "logically, the abortion lobby must support the reluctance of Distillers to pay more than nominal compensation to the children who are victims of thalidomide."
Cato reasons that, since thalidomide exerted its ill effects on foetuses, which "abortionists have argued all along are not persons," those favouring abortion are committed to the view that the children — undoubted persons — whom these particular foetuses subsequently became, cannot enjoy even a moral claim for damages.
The paradox may perhaps be re solved by citing another: to those favouring abortion, the human foetus enjoys no moral status unless subsequently born. The real argument then focuses on who should decide whether a particular foetus should be born.
Besides, as Cato observes, English law-endows the human foetus with no legal rights, despite the Offences against the Person Act 1861, even as clarified by the Abortion Act 1967; in other words, for at least a century before the abortion lobby became a reality! (I regret that Cato finds it " impos sible to discuss matters reasonably with the abortion lobby." As a proponent of legal abortion, I should be delighted to enter into a reasoned discussion with Cato at any time, albeit at greater length than is feasible in the correspondence columns of The Spectator). Philip Kestelman 10 Carston Close, London SE12
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