The progress of events in the Crimea might have told
us, if we had not alreedy perceived the truth, not only that we shall need i
an increase of strength for sustaining the war in that quarter, but that we shall have to extend oar defensive counter-attack to other fields, and perhaps even, to the more central parts of Europe. We have signs, this week, that those who have held baok from us are yielding to necessities, and are reluctantly signifying their assent to some approach towards an alliance with the West. Prussia has gone so far—let us thank her I.—as to continue her "negotia- tions," and even publicly to prohibit the Russian loan in the mar- ket of Berlin. The Swedish Court has gone to such lengths as to obtain naval and military grants from the Legislature to sustain neutrality ; while the Government withholds assurances that if neutrality be abandoned 'Sweden will side with the Allies. Austria, it is affirmed, advances in securing the support of other German Governments, Bavaria, included ; and her great military prepara- tions are pointed out as proving that she must mean to continue in a sincere and active alliance with France and England. This assurance was not without force at-one time, but recent events have somewhat altered the relation of Austria to the West- ern Powers. There was sense in the representation that Austria was willing to enter into an alliance offensive and defensiVet and to take an active share in coercive measures against Rusnit, 'but that a - premature step ' of that kind would entail a rapture with Prussia and Germany, whereas with time those states could be brought over. To have had Prussia and the Ger- man States as enemies, would have entailed loss of rela- tive military power, and the Western Governments were willingto grant the time; but it has, now become a question whether the want of the support which Austria professes her willingness to give is not a greater evil. then the possible hostility of certain German Governments. For that hostility would In itself consti- tute another change in the relations of England. Hitherto, as a power maintaining "the. European system;" England has rather stood between the misgOverning Courts and their indignant sub- jects. For want of support from Germany it seems probable that we shall be unable to confine the war within the territories of the power that has provoked it : yet we are not going to yield by ac- cepting the four conditions preliminary as final ; so the war 'must extend. But war in Central Europe will not be only war. • In the ferment, certain arbitrary Governments may have to confront the consequences of their own past crimes and follies in the indig- nation of their subjects ; and those Governments may then regret that they have failed as allies in the day of trial