De Gaulle Is An Issue
TM French pronouncements about the future of NATO strike at the whole integrated system of defence upon which the security of the west and the free- dom of mankind depend.' Thus the Foreign Secretary, on Monday, demonstrating that while progress is all very well for septua- genarian French nationalist generals, a British government of the left is resolved to remain steadfastly frozen in the atti- tudes of the cold war. At a time when America, to whom, alone in NATO, the new French initiative represents a direct challenge, has wisely decided to play it cool, Britain, whose every interest lies in fostering an Anglo-French entente, once again prefers to demonstrate her unques- tioning loyalty to Big Brother across the Atlantic by leading the anti-French chorus. The Prime Minister likes to claim that he needs a larger majority so that he can speak for Britain. This would be more convincing if he could first demonstrate that he has, in fact, got anything to say that could not be said a great deal better in Washington.
What de Gaulle has done is not, of course, without its dangers. The brusque and un- necessarily anti-American tone in which he has given notice to withdraw from the NATO integrated defence system, although no doubt deliberately chosen with an eye to the forthcoming elections to the French National Assembly, could help to reinforce isolationist tendencies within America. The more real danger is the effect on the Ger- mans. NATO has been important as a framework for the willing containment of Germany. Any weakening of NATO is likely to lead to renewed demands within Germany for a genuine share in the Western nuclear capability, and to a greater readi- ness in Washington to accede to any such pressure. This must be resisted: German security must remain assured in the last in- stance by the American nuclear guarantee alone, until such time as it can be supple- mented by an Anglo-French guarantee.
But de Gaulle is clearly right in his con- tention that, twenty years on, the old con- cept of NATO is completely out of date. A new and more equal balance of power has grown up between the United States and her European allies, while at the same time relations with Russia have developed , to the point where the threat of a military attack is almost non-existent. Nor is this diagnosis peculiar to the French. Until the General decided to act on it, this was the official policy of the British government, and freely used as the justification for 1 Labour's _devotion to East of Suez, where the real threat was held to lie. What matters now is to exploit the thaw in East-West relations by abandoning the rigid positions of the past and by seeking to achieve a real and lasting détente in Europe involv- ing, ultimately, German reunification.
By giving notice, in advance of his visit to Moscow, of his intention to take a posi- tive step in this direction, de Gaulle has in effect challenged the Russians to make some positive response. Whether they do or do not will almost certainly determine the manner in which the French conduct their forthcoming negotiations with their NATO allies. It could well determine the whole Shape of European politics in the decade ahead.
Meanwhile, the right attitude for Britain is clear. So far from regarding de Gaulle as the devil incarnate, we should welcome a loosening of the structure of the alliance. Nothing is more important for Britain than that she should escape from the suffocating bonds of the unequal Anglo-American 'special relationship' and seek, as a leading member of a united Europe, to regain her independence and her self-respect. So long as we are determined to play deputy world sheriff to the United States, on borrowed equipment financed by borrowed money; so long as we are unwilling to treat the £ as a sovereign currency instead of a short- hand way of referring to $2.8; so long will we remain economically weak and politically impotent; a frustrated satellite of a great nation that no longer needs us.
And if Britain's future lies, instead, as a member of an independent Europe within the alliance, the opportunity to make the most important single step, of joining the EEC, may not be far off. There is no reason to believe that M. Couve de Murville's message on Monday welcoming the possi- bility of British entry to the Community was simply a meaningless gesture. On the contrary, the French initiative in NATO, by throwing Germany—as it must do—in the arms of America, gives France a real reason to want closer and more intimate relations with Britain as a counterweight. By attacking the Government's predictably, hostile reaction to the new French move, by making the real and urgent question of Britain and Europe, NATO and the Atlantic Alliance, a major election issue, Mr. Heath has done the nation a service, and provided the most compelling reason so far for supporting the Tories on March 31.
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