ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION. B EFORE we leave the subject of naval defence
we desire to say a word on Lord Charles Beresford's speech, for he raised a point of the highest importance. We must never forget that though it is absolutely necessary to build more ships, and better ships, and to give our sailors the advantage of the very best possible mechanical contrivances, that alone will not give us an invincible Navy. It is essential to have the best possible material, but it is equally essential to make the best use of that material. Indeed, unless we make provision for using it properly its value is gone. Now, without being pessimists in regard to Admiralty organisation, and while feeling the greatest possible confidence in our seamen and in the enterprise and splendid training of our naval officers, we do not feel sure that we are making adequate provision for using our fleet to the best possible advantage. Here we come to the essential point. Lord Charles Beresford told the House of Commons that the Admiralty had never had aWar Staff, and that there was not one now. Lord Charles went on to show how we suffered from this fact by pointing to the notorious Memorandum by the First Sea Lord which was published in the polemical work for the destruction of all schemes forcom- pulsory service produced under Mr. Haldane's auspices. Out of Bedlam, said Lord Charles, he had never heard such an extraordinary theory as that set forth in the Memorandum. By this he meant the policy of disposing the fleet round the British Isles in order to prevent invasion. " The old policy had been to sink or destroy enemies, while the new policy was to rub along the shores and send out sub- marines to do the fighting. In other words, they had adopted a. defensive, not an attacking, policy." If Lord Charles is right in this—and we fear there is only too much evidence to show that he is right—then, indeed, of all nations are we most miserable. A policy of defence is probably always wrong, but there can be no doubt that at sea, and for a Power situated as we are, it can mean nothing but ruin. Seek out the enemy's fleets, wherever they are—follow them, if necessary, to the Antipodes—and when you have found them, destroy them. That is the only path of safety for us, let the old women of both sexes at the Admiralty, in the Cabinet, or in the country say and do what they will. Nelson's signal, " Engage the enemy more closely," is nob one which applied merely to the circumstances of a particular battle. It is the essential guarantee of victory. Those who wait to be attacked, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred are beaten before the first shot is fired. If, then, the policy of standing on the defensive and neglecting the old maxims in regard to closing with the enemy, and fighting to a finish, has crept into the Fleet, as Lord Charles Beresford evidently means to imply, and as we fear is the case, then the sooner we get an Admiralty Staff devoted to the work of thinking out such problems and revising and correcting our strategic and tactical intentions, the better. [Lord Charles Beresford's view, we may note, is indirectly confirmed by the prevalent notion that a large secondary armament is not wanted in our battleships, because they will always stand off and pound the enemy to pieces from a great distance The only serious objection that we have ever seen stated to the formation of an Admiralty Staff is that it would deprive the Board of Admiralty of a, certain amount of power, and that it is essential that all power should be vested in their hands. We cannot agree that this will be the result. It is only weak men and weak institutions that are jealous of power after this fashion. The Board of Admiralty are, and must be, absolutely supreme, and the Admiralty Staff could be nothing but their servants engaged in working out particular problems for their final approval. To be afraid of your own servants is a confession of failure. The alternative is for the Board of Admiralty to turn itself into a General Staff. But this is impossible, for it is notorious that the Board is already overweighted with work, and its individual members crushed beneath a vast load of detail. Therefore, for them to undertake work that ought to be done by an Admiralty Staff merely means that the work will not be done at all.
It is possible, of course, that our whole scheme of Admiralty organisation should be altered. It has been suggested, for example, by Sir Cyprian Bridge, that we aught to revert to the old plan of a Board of Admiralty which should deal primarily with the great war problems of strategy and command, and have below them, ar in old days, a Navy Board which should be respon• Bible for producing the material which the Board of Admiralty would use. We are bound to say that this seems to us the true policy in regard to organisation. The Navy Board would never be out of touch with the Board of Admiralty, and would fulfil its requirements, but at the same time the minds of the supreme rulers of the Navy would be left free for the great problem of how to use our fleets to the best advantage. It may be, however, that there are reasons against this proposal which we do not fathom. If so, all we can say is that it is essential that a General Staff should be formed at the Admiralty and should be instructed by the Board of Admiralty to work out the great problems of naval strategy and tactics which have been, we will not say altered, but necessarily very greatly affected, by the most recent developments in ship construction and gunnery. The nation is giving the Admiralty the best possible material. It must insist that the Board shall get the best possible results out of that material.
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