THE NAVY DEBATE.
THE Navy debate must be regarded as on the whole satisfactory. In the first place it exposed the weak- ness of the advocates of the Little Navy. In truth, their position has become one of extreme absurdity. For the most part they have not the courage to act on the Quaker theory, which they more than half believe in, and to declare that all armaments are wrong and wicked, and that our duty as a nation is to cease spending money upon warlike preparations of any kind, and thus set the world a good example. It is clear that for those who advocate such a coarse there is no halfway house. If the policy of naval and military preparation is condemned as wicked and unchristian, then every penny spent upon the Navy or Army, though only for defence, becomes a folly— nay, a crime. But though there may be a few people willing to talk round such a proposal, there are in fact none, or at any rate none in the House of Commons, who will seriously recommend that it shall be carried into practice. Even the extreme pacificists are willing to vote money for armaments provided that those armaments are what they term non-provocative--i.e., inadequate and there- fore useless. They will tolerate a small Navy which cannot perform its essential work, but not a big Navy or one which can do its work effectively. But if you are not prepared to go the whole hog of Quakerism, and are driven, as you must be, from the position of " We will only have a Navy if it is inadequate," there is no stopping short of the proposition that, if we have a, Navy, it must be adequate—able to do the work of naval defence. This means securing that command of the sea without which, if war comes, we must as a nation be undone, see our Empire oversew destroyed, and our people at home starved to death or into abject submission to the enemy. • The only point at issue, therefore, is, what constitutes a Navy adequate for securing command of the sea—i.e., over- coming the fleet that any single Power or likely combination of Powers can bring against us ? Here we enter a field in which, though we do not say that the expert's voice is the only voice that ought to be heard, that voice is bound to be predominant. The Government, recognising that their business is to provide the nation with an adequate Navy, tell us that after they have taken the very best expert opinion, and with the fullest sense of the responsibilities before them, they have come to the conclusion that a certain increase in ships and men Is essential. The opponents of increased expenditure on armaments tell us in effect that the Government and their expert advisers are wrong, and that the suggested incre- ment in the fleet is unnecessary to secure an adequate Navy. Between these two views the House of Commons and the country have had to judge. Their decision is that the Government, which is responsible, and which has access to the essential facts—i.e. the preparations made by those foreign Governments which challenge our com- mand of the sea—is likely to have formed a better opinion on the problem of adequacy than their critics. Can we doubt that this decision is a wise one ?
There are many arguments which may be used to support it, but there is one only which we shall set forth. It is one which weighs, and we believe ought to weigh, specially with the ordinary citizen. If two solutions are proposed in a vital problem, and that problem is one which a man has not sufficient knowledge to eelve on the technical merits, he ought to consider and compare, the consequences of the proposed solutions. Let us consider the respective consequences of adopt- ing the Government view and the view of the Little Navyites. If the advocates of the Little Navy are right, as of course is conceivable, the consequences of rejecting their advice will be that we shall spend an unnecessary amount of money on ships, guns, armaments, and men. That, no doubt, is a grave consequence, for an unneces- sary expenditure of the national resources is admittedly a most serious evil. Still, it is not one which any sane man can regard as involving absolute ruin to the State. At its worst it is waste. Now, look at the consequences which may flow from rejecting the proposals of the advo- cates of the Big Navy, assuming those proposals to be in fact wrong and the Navy to prove inadequate for its work. The consequences would be utter ruin. We should lose the command of the sea, and then nothing could save us. We must perish, and perish with the bitter thought that had we been wiser and faced the risk of waste rather than the risk of destruction, we might have survived. Who can doubt that, faced with the dilemma of a possible over- insurance and a possible under-insurance, the wise man chooses the risk of being over-insured?
We have written as if there were only two views—that of the Government and that of the Little Navyites. In fact, of course, there is a third view, the view of those—and it is by no means the view of wild and incompetent persons— that the Government proposals err not from being too large, but from being too small. This fact has influenced, and clearly ought to influence, the nation very strongly in supporting the proposals of the Board of Admiralty. In choosing these proposals rather than the proposals of the advocates of the Little Navy, they realise that they are not going as far in the direction of safety as many expert advisers would wish them to go. They are not, that is, " plunging " for a wasteful policy in what may prove a, panic, but, in fact, only choosing the minimum proposals in regard to prudent insurance. For ourselves we will say frankly that we should prefer, in a matter so vital, to see rather more done in the way of adding to our naval force than the Government propose. Our reasons are those which we have often set forth in these columns. We are engaged in competing with Germany for the command of the sea, and it is absolutely vital that we should win in that competition and induce our rivals to give up the game as not worth the candle. Now, in our opinion, the best way and the cheapest way to do this is to make it quite clear to Germany that whatever happens we shall outbuild her and so outstay her in the race. We do not wish to encourage her to strain every nerve by keeping only just ahead of her. We want to put such a distance between us that the German people will realise the im- possibility of ever coming up with us. They should be made to feel that if their object is the command of the sea, as undoubtedly it is, they are throwing their money away.
If we only keep just ahead and make them believe that the effort is so painful to us as to be almost intolerable, we are inciting them to fresh efforts. We are making them say to themselves : " The British are now leading only by a head. Look at their distress, their panting sides and failing breath. A very little more effort and we shall pass them, and then they will never be able to regain the lost ground." If, on the other hand, we make a spurt which will put a whole lap between us and Germany, they must and will feel the sense of discouragement which comes from seeing a competitor shooting ahead, rather than the en- couragement which comes from being almost able to touch the shoulder struggling just in front of you. That what we are saying is founded upon fact and not upon fiction is seen clearly in the history of the last few years. When we have slowed down in the race of shipbuilding and naval preparations, we have always incited Germany to greater efforts. On the other hand, whenever we have spurted there has been a visible tendency on the part of the Germans to ask whether the expense was good enough. It is for this reason that we desire to work up to our full shipbuilding resources rather than depend upon a policy of " nicely calculated less or more "- a policy which will just keep us ahead of Germany, but only just ahead, and thus, as we have said, provoke her to fresh efforts.
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