THE IMPORTANCE OF MR. MARSHALL
THE original suggestions made at Harvard on June 5th are variously referred to as the Marshall plan and the Marshall offer. They were not a plan, but an invitation to the countries of Europe to submit a plan. They were not an offer, but a carefully guarded hint that if an acceptable European plan is produced it might be followed by an American offer of assistance in carrying it out. And the final decision does not rest with Mr. Marshall but the American people. But in the six weeks which have suc- ceeded the original speech it has become overwhelmingly clear that these reservations, far from destroying the importance of the announcement, have merely revealed the fact that it was a deliberate and judicious understatement.
Mr. Marshall usually says rather less than he means. His speech this week to the annual conference of State Governors at Salt Lake City was one more example of that fact. As reported, the speech conveys no more precise promise than the first modest address to the Harvard University Alumni Club, but it underlines far more strongly the importance to America of the future course of European affairs and, above all, it was delivered in entirely different circumstances. Britain and France, with the support of fourteen other European countries, have rushed forward their arrangements for a statement of co-ordinated needs, which as a result of the latest Paris Conference, concluded on Tuesday, should be ready on September 1st. This haste has not been discouraged. The Soviet Union has flatly dissociated itself from the whole matter, forcing its Eastern satellites to follow. The question has not fallen to the ground. Mr. Marshall, far from retracting one word of his original speech, has emphasised them all. The evidence that each move fits into a concerted policy grows steadily stronger. It may be that, as one American said of the European response, " We expected them to jump six inches or so. But we never thought they would jump ten feet." Yet it still looks as if Mr. Marshall would not be perturbed if we jumped ten yards.
All this is good. It is also inevitable. Mr. Bevin was not merely right to seize the opportunity with both hands—there was nothing else he could have done, given his knowledge of the economic situation of Europe. The offer could not have been turned down, however guarded its first expression. It would have been com- pletely foolish to look the gift hork in the mouth, although the state of American opinion is such that several very doubtful teeth might have been found there. Even if it had turned out that there was no offer and no horse, the heartening exhibition of the ability of the Western European countries to work together would have been worth while. As to the Russian withdrawal it was a pity and it will remain a pity. Whatever may happen concerning the prosperity of Europe, the peace of the world is not assured until the Soviet Union decides to play a positive part in achieving it. The long-term aims of policy remain the same. Russia must be brought into the politidal and economic comity of nations. Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault must not tire of saying that the door remains open. But it would be sheer hypocrisy to deny that, for the short term, the recent clearing of the air of the sultry threat of Russian obstruction has had a stimulating effect.
But what of the outlook to the West? The major doubt in the whole situation has always been the willingness, and even the ability, of the American people to undertake the vast new overseas investment which the Marshall plan implies. The attention of Europe must now be concentrated on that one overwhelming ques- tion. By far the most disturbing factor in the whole question, and the one most likely to lead to a complete break between the policy of the State Department and the will of the American people, is the sheer size of the financial effort required to meet the dollar requirements of Europe. Later American estimates of those requirements have tended to push the total upwards rather than downwards. A study issued by a sub-committee of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee puts the requirements of eighteen European countries, excluding Russia, for the three years 1947-49 at some $17,000 million and points out that this is a minimum rather than a maximum. Aid to the extent of over $5,000 million a year is a lot to ask, even when the alternative is economic chaos and the reward is• the vindication qt the free economic enterprise for which America stands. The average American will have to be much more far-sighted than he is before he accepts such a. burden. It is in convincing him that Mr. Mar- shall will have to exert his most titanic energies and he may fail.
The circumstances are not propitious. Even sympathetic Ameri- cans are apt to view the plight of Europe not with that practical determination which is the most inspiring quality of the New World but with a kind of pity which is as infuriating as it is inappropriate. The least sympathetic see in the political systems of all European countries only a display of varying shades of red, and advocate preparation for inevitable war. And between the two extremes are the vast mass who did not raise a murmur when President Truman and the Congressional leaders agreed that " at present there was no reason to contemplate " a special session in the autumn. What is Europe to make of this ? So far as it is concerned there is every reason to contemplate such a session, and the fact that in the formal politics of the United States it counts for nothing must not inhibit Europe from saying so. The balance-sheet of European resources will be ready for submission to the United States on September 1st. The questions underlying that balance-sheet cannot wait. Even if the present trickle of responsible American opinion towards support for the Marshall plan, becomes a flood by that date, the State Department will still be unable to move without the explicit support of Congress. The underlying suggestion that the whole thing must wait until the Presidential elections are out of the way leaves all realities out of account. If there is to be action, it must come before that suggestion becomes irresistible, which means in effect that there must be action this year.
At any other time such detailed interest in American politics as now exists in Europe would have been completely improper as well as unwelcome. But the changes which have followed the Harvard speech have been so profound that there is a widespread feeling that if Mr. Marshall and the whole State Department policy were now overturned that would be a major betrayal. That such a feeling should exist may seem positively unjust to many Americans, but exist it does. The withdrawal of Russia is a major surgical operation from which Europe can only recover successfully if she is given every possible assistance in the next few years. The hideous dilemma thrust upon the countries of Eastern Europe who have now unwillingly given up the immediate prospect of American assistance in return for Russian forbearance is a responsibility in itself. The decision has been scarcely less painful for Italy, France, and the Scandinavian countries—indeed for every country of Western Europe. Nobody wants a breach with Russia and every- body hopes that one day it may be closed. Perhaps the break would have come anyway, but there is no doubt whatever that, so far as economic affairs are concerned and probably so far as political affairs are concerned too, the Marshall offer has brought it for- ward in time.
So much responsibility rests on America, and such a great pro- portion of it is carried by Mr. Marshall, that whatever the outcome of his offer there can be no denying him the status of a really great man. He knows what he is doing, and what he is doing is abss- lutely crucial for the future of Europe and the world. The events of the past six weeks have shown that he weighs his words care- fully. In the Salt Lake City speech Mr. Marshall said that if his country did not finish the task of assisting the countries of the Old World towards recovery " the United States would be faced with a radical alteration of its own position in the world." That is precisely the point—to go forward now would not be to change existing American policy but to carry it to its logical conclusion. It is not Mr. Marshall but his opponents who want to distort the course of history. A rejection of his policy would be a betrayal of reason, a retreat into isolationism, and an invitation to another war beside which the rejection of Woodrow Wilson was a comparatively insignificant matter. The longer the time which passes before America reaches a final decision, the further the countries of Western Europe go with their plans for co-operation, and the wider the gap between them and Soviet Russia becomes the more essential it is that the Marshall policy shall become the American policy. For the past seven years Europe has seldom looked to America in vain. However great the odds seemed to be, the forces of reason have triumphed in the end over the irrational pull of isolationism. One more big heave will ensure peace for years to come.
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