Under this title appt ars a blue-hook of unusual interest,

containing despatches from our Foreign Office, the answers from countries involved in the present war, and instructions of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs ; the whole forming a complete history of the diplo- matic struggle which preceded the Italian war. There are some five hundred and thirty documents, extending over more than four hundred folio pages, and reaching in point of date from the 1st of January till the 5th of May. To give our readers a good digest of this enormous mass of historical evidence, we will arrange the leading facts under three periods, into which they fall most conveniently.

I.

Period the first, dating from the beginning of the year till the middle of February, the time of Lord Cowley's departure for Vienna, gives distinct picture of the impression which the increasing rumours of war and actual preparation for it made on the English Government. Mahnesbury, hearing at the same time from Paris, Turin, and Vienna, that things begin to look more and more warlike, sends pressing de- spatches to the British Envoys at those Courts, entreating them to re- present the danger of a European conflict. Under date of January 10 the Earl writes to Lord Cowley-

"Her Majesty's Government the assurances with which, in 1852, the Emperor of the French conseemt received and hailed with sincere satisfactio

ro his election to the throne. Those assurances were, that his Imperial Ma- jesty would observe and maintain the treaties which were then the law of Europe, and her Majesty's Government are bound to say that no pledge was ever more faithfully and loyally kept. " The European benefit of an unbroken alliance between England and France has been the result of that honourable policy, and her Majesty's Government, who believe that the peace of Europe is over in the hands of those two great empires, feel the deepest anxiety whenever France appears likely to be in hostility with any of the great Powers of the Continent. " Her Majesty's Government must state to your Excellency that, in the evident ill-humour displayed reciprocally between France and Austria at this moment, they can conceive no great national question or interest in- volved which can reasonably cause such a feeling. No portion of the ter- ritory of either is threatened by the other; no commercial privileges are asked or refused by either; no point of national honour is at stake in either country.

"The solution of a sentiment which has apparently brought these two States to the verge of collision appears to her Majesty's Government to be found in mutual faults of temper and indiscretion on the part of the two Governments, and neither party appears disposed to make such sacrifices as would put an end to the panic which they have caused and the practical evils which they may create. "It is under these circumstances that 'an impartial state like England is justified in proffering to her two allies (the best and most sincere advice that she can give.

"I repeat that I trust to your Excellency to perform this duty, and I hope you will not omit to point out to the French Government that, while no French interest is at stake between France and Austria, there is a State and there are persons who, to increase its territory and fortify their personal position, ardently desire 'to involve two powerful empires in a war from which they expect to obtain those results. " That war, if it be what is expected, namely an Italian war, can neither be short nor decisive. It may begin as a conflict in which three monarch- ies are engaged, but looking at the soil on which it will be waged, and the elements which it will contain,. it must before long expand into a war of opinions. Among these theories your Excellency may be assured that those of a republican hue will not be the faintest.

" Of such a war France would have to bear the heaviest expenditure of blood and treasure against a foe possessing great military power, and a de- termination to use it to the last; while the phases of the contest would give new life to that dreaded class who look in anarchy alone for a realization of their avarice or ambition.

"Her Majesty's Government have already pressed upon Austria =ala gous advice, and they believe that they will also be aided in their counsels by the Court of Russia.

ed.

"No one looking on the state of Italy can doubt that many causes of just discontent arc to be found in the general administration of the country, and her Majesty's Government, sympathizing, as they unquestionably do, with the sufferings of the Italian population, would gladly lend their best efforts to produce an amelioration in the existing state of things. But they know that such amelioration can never be effected, with any certainty of perms- noisy, by war. It may produce a change of masters, but it will not confer independence : it may, perhaps, contribute to the elevation of some fortu- nate individuals, but it will insure the disorganization of the whole social system, and indefinitively retard the material improvement of the Italian population. " On the other hand, her Majesty's Government entertain but little doubt that if Austria and France—the former an Italian, and both Roman Catholic states—laying aside mutual suspicion, were to join heartily with a view to promote, by peaceful means, the regeneration of Italy, their com- bined influence would speedily effect a change in the present unhappy state of affairs, and contribute to establish confidence between rulers and their subjects. " Her Majesty's Government have not failed to press upon the Govern- ment of France considerations such as these, and they have not hesitated to express their conviction that France, though she may have no material stake at issue, could have little or nothing to gain in an Italian war."

To these representations, the answer: is in substance the same from all sides ; viz., all the parties represent that they are quite willing to keep peace provided their adversaries are also willing to do the like. There is, however, a considerable difference in the tone and manner of these replies ; for whereas the language of the Sardinian and French Governments is courteous and polite in the extreme, that of the Austrian Cabinet is arrogant and snappish to a high degree. In a personal interview of Lord Cowley with the Empe- ror of the French, the latter explains his policy in a. very straightfor- ward manner. " My sympathies," says his Majesty, [Despatch of Janu- ary 19,] "have always been and still are with Italy. I regret that Lombardy should be in the possession of Austria, but I cannot and do not dispute the right of the latter. I respect existing treaties, because they are the only landmarks we have. So long as Austria remains with- in her own frontiers, she is, of course, mistress to do as she pleases." To which Count Walewski added, in another conversation, " he would guarantee there would be no interference from France as long as Austria did not disturb the peace."

" I stated to Count Buol that your Lordship's intention and wish was not to inflame the Italian mind, or to raise hopes which could not be pacifically realized. Your Lordship had given the soundest advice to the Cabinet of Turin not to commit any wilful infraction of the peace, and you had depre- cated in the strongest terms any attempt to carry out the reforms required in Italy by physical force, and hadadvocated at Paris, as well as here, the desirableness of an harmonious understanding between Austria and France on the affairs of Italy." " 'There are,' I observed to his Excellency, o two courses to pursue with respect to Italy, where the present state of things is intolerable ,and cannot re

last. The forms, which must inevitably be made, can be effectetley peace- ful negotiation, and the establishment of a complete agreement between Austria and France, with far more chance of eventual success than by the ruinous action of war. Such is the muse urged on your attention and re- commended by her Majesty's Government. The other course and only al- ternative, must be, eventually, revolution and war ; and I have no doubt that your Excellency will agree that the remedy in the last alternative is as dangerous as the evil which it seeks to cure.' I recalled to him the opin- ions enunciated at the Conference of Paris, when the continued occupation of the Roman States was acknowledged to be an irregular state of things which could not last and served only to perpetuate the bad government of those States. It amounted almost to an annexation which was opposed to the spirit of the European treaties. If, therefore, 'I said, you will do no- thing by peaceful means, and in concert with France, for the amelioration of the Italian Governments, be assured that a war will be inevitable, and no human foresight can tell to what ultimate changes it may lead. You reply,

we shall not begin war. We do not meditate any aggression.' But let me tell you that at this moment the decision of peace or war is no longer within the hands of the Governments, but is transferred into those of the Mazzini and Revolutionary party, whose aim has always been to bring about a breach between France and Auslria for the attainment of their own ends. You are therefore playing the game of the Revolutionary party, and you will inevit- ably fall into the trap which they have laid. " How so ! ' said his Excellency. I replied, by loudly declaring your

intention of giving succour to the minor independent States of Italy, you will give a pretext for others to oppose such intervention, and you thus place it in the hands of Mazzini, by getting up some disturbance in Purina or Modena to bring about that very collision with Piedmont, and probably, also, with France, which that party are desirous for. If your Excellency, I continued, gives me the assurance that in no case will Austria move a sol- dier across her fr6ntier in Italy without previous concert with France, then I shall consider that war may be averted. "No, said Count Buol, I cannot give you that assurance, for it would be a surrender of our sovereign power.

"And," continued his Excclieney, after some further conversation- " The truth is, we can never come to an understanding with France on Italian affairs, for we strut from two different points : first, we do not con- sider France to be an Italian Power ; secondly, France sympathizes with and protects the cause of nationalities, whereas we support that of the Sove- reigns, Governments, and of l'ordre kabli ; therefore there can be no basis on which to found a concert or perfect cooperation. Nor is it necessary. It is a great mistake to think that Italy requires change. If Italyis left quiet, if agitation is put down, and if the hopes of certain parties who only seek their own aggrandizement are annulled, there will be no commotion, no war in Italy, and no cause for the measures which are counselled in the despatch you have read to me." From this and similar utterances, it appears all but certain that Austria was resolved on drawing the sword long before she sent her famous ultimatum.

Lord Malmesbury, seeing that his circular despatches—more philo- sophic in their reasoning then energetic in tone—were of not the slight- est effect in altering the political state of affairs, determined on sending Earl Cowley to Vienna, this time rightly judging that the question of peace or war now mainly depended on the Austrian Government. The second part of the diplomatic struggle begins here ; and the despatches of this period. extending from about the middle of February to the mid- dle of March, detail the whole of the efforts made by the British Government and Earl Cowley to bring the Austrian Government to more concilatory views than those hitherto professed. The mission of the no- ble Earl, as we see it defined in Lord Malmesbury's own writtng, [Fe- bruary 22,) was to be "perfectly confidential and not official," and he was moreover instructed not to " originate " any proposals, but merely to "communicate the French opinions and those of her Majesty's Govern- ment on the state of Italy to the Austrian Government, and ascertain from Count Buol how far his own are reconcileable with these." But even in this undertaking, modest as it was, our English Foreign Secretary completely failed. The mission of the noble Earl wax entirely fruitless, although as he himself mentions, "hardly a day interveeess, (during more than a fortnight) in which I have not had long conversations with Count Bind." Nevertheless no satisfactory assurances of any kind, be- yond mere vague promises of keeping peace, could be got from the Austrian Minister. The celebrated Four Points, 1st, the evacuation of the Roman States by the Austrian as well as French troops ; 2d, the in- troduction of reform in the same States ; 3d, a security for the better re- lation between the Governments of Austria and Sardinia ; 4th, the abro- gation or modification of the Austro-Italian treaties of 1847, were dis- cussed [Despatch of March 29,] in an off-hand manner by Count Buol, he neither promising nor granting anything, but maintaining unceasingly that the source of all the political troubles of the time was in Piedmont and France, and not in Austria. calling out the Sardinian contingents had been raised in the Chambers, and ultimately voted in the affirmative, Count Cavour, on the entreaties of Sir James Hudson to postpone the decree, "said he had a heavy re- sponsibility on his shoulders, but would delay the measure for a week in the hope that Lord Cowley's mission might lead to a better state of things.

rIT.

Ea r1 Cowley returned to London March 14, and after an interview with the Foreign Secretary went back to his post at Paris. Here the third period of the diplomatic prelude to the war begins. If nothing else, the British Envoy to Vienna had brought back with him the notion that a Congress might yet settle the disturbed state of European affairs, and accordingly for about two months and a half there was a terrific in- terchange of notes on this subject between England and the different Go- vernments of the continent. There are printed in the Correspondence at least three hundred despatches of this kind—all wearisome beyond des- seription ; but to any reader of these documents it must be evident from the beginning that the task of forming either a Congress, or a " Con- ference " as some wanted to call it, had always small chance of success.

Lord "Con- ference,"

and the Earl of Malmesbury appear, in this interminable interchanges of despatches, the only two who never lose patience and who kept on hoping against hope. Among all the rest of the diplomatic correspondents a kind of impatience is visible at thus being played with, on the eve of more serious affairs. For while at this period long and unmeaning official notes were gravely handed about between Ambassa- dors and Ministers, an undercurrent of small yet far more important messages was dropping in from other sides into the " Correspondence." Her Majesty's Consul General at Venice reports [March 8] that "some fresh bodies of troops have been poured into the Lombardo-Venetian territory; additions made to the fortifications round Venice, and some new stockaded forts have been erected on some of the islands at the head of the Adriatic." Likewise Vice-Consul Lever at Spezia writes [March 22] that the authorities of that town are enlisting volunteers "for the war with Austria ; a struggle which they assume as certain." Finally, there is a most significant despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus at Vienna [March 31] in which the concluding lines arc, I am free to confess to your Lordship that there is but little confidence felt here, either in the mind of the Sovereign, of the Government, or of the public, in the eventual maintenance of peace. It is generally suspected that the pro- posed negotiations are merely undertaken with a view to gain time." Under the influence then of this suspicion, Austria at length began the war; began it, as ive see from the correspondence, most deliberately. As far back as the beginning of April, Lord Augustus Loftus had a conver- sation with Count Buol, [April 6] in which the latter exclamed, " If war is to be, we prefer to have it now. We cannot endure this continued sus- pense, this continued armed peace which is more prejudicial to the country than war." " On this, the Earl of Malmesbury informs Lord Cowley at Paris, [April 11] that " Her Majesty's Government is under considerable apprehension lest the Cabinet of Vienna should commit it- self by some precipitate act ; " which, indeed, proved to be the case im- mediately after. In a despatch of Count Buol to Count Apponyi, dated April 12, and laid before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs a few days after, we find the official announcement of the intended ultimatum. "The Emperor, our august master, owes it to his dignity and to the safety of his Empire, to put an end to so intolerable a state of things, by him- self undertaking (en prenant lui-meme on main) the question of the dis- armament of Piedmont." The chief effect of this notification on Lord Malmesbury is, that he at once writes to Mr. West, [April 16.] " It seems to her Majesty's Government that the Cabinet of Turin would do well to anticipate the Austrian summons," and the noble Earl at the same date informs Lord Augustus Loftus that "her Majesty's Government see no objection to Austria asking Sardinia to disarm, if the demand is combined with a statement of the offer of Aus- tria to admit the principle of a general disarmament." Thus backed, Austria was evidently ready to throw the gauntlet, when at the last hour en unforeseen circumstance retarded the act for a short while, Piedmont, trembling at the brink of hostilities, gave way. " Since France unites itself with England," wrote Count Cavour, [telegram, April 19] "in demanding from Piedmont previous disarmament, the Government of the King, while foreseeing this measure may have disagreeable con- sequences for the tranquillity of Italy, yet declares itself ready to submit to it. "But this evidently did not suit the intentions of Austria who, as ' "reeent Buol himself declared, preferred an immediate war. In spite, therefore, of the pacific and even humble behaviour of Sardinia, the Kaiser's threatening ultimatum was forwarded to Turin. This stroke was most unexpected even to the French Government. " It has become impos- sible to understand the proceedings of Austria." (C'est d ne plus rien corn- preadre aux facons de faire de l'Aulriche) writes the Duke of Malakoff early on the morning of the 21st of April, from Albert Gate House; add- ing, "Public opinion in England will stigmatize, I hope, the conduct of Austria in this circumstance." The immediate consequence of the ulti- matum was that the Emperor Napoleon sent orders to Toulon the same day, [April 21] to embark all the troops in the south of France, so as to be ready to put to sea for Genoa at a moment's notice. But the British Government, even now, [April 21] "still cherish the hope that Austria may be induced to refer her differences with other powers to the friendly mediation of am impartial and disinterested ally." This hope, it seems, the British Foreign Secretary kept on "cherish- ing," in spite of all facts to the contrary, and even after actual hostilities had broken out. But the "impartial and disinterested ally"

evidently was not understood, or at least not appreciated to his full value, by either party ; for from this point the correspondence of Lord